

fissile materials and technology against unauthorized use. Subsequently, the agreement stipulates a detailed declaration and verification process that specifies timeline requirements. In doing so, the agreement establishes that the IAEA will be responsible for ongoing monitoring and verification. Finally, the agreement contains provisions for special inspections that can be made upon the request of another State Party.

In the discussion period, concerns were raised whether states will have the necessary interpretation capacity to make use of information distributed by the CTBTO. It was also suggested that considering the challenges experienced in seeking nuclear weapon state (NWS) support for an FMCT at the Conference on Disarmament, it might be helpful for middle power countries to attempt to compel the NWS to elaborate an FMCT that they would be willing to support. Dr. Meerburg responded that there is a need for a greater elaboration on the FMCT in order for it to be successful.

Concern was also raised that FMCT proposals do not contain provisions to address clandestine efforts to use or traffic fissile materials. Comments were also made about the ongoing risks posed by HEU in the civilian sector and that middle power states may be able to propose an institutional solution that will diminish the threats and build a norm to reduce future risks.

Mr. Toth closed the discussion by agreeing that although there is much that can be pursued in the future, for the time being it would likely be most productive to establish common ground and work to expand it. Additionally, the United States contributed the most monitoring stations to the CTBT thus it is important to recognize this contribution if middle powers are to effectively engage them in the future.

STEPS TOWARD IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1995 MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTION

For the first time at an Article VI Forum consultation, a session was dedicated to the Middle East Resolution, which was adopted as part of the package at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. **Mr. Jonathan Granoff**, the President of the Global Security Institute (GSI), who chaired the session on *Steps Toward Implementation of the 1995 Middle East Resolution*, noted that there has been “quite a dearth of critical work to clear this high hurdle.”

Dr. Mohamed Shaker, the Vice-Chairman of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, discussed the history of proposals to rid the region of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). He said the international reaction to the WMD-free zone proposal was “lukewarm” when Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak raised it in 1990 in response to the nuclear weapons program of Iraq. Despite this reaction, that proposal has become a focal point of discussions. The initiative centered on three points: all WMD should be prohibited; all states in the region, without exception, should make equal and reciprocal commitments in this regard; and a zone should include verification measures to assure full compliance.

Dr. Shaker, who was the President of the 1985 NPT Review Conference, also discussed the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) talks held within the Middle East Peace Process held between 1991-1994. While that group made progress on confidence-building measures (CBMs), the initiative failed to persuade Israel to discuss the nuclear issue openly, he said.



Dr. Emily Landau

More recently, a committee of the Arab League has been negotiating a draft treaty on the establishment of a Middle East WMD-free zone. At its last ministerial meeting in March, the League reached a standstill, though it took several important decisions, including:

- a call for an emergency ministerial meeting of the League to discuss the creation of a mechanism to establish such a zone and to implement the 1995 resolution. The mechanism would then be put before the international community;
- a decision to suspend its technical committee discussing a WMD-free zone treaty until the different foreign factors have been clearly defined and assessed;
- a yet-to-be-drafted message to three depository governments of NPT concerning this issue and others pertaining to NPT. These three depository governments—the US, UK and Russia—were the ones responsible for the 1995 Resolution.



Ms. Merav Datan and Dr. Mohamed Shaker

goal of a Middle East WMD-free zone.

Dr. Shaker argued for greater international involvement on this issue, especially since the Arab League’s technical committee has been suspended. In addition, there has been “a slight opening” among Israeli scholars to discuss the issue, a development that must be seized by the international community to advance the

Dr. Shaker also suggested that the two processes—seeking a nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ) as well as a WMDFZ—should proceed simultaneously with the peace process. He cited the first operative paragraph of the 1995 Resolution, which articulates the link between the peace process and the establishment of a WMD-free zone. He urged Israel not to prevent such parallel discussions, so that when both issues are ripe for movement, progress can move on all fronts.

Dr. Emily Landau, the Director of Arms Control and Regional Security Project at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, argued that weapons should be evaluated in their regional context, taking into account “the full spectrum of relations, interactions and other modes of state behavior that make up the regional interstate framework.” She asserted that disarmament goals in the region cannot be effectively approached or even understood outside this context of interstate interactions.

She rejected Amb. Choi’s framing of enlightened national interest as an opposing binary to national self-interest. “It is not a question of narrow self-interest of states to hold WMD versus a collective interest in disarmament,” she stated. Such a view is a “superficial” and “even (a) potentially misleading characterization of the situation.” Instead, Dr. Landau argued we think about a Middle East WMD-free zone as a process which takes into consideration both armaments and behavior, and in particular interstate relations. Such a process-oriented approach “allows us to tackle the context of interest, concerns and regional relations within which WMD are developed, and to focus on possible creation of rules of the game for engagement and, hopefully, peaceful coexistence.”

While recognizing the NPT as an important norm, Dr. Landau argued that discussions on the Middle East in the NPT framework do not address “real security concerns,” but rather focuses too much on the elimination of a category of weapons. This focus assumes that such elimination is the overriding interest of states when, in reality, the relationship between weapons and security is more complex; simply eliminating a category of weapons would not necessarily bring security and peace to all regions.

Any discussion of nuclear weapons must also recognize the prestige and perceived power that is associated with a nuclear program. The NWS themselves “seem to have no intention of completely giving up their arsenals.” She also cited a recent statement by an Egyptian parliamentarian, who commented that a nuclear program is what makes a country strong.

Since weapons are developed to compensate for feelings of insecurity, Dr. Landau urged that major emphasis of WMD discussions must seek to lower the intensity of perceived threats and to improve interstate relations. Any initiative that fails to do so “is bound to come up short,” she insisted.

Within Israel, its nuclear program is most often referred to as an “insurance policy” ensuring the state’s very existence. She argued that Israel’s unique ambiguity policy serves this rationale very well. However, Israelis perceive this policy quite differently than do others, she said. Israel regards its low nuclear profile as “an important manifestation of restraint,” while Arab states view their ambiguity as a major problem that detracts from confidence building measures. Such polar assessments must be addressed in clear and stark terms amongst all parties.

While noting the utility of the ACRS initiatives, they gradually lost steam “because nothing was happening on the official level.” Upon the start of the second intifada, the discussions moved away from regional security and focused narrowly on the Israeli/Palestinian issue, she said.

More states in the region are now considering nuclear programs. Iran, she stated, is “no doubt the motivating factor” for these contemplated programs. Therefore, ensuring all nations in the region are included in Middle East WMD-free zone discussions “may be a very important step forward to initiating dialogue down the road.”



Mr. Jonathan Granoff

Ms. Merav Datan, Political Advisor of Greenpeace International on the Mediterranean and Middle East, highlighted the particularities of the Middle East context. First, only in the Middle East is a NWFZ linked with a larger WMD-free zone. Second, the Middle East has the largest percentage of states not party to any one of the main WMD treaties. Thirdly, the Mideast is a region where WMD have in the past been used. Therefore, she said, such a zone is not only more of a challenge in this region, but also more relevant and important.

Ms. Datan said the current deadlock on negotiations towards a WMD-free zone in the Middle East is a direct result of substantively different starting positions, with the Arab states maintaining that Israel’s nuclear capabilities are destabilizing and therefore must be addressed as a precondition to peace and security in the region; meanwhile Israel says peaceful relations and reconciliation are preconditions for creating a zone. “But these polar opposite positions – nuclear first or Nirvana first – can be overcome if the states involved accept that everything needs to be put on the table,” she said, “It is not possible to discuss regional peace without addressing the nuclear issue, and that the nuclear issue cannot be dealt with in isolation, outside the context of a comprehensive regional solution.” To this end, interim measures that might help lay the groundwork for eventual realization of UN resolutions, NPT commitments, and security aspects of the regional peace process.

Ms. Datan walked the issue back a step, arguing that because of the “inherently dual-use nature of nuclear technology” and because of the suspicion and proliferation concerns that all nuclear programs generate, Greenpeace believes that a fully nuclear free zone is an essential element of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. Such a zone will also require parallel progress on biological and chemical weapons disarmament through the existing treaties that deal with these two categories of weapons.

On the question of more openness within Israel to discuss the nuclear program, she concluded that the issue is a strangely operating taboo that is not absolute. Those with connections to the program remain silent, and the freedom granted to those who do talk is predicated on their ignorance and their reliance on foreign sources; only conjecture is permitted.

Ms. Datan agreed with recommendation 12 of the report of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, which found that, despite the challenges of the region, some steps can be taken now. That recommendation deals with confidence-building measures on “sensitive fuel cycle activities.” She also cited the report of the UN Advisory Board on Disarmament, which observed that potential new NWFZs could benefit from the good offices of the Secretary-General and others.

The majority of responses during the comment period were from delegates of Middle East states who argued that peace and stability concerns had to be addressed comprehensively, including immediate consideration of nuclear issues. One participant said comprehensive peace would not be possible without “stable, acceptable and symmetric security structures.” A NWFZ would be at the heart of such a security structure, he said, therefore the process of establishing a zone must start ahead of the peace process. Another delegate said balance was needed among the three pillars of the NPT, the responsibilities of the NWS, and regional initiatives (Northeast Asia, South Asia and the Middle East). He added that the ACRS process stalled because Israel refused to move beyond confidence-building measures toward disarmament deliberations. Therefore without a firm disarmament commitment while “waiting for the pieces to fall into place,” discussion of a zone is “counterproductive.”

One participant – a delegate not from the Middle East - commented on “the pretentiousness of uniqueness,” and rejected claims of the Middle East’s unique status as a kind of exception against the whole set of norms that comprise international law. He argued that it is in the interest of all states to have an international environment regulated by norms and laws. One state should not view its security and existence as reliant on policies of power, but rather we must understand that we live in an environment of relative security.



Mr. Garry Jacobs (International Center for Peace and Development), Rev. Masamichi Kamiya (Rissho Kosei-kai), Mr. Bruce Roth (Author)

Mr. Granoff closed noting that reframing nuclear weapons threats in a global context is both accurate and an effective way of bringing international cooperation to bear in addressing the Middle East challenge. “When we put before people the proposition that their lives and all lives on the planet are in danger, collectively, and that our fates are intertwined in new ways, regardless of our national identity, our religious identity, our racial identity, that our lives are collectively threatened, then people everywhere are able to start to think creatively and positively.”