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Arms control is not new. At the Second Lateran Council, which was convened in 1139 A.D., Pope Innocent II outlawed the crossbow, declaring it to be “hateful to God and unfit for Christians.” The crossbow was later overtaken in effectiveness by the English longbow. The crossbow and the longbow were then eclipsed by the destructive firepower of the cannon. The Church also banned the rifle when it appeared, but military technology continued to develop over the centuries, and diplomacy and arms control efforts could not keep pace. However, the relationship between weapons technology and the requirement for arms control changed forever with the advent of the atomic bomb in 1945. Now, for the first time, humanity possessed a weapon with which it could destroy itself.

During the Cold War and thereafter, the United States built some 70,000 nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union around 55,000, and at the peak the United States had 32,500 weapons in its stockpile, the Soviet Union some 45,000. And there was a perceived risk that these weapons might simply spread all over the world. During the Kennedy Administration there were predictions that there could be in the range of two dozen nuclear weapon states, with nuclear weapons integrated into their national arsenals by the end of the 1970’s. President Kennedy in response to a reporter’s question in March of 1963 said “...personally I am haunted by the feeling that by 1970...there may be 10 nuclear powers instead of 4, and by 1975, 15 or 20... I regard that as the greatest possible danger and hazard.”

If such anticipated proliferation had in fact happened, there could indeed be significantly more than two dozen nuclear weapon states in the world today. Mohamed El Baradei, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, expressed this concern in 2004 when in a speech in Washington DC, he said, “The danger is so imminent...not only with regard to countries acquiring nuclear weapons but also terrorists getting their hands on some of these nuclear materials- uranium or

plutonium.” Director General El Baradei said in another speech around the same time that more than 40 countries now have the capability to build nuclear weapons. Thus, under such circumstances with this many nuclear weapon states, potentially every significant conflict could have brought with it the risk of going nuclear, and it might have become extremely difficult to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorist organizations, they would have been so widespread.

However, the nuclear weapon proliferation so rightly feared by President Kennedy did not happen. Indeed since 1970 and the entry into force of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), at least until now, there has been very little nuclear weapon proliferation. In addition to the five nuclear weapon states recognized by the NPT- the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China, three states, India, Pakistan and Israel and perhaps North Korea have built nuclear weapon arsenals- but India and Israel were already well along in 1970. This is far from what President Kennedy feared.

But the success of the NPT was no accident. It was rooted in a carefully crafted central bargain. In exchange for a commitment from the non nuclear weapon states (today more than 180 nations, most of the world) not to acquire nuclear weapons and to submit to international safeguards to verify compliance with this commitment, the NPT nuclear weapon states pledged unfettered access to peaceful nuclear technologies and undertook to engage in nuclear disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear arsenals. It is this basic bargain that for the last three decades has formed the central underpinnings of the international non proliferation regime. A very important part of the basic bargain was the undertaking by the nuclear weapon states, primarily the United States and the Soviet Union, to drastically reduce their nuclear arsenals.

The NPT is a strategic international political bargain, it is not a gift from the non-nuclear weapon states. But few today deny that the NPT is in crisis. The nuclear weapon states have never truly lived up to their nuclear disarmament obligations contained in their side of the basic bargain. And now the other side of the basic bargain is beginning to come apart with North Korea’s quest to become a nuclear weapon state and the nuclear weapon program in Iran conducted under the guise of a peaceful program, both perhaps influenced by the expanding nuclear weapon arsenals in India and Pakistan. The question is how long can it remain viable as an unbalanced treaty with one-half of its basic strategic bargain unrealized and the other half unraveling. It is true that the norm of nonproliferation runs deep after forty years. It may be that the NPT can limp along for some years with only limited further proliferation or maybe not. It may be that the world community is on the verge of a new wave of

proliferation, there are a number of experts who think so, and it will take a strong NPT regime to prevent it. But also it will take close U.S.-Russian cooperation to prevent further nuclear weapon proliferation. Our relationship with Russia is the most important international state to state relationship that we have. We must take care to try to understand the way Russia sees the world and not drive the one state essential to the U.S. objective of a peaceful and stable 21<sup>st</sup> Century into a corner.

Indeed essential to success in reviving and strengthening the NPT is a U.S.-Russia relationship that permits extensive cooperation toward this goal, yet we remain in a partial Cold War situation. Senator Sam Nunn in an article in the Financial Times in December 2004 pointed to the serious danger that exists as a result of the fact that many years after the end of the Cold War the United States and Russia still maintain, on fifteen minutes alert, long range strategic missiles equipped with immensely powerful nuclear warheads capable of devastating each other's societies in thirty minutes. Senator Nunn said in his article that then current United States nuclear weapon policies (which have not essentially changed in this regard) which in effect rely on the deteriorating Russian early warning system continuing to make correct judgments as it did during the Cold War "risks an Armageddon of our own making."

If it is a correct judgment that the world may be moving toward the beginning of a new wave of proliferation and that United States-Russia close cooperation is vital to prevent this from happening, it should be recognized that some experts believe such cooperation is not possible at this time. Underlying Russian anxieties and resentments could be too great to expect this to happen in the near future. President Putin was the first world leader to call President Bush and against the advice of some advisors he agreed to open Russian bases in Central Asia on a temporary basis to American forces and provide heavy logistical support to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan to ease the American burden. A Russian official might say "and what did we get for this?" An American desire to keep the bases permanently; U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, considered integral to strategic stability by Russia, as well as proposed deployment of U.S. missile defenses near the Russian border; refusal to make the 2002 Treaty of Moscow a real Treaty rather than just an exchange of statements much to President Putin's embarrassment; NATO expansion into the Baltics; Western efforts to pull Ukraine into NATO apparently against the wishes of a majority of its population thereby challenging core Russian security interests; and the invasion of Iraq over strong Russian objections. It is noteworthy that should Ukraine become part of NATO, the Russian leased base at Sevastopol, home to its Black Sea fleet, would be within NATO territory, further threatening Russian security and being sort of a super Guantanamo in reverse.

And then there was the war last summer between Russia and Georgia and the subsequent putting aside by the United States of the U.S.-Russia Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation which has been many years in development and was nearly complete. After the United States, the Russian Federation is the world's most advanced nuclear state, it is remarkable that the United States has no agreement with Russia permitting nuclear cooperation and commerce.

And while the war last summer was portrayed in the Western media as an act of naked Russian aggression another side of the conflict has emerged. The dominant initial story was that a resurgent Russia had without provocation launched the attack- or perhaps set a trap for Georgia to shoot first and then begin a major onslaught. The objective of the Russian aggressor it was said was to crush a small, peaceful state that had been liberated from the Soviet Union and had simply been trying to build a Western democracy. Slowly, later another story emerged of a Georgian leadership seeking by a fast maneuver to achieve a de facto integration of Ossetia that years of negotiation had failed to achieve and that violated a long-standing cease fire. This matter has had a significant impact on how the world views Russia, but the full truth has perhaps still not yet emerged, it may perhaps lie somewhere between these two narratives.

So in considering further NATO expansion to include Ukraine and Georgia, this issue must also be viewed in the light of U.S.-Russia relations and the long term United States national security interest. The well being of the people of Ukraine and Georgia is highly important and of great interest to the United States but so is reducing worldwide nuclear dangers and the achievement of a peaceful and stable 21<sup>st</sup> Century world. Gaining the requisite Russian cooperation should be one of our top objectives.

The START process is an important part of the NPT bargain, deeply significant for the U.S.-Russia relationship and for world peace and security. The United States and Russia together possess 95 percent of the nuclear weapons in the world. During the Cold War, the strategic nuclear arms limitation and later reduction process was the primary means of communication between the two thermonuclear antagonists. Outside events, no matter how significant, such as the U.S. B-52 bombing of Hanoi during the Vietnam War when the Russian premier was visiting that city, was never allowed to interfere with this process.

The Reykjavik Summit between President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev established the principle of intrusive on-site inspection to verify arms control agreements. Among other positive developments, this opened the door to the conclusion of the Strategic Arms

Reduction and Limitation Treaty, the START Treaty, some five years later. This Treaty reduced the strategic nuclear armaments of the two Parties to 6,000 warheads for each Party attributed to strategic nuclear weapon systems: nuclear armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs); strategic bombers; and long range cruise missiles. The START Treaty entered into force in December 1994 after each party had completed the requisite on-site verifiable reductions to reach the level of 6,000 strategic weapons. These reductions in nuclear weapons were accomplished pursuant to an extremely elaborate and highly intrusive verification system which ran into some 250 pages of treaty text and was a truly major achievement of U.S.-Russian cooperation. The Treaty was drafted to last for 15 years, after which it could be extended by an exchange of notes of the parties for a five year period and thereafter for successive five year periods. The Treaty was negotiated with the Soviet Union and signed shortly before the dissolution of the USSR. Pursuant to the so-called Lisbon Protocol to the Treaty negotiated in the spring of 1992, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Russia assumed the obligations of the USSR under the START Treaty and by means of accompanying letters the first three states recognized that Russia was the successor nuclear state to the USSR, while they agreed to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states. However, there is one document associated with the START Treaty which should be noted in this discussion today. On June 13, 1991, prior to the conclusion of the negotiation and signature of the treaty on July 31, 1991, the Soviet Union negotiator read a statement to the U.S. negotiator which said in part "This Treaty may be effective and viable only under conditions of compliance with the [ABM Treaty]."

The START Treaty was followed by a second START Treaty in 1993 which would have reduced the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons for the United States and Russia to 3,000 to 3,500 each. Again the Russians made clear in the negotiations that their adherence to START II- which among other things eliminated heavy ICBMs and ICBMs with MIRVs, the area of greatest Russian strength- depended on the ABM Treaty remaining in force. The United States ratified START II in 1994, the Treaty was amended to change the time lines for the reductions in 1997 and the Russians ratified in 2000. The amendments required a second U.S. ratification which never happened. And when the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002, the Russians withdrew their ratification of START II and this Treaty vanished into history. Russian President Medvedev on June 21 in a statement released in Moscow asserted that for the replacement START Treaty to be concluded the United States could not go ahead with its plan to deploy an ABM system in Poland and Czechoslovakia. In any case he said "...the issue of the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive weapons should be clearly laid out in the Treaty."

Thus, the START Treaty could be extended for five years by a simple exchange of notes of the Parties, nothing more. However the parties do not want to do a simple extension. The limit of 6,000 strategic weapons for each Party still stands as START II did not come into force and the 2002 Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions did not call for actual reductions in weapons but only removal from operational status by the end of 2012. The Parties intend to lower the 6,000 weapon limitation number to perhaps 1,500, effective upon entry into force of a new START Treaty.

The START II Treaty since it would have legislated reductions well below the 6,000 START I level expanded the use of the so called “down loading” concept which requires elaborate and special verification. This concept was first introduced in a more limited way in the current START Treaty. In previous agreements in order to ease the task of verification, various strategic nuclear missile systems were assigned a certain number of warheads based on the maximum number of warheads with which a particular ICBM or SLBM had ever been tested. The downloading concept permits a number of warheads to be attributed to a particular missile system based on the number of warheads actually deployed with that missile system, rather than the maximum number with which that missile had been tested. Since the 1,500 weapon limitation level is significantly even below the START II level the existing START counting rules likely should be significantly modified even beyond the rules in the START II Treaty. This could require in turn important modifications in the existing START verification system.

To achieve these changes in a completed treaty probably will take complicated negotiations which one could perhaps hope to be completed by the end of this year. However, since the new Treaty would require ratification by the United States Senate, entry into force would not be anticipated before the spring, thus the existing Treaty will need to be extended in December to provide the time needed to achieve entry into force. And it may be that to achieve this Treaty and certainly to go beyond, Russia must believe that there will be more NATO expansion under foreseeable circumstances and that U.S. anti-ballistic missile systems will not be deployed in Eastern Europe.

In Prague, President Obama said: “To reduce our warheads and stockpiles, we will negotiate a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with the Russians this year. President Medvedev and I began this process in London, and will seek a new agreement by the end of this year that is legally binding and sufficiently bold. And this will set the stage for further cuts, and we will seek to include all nuclear weapons states in this endeavor.”

But a new level of 1,500 strategic weapons almost certainly will not “set the stage” for further reductions in nuclear weapons which will “include all nuclear weapon states,” as each of the other nuclear weapon states, roughly speaking, have less than 500 total nuclear weapons. The replacement START Treaty being negotiated will not address reserve nuclear weapons of the two parties which number in the several thousands. Likely these weapons will also have to be drastically reduced, as well as the quite large number of Russian tactical nuclear weapons along with the far smaller U.S. tactical stockpile, for multilateral nuclear weapon negotiations to take place. Probably, the U.S. and Russia, will have to achieve a level of 1000 total nuclear weapons before multilateral nuclear weapon negotiations could begin. Thus, a number of years of the bi-lateral START process may lie ahead before the next stage can be approached.

But if the objective of zero nuclear weapons is ever to be seriously contemplated, as advocated by the four statesmen, former Secretaries of State George Schultz and Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of Defense William Perry and former Senator Sam Nunn, this multilateral phase must begin in the reasonably near future. It also will be immensely difficult, as it must involve not only the United States and Russia along with Britain, France and China, but also India, Pakistan and Israel. The program in North Korea would be eliminated. So a very long road lies ahead and we must proceed because time is not on our side.

If the United States can satisfy Russian concerns, a practical partnership between the United States and the Russian Federation for the short term to strengthen the NPT and to reach a follow-on START Treaty and perhaps a few steps beyond likely will be possible. But to be partners for the long term, to together lead the world towards zero nuclear weapons, more will be required. But who can say that in the further off future this cannot happen. In 1861 Czar Alexander, the “reform tsar,” directed that a vast program of judicial and legal reform be introduced into Russia and it became law in 1864. While the following U.S. statement is in the category of “might have been,” hopefully Alexander’s example will guide today’s Russian leaders as President Lincoln’s vision has inspired generations of Americans.

Czar Alexander’s 1861 directive caused Lincoln’s Secretary of State William Seward to write the following to his Charge d’Affairs in St. Petersburg in 1862:

“The Decree of the Emperor which establishes an independent and impartial judiciary...is calculated to command the approval of mankind. It seems to secure to Russia the benefits without the calamities of

revolution...Constitutional nations which heretofore have regarded the friendship between Russia and the United States as wanting a foundation in common principles and sentiments, must hereafter admit that this relation is as natural in its character as it is auspicious to both countries in its results..."