

Report of the Informal Group on RGAP 88

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INFORMAL GROUP

ON


PRIME MINISTER  
RAJIV GANDHI'S ACTION PLAN

FOR A  
NUCLEAR-WEAPONS-FREE

AND  
NONVIOLENT WORLD ORDER 1988  
(RGAP 88)

New Delhi  
20 August 2011





**Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi,**  
Third Special Session on Disarmament  
UN General Assembly, 9 June 1988

**The essential features of the Action Plan are:**

*“First, there should be a binding commitment by all nations to eliminating nuclear weapons, in stages, by the year 2010 at the latest. Secondly, all nuclear-weapon States must participate in the process of nuclear disarmament. All other countries must also be part of the process. Thirdly, to demonstrate good faith and build the required confidence, there must be tangible progress at each stage towards the common goal. Fourthly, changes are required in doctrines, policies and institutions to sustain a world free of nuclear weapons. Negotiations should be undertaken to establish a comprehensive global security system under the aegis of the United Nations.”*



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## PREFACE

On 20 October 2010, the National Security Adviser (NSA) informed Shri Mani Shankar Aiyar, MP (RS), who had proceeded to New York as India's Representative to the UN's First Committee on Disarmament, then in session, that the Prime Minister had decided to constitute an informal group to consider how best the ideas contained in the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free and Nonviolent World Order (RGAP 88) could best be carried forward.

2. After further consultations between NSA and Shri Aiyar, the Group was constituted as follows:

Shri Mani Shankar Aiyar, IFS (retd), former Joint Secretary, PMO and former  
Union Minister, now MP (RS) – Chairman

Members (in alphabetic order):

- i. Prof Amitabh Mattoo, then at Jawaharlal Nehru University, now Director,  
Australia-India Institute, University of Melbourne, Australia
- ii. Dr. Arvind Gupta, IFS, Lal Bahadur Shastri Chair,  
Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi
- iii. Cdr. C. Uday Bhaskar (retd), National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi \*
- iv. Dr. Manpreet Sethi, Senior Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies,  
New Delhi
- v. Ambassador Satish Chandra, IFS (retd), former Permanent Representative to the  
UN Offices, Geneva, and Deputy National Security Adviser, now Distinguished  
Fellow, Vivekananda International Foundation, New Delhi
- vi. Ambassador Saurabh Kumar, IFS (retd.), former Permanent Representative to  
the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, now Visiting Professor, National  
Institute of Advanced Studies, IISc Campus, Bengaluru
- vii. Shri Siddharth Varadarajan, now Editor, *The Hindu*

\* Subsequently, at the personal request of Cdr. Uday Bhaskar, he was replaced, in consultation with NSA, by Admiral L. Ramdas, former Chief of Naval Staff, now resident in Alibaug, Maharashtra.

3. The Group held 9 meetings between 22 December 2010 and 30 July 2011. Minutes of the meetings may be seen at Annexe VII.

4. The Group was privileged to receive evidence from:

- i. Prof Muchkund Dubey, IFS (retired), Additional Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs at the time of the formulation and presentation of RGAP 88, later Foreign Secretary, now President, Council for Social Development, New Delhi
- ii. Ambassador C.R. Gharekhan, IFS (retired), former Joint Secretary, PMO, Permanent Representative to the UN at the time of the presentation of RGAP 88 to the Third Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly, now Director General of the Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, New Delhi
- iii. Ambassador Ronen Sen, IFS (retired), former Joint Secretary, PMO at the time of the preparation of RGAP 88 and subsequently Ambassador of India in Moscow, Berlin and Washington, DC, besides High Commissioner of India, London
- iv. Hon. Douglas Roche, OC, Senator (retired), now with the Middle Powers Initiative, Chairman, First Committee in the year of presentation of RGAP 88 and Ambassador of Canada for Disarmament Affairs
- v. Mr. Jonathan Granoff, President, Global Security Institute, Washington, DC and Middle Powers Initiative
- vi. Mr. Alyn Ware, Global Coordinator, Parliamentarians for Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament
- vii. Dr. Vipin Narang, Asst Prof of Strategic Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass., USA

5. The Group divided the work of drafting different chapters of the Report among its Members, but finalized the drafts after mutual consultation, so that the Group as a whole takes collegiate responsibility for the Report and its Recommendations. The Chairman wishes to thank each of the Members for the immense contribution they have made to individual chapters of the Report as also to the Group as a whole for the consensus reached.



6. Invaluable assistance was rendered to the Group by its Honorary Adviser, Dr. Vidya Shankar Aiyar, formerly of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Channel NewsAsia and CNN IBN, who kept all the minutes, networked over the Internet with Members of the Group, sorted out various administrative problems and personally contributed to individual chapters as well as the drafting of the Report as a whole.

7. The Chairman wishes to place on record the Group's deep gratitude to the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses for the logistical assistance rendered and to the Ministry of External Affairs, in particular, Shri Venkatesh Verma, Joint Secretary (DISA) for helping resolve various administrative issues. However, the Group alone is responsible for the Report and its Recommendations.


8. The Honorary Adviser was assisted by a team of volunteers comprising Shri Dominic K and Smt Seema Nayyar, and by a team of staff comprising Shri N.K. Bagga, Kumari Mahua Chowdhury, Shri Farukh Khan and Shri Sheshnath Pandey. To all of them the Chairman, in particular, and the Group as a whole owes its grateful thanks.

9. This Report is presented to Government on the 67th birth anniversary of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in tribute to his Action Plan which retains its vitality and relevance an amazing 23 years after it was first presented to the world in the hope that wisdom will dawn on the international community to recognize the indispensability of the key ideas contained in RGAP 88 to ensure the survival of humankind and our Planet Earth by eliminating the scourge of nuclear weapons and anchoring the world order in the sacred principles of Nonviolence.




**(Mani Shankar Aiyar)**

**Chairman**



**(Prof. Amitabh Mattoo)**



**(Dr. Arvind Gupta)**



**(Admiral L. Ramdas)**



**(Dr. Manpreet Sethi)**



**(Ambassador Satish Chandra)**



**(Ambassador Saurabh Kumar)**



**(Shri Siddharth Varadarajan)**



**(Dr. Vidya Shankar Aiyar)**

**Hon Adviser**

## CHAPTER I

### OVERVIEW

India is now a State with Nuclear Weapons (SNW)<sup>1</sup>. Further, it has affirmed its intention to maintain a credible minimum nuclear deterrent.

1.2 How does this affect the Action Plan for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free and Nonviolent World Order submitted by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to the Third Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly at New York on 9 June 1988<sup>2</sup>?

1.3 Is India as an SNW better or worse placed than it was before becoming an SNW to persuade others, particularly NWS, other SNW and near-SNW, to move in the direction of a world without nuclear weapons? On the other hand, do India's national security considerations require the country to adopt a low profile in regard to contentious issues of nuclear disarmament? Indeed, would it be more in keeping with broader foreign policy objectives for India as an SNW to align its position on nuclear disarmament with the NWS rather than be in the forefront of pressing for nuclear disarmament? Or now that India has successfully ended the apartheid in international civil nuclear commerce, while retaining the unfettered right to take sovereign decisions on the military applications of its nuclear technology, should India champion and carry forward the basic ideas contained in RGAP 88, which have largely and in all essential respects, stood the test of time? Does India as an SNW retain the moral standing to resume a vanguard role in the worldwide campaign for nuclear disarmament? What further diplomatic or other action needs to be taken in regard to the 7-point Working Paper (WP 06) circulated by India<sup>3</sup> in the First (Disarmament) Committee of the UN General Assembly in 2006 and subsequently at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva? In this regard, what strategic

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<sup>1</sup> In the current jargon, a Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) is one so recognized in the 1967 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), whereas a State that declares itself to be in possession of nuclear weapons but has not been recognized as such in the NPT is called a State with Nuclear Weapons (SNW).

<sup>2</sup> See Annexes I and II of this Report respectively for the text of the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan (hereinafter usually called RGAP or RGAP 88) and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's Address on the occasion of presenting the Action Plan to the United Nations General Assembly's Third Special Session on Disarmament (often known by the acronym SSOD-III).

<sup>3</sup> For details of the Working Paper 06, see *Annexe III*.

objectives and tactical steps would be best suited to enable our diplomacy to secure over time a broad international consensus involving all concerned on this complicated issue which involves both national security considerations, including India's own security, and an appreciation of international security imperatives? And what factors in the present international climate are favourable to such an exercise and what factors might militate against it? In short, can we overcome – and, if so, how?

1.4 After having studied these issues in some detail, and interacted with a wide cross-section of national and international experts<sup>4</sup>, the Informal Group have arrived at the firm conviction, for the reasons set out in the Report, that India can and must play an effective and credible role as the leader of a campaign for the goal of universal nuclear disarmament, both because India can bring to the campaign its moral strength deriving from six decades of consistently campaigning for nuclear disarmament but also now the weight of its growing presence in the international system. Moreover, an SNW leading a serious campaign for universal disarmament would be perhaps unique, and certainly unprecedented, thus lending tremendous credibility to the movement and increasing India's own standing within the larger international community. The world and India need a security architecture that is not dependent on nuclear weapons, but neither can get it except in a world without nuclear weapons.

1.5 More than any other country, perhaps, India has understood this since the day the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima; over the 66 years since then, India has been steadfast and consistent in championing the cause of a world without nuclear weapons irrespective of changes of government or changes in regional and global security conditions. The details of this consistency are spelt out in the next chapter: "India and Nuclear Disarmament: Six Decades of Consistency". This adherence over 66 years and many changes of government and national leadership to the goal of universal, non-discriminatory, time-bound, verifiable and phased disarmament, commencing with nuclear disarmament, and anchored in a world order founded in Nonviolence, and espoused in the 23-year old RGAP 88, as updated by WP 06, may be summed up as follows:

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<sup>4</sup> Please see Minutes of meetings reproduced at Annexes VII.

- This was the goal sought for the 27 years between 1947 and 1974 when India had not undertaken any nuclear tests.
- It remained so after the first series of tests at Pokharan in 1974 which established India as a threshold NWS.
- And it has remained so since India became a State with Nuclear Weapons (SNW) in 1998.

1.6 This unwavering national consensus on the external dimension of India's nuclear policy, whichever the party in power or whatever the national security posture, places a moral and global obligation on the country, especially at this juncture when the climate of world opinion is more favourable than ever before, to restore India to its rightful place in the vanguard, the forefront, the leadership of the increasingly galvanized global movement for nuclear disarmament.

1.7 The Group is not unmindful of the many hurdles on the way to achieving this goal. Nor is the Group unaware that many of the favourable factors are hedged with conditionalities, ifs and buts. The Group is particularly conscious of the threat of nuclear terror and the sad fact that India is perhaps more vulnerable to the threat of nuclear conflict and nuclear terror than any other country in the world. Yet, the balance of considerations has persuaded the Group that it is in a world without nuclear weapons that India and the world will best find true security.

1.8 This Report spells out all the factors that have led the Group to its conclusions and the Recommendations on the Way Forward that it makes to the Government of India.

## **RECENT DEVELOPMENTS**

1.9 Testimony led before the Group by some of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's closest foreign policy aides indicates that there was little expectation in 1988 that the international community would seriously consider the Action Plan<sup>5</sup>. There was also curiously little bilateral or multilateral diplomatic action taken to canvass support and carry forward the Action Plan in

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<sup>5</sup> See the Minutes of the Group's meetings at Annexes VII, especially meetings 4 and 6.

the 18 months that fell between the presentation of the Plan and the Prime Minister demitting office in December 1989. Of course, as far as his public statements were concerned, there were frequent and repeated references to the Action Plan, notably at the Nehru Centenary international conference convened in Delhi in November 1988 and at the Tenth Nonaligned Summit in Belgrade in September 1989, as also on other occasions, including the Nehru Memorial Centenary lecture on 13 November 1989, which turned out to be his last major statement as Prime Minister.

1.10 This is pointed out here because there are many possible explanations for the timing of the Action Plan that are relevant to our present consideration of the reasons for taking forward the ideas contained in the Action Plan in the present international context.

1.11 For **one**, it was the logical culmination of the leadership role India had played, since its early beginnings when Smt Indira Gandhi was PM, of the Six Nation-Five Continent Initiative that was at that time the single most concerted international effort to thwart the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war between, or at the instigation of, the two super-powers, given that the rhetoric of confrontation had at the time reached a high pitch.

1.12 **Second**, President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev of the Soviet Union abandoning a fundamental principle of Marxism-Leninism to subscribe to the doctrine of Nonviolence in the Delhi Declaration of November 1986 was a powerful incentive to promote a new international order anchored in Gandhian principles and philosophy.

1.13 **Third**, Reykjavik, INF and the commencement of the START negotiations had focused international public attention on issues of disarmament.

1.14 **Fourth**, perhaps crucially, Pakistan, through A.Q. Khan's now infamous interview to Kuldip Nayyar in 1987, had deliberately revealed how far down the path to going nuclear Pakistan had gone. India needed to make a last pitch for NWS to initiate a programme of time-bound nuclear disarmament if the South Asian sub-continent were to be kept free of

nuclear weapons. The NWS did not heed Rajiv Gandhi's clear warning in his address to the UN General Assembly Third Special Session on Disarmament:

There is another danger that is even worse. Left to ourselves, we would not want to touch nuclear weapons. But when, in the passing play of great power rivalries, tactical considerations are allowed to take precedence over the imperatives of nuclear non-proliferation, with what leeway are we left?<sup>6</sup>

1.15 Perhaps inexorably, India became an SNW (a State with Nuclear Weapons) almost exactly a decade later, in May 1998, and Pakistan followed suit within three weeks.

1.16 In this Report as a whole, the Group has argued the case for India to continue advocating the essential ideas contained in the time-bound, universal, non-discriminatory, verifiable, phased process of moving towards the elimination of nuclear weapons as a precursor to general and complete disarmament and the anchoring of the international order in the principles of Nonviolence as spelled out in RGAP 1988. The fundamental question that now arises is whether the international setting is any more favourable now than it was 23 years ago for meaningfully promoting those ideas and, if so, whether India should play a leadership role in championing the cause of disarmament.

1.17 Several factors would appear to suggest that the time is indeed ripe for India to resume its traditional championship of the cause of disarmament. Let us first set out the **general reasons** before moving on to the **India-specific reasons** for India to resume its traditional activist role as a champion of nuclear disarmament.

### **General Reasons**

1.18 The general reasons are that we inhabit today a world where far more numbers of States have nuclear weapons; where even more could be tempted to cross the threshold,

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<sup>6</sup> Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's speech, SSOD-III, UNGA, 9 June 1988. See Annexe II.

thereby leaving a large tear in the non-proliferation fabric; where non-State actors are powerful enough to pose threats to State security; where the possibility of non-State actors acquiring nuclear materials or weapons for terrorism, either with or without State complicity, have multiplied; where inter-State relations are mired in mutual mistrust; and where the possibility of a nuclear incident – terrorist triggered or State-sponsored - occurring somewhere in the world poses a risk for, as President Obama stated at the Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010<sup>7</sup>:

It is an irony that while the risks of a nuclear confrontation have come down, the risks of a nuclear attack have increased.

1.19 It is presumably considerations of this kind, long iterated and re-iterated by India since the first Bomb fell on Hiroshima, that have led President Obama to affirm at Prague:

So today, I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. (Applause.)<sup>8</sup>

1.20 This was the first such assertion by an NWS, rewarded by a grateful and relieved world with a Nobel Prize for Peace – the first time a Nobel laureate has been created for stating an intention rather than completing an action - and deservedly so for without the intention, nothing can change.

1.21 President Obama has expressed his personal support for initiating steps towards universal nuclear disarmament, though he cautions that the process will be long and difficult<sup>9</sup>.

1.22 As different approaches and steps are being contemplated to realize nuclear disarmament, there is a lot that can still be derived from the RGAP. Of course, some of its recommendations, such as the conclusion of treaties banning chemical and biological weapons,

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<sup>7</sup> For the text of Obama’s Nuclear Security Summit speech, see <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-opening-plenary-session-nuclear-security-summit>.

<sup>8</sup> For the text of Obama’s Prague speech, see [http://www.whitehouse.gov/the\\_press\\_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-in-Prague-As-Delivered/](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-in-Prague-As-Delivered/).

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid*: ‘I’m not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly - perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence. But now we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change. We have to insist, “Yes, we can.” (Applause.)’



have since been fulfilled. Yet, there are several others that still await fulfilment. But even more importantly, the fundamental principles on which the RGAP was built are still relevant. In fact, several Indian initiatives in recent times, most notably the seven steps that India has reiterated in international forum since 2006, draw their basics from the RGAP<sup>10</sup>.

1.23 With an increase in the nuclear dangers, there must come a simultaneous progression in the understanding that the only sustainable route to mitigating these dangers has to pass through a nuclear weapons free world. The problem in going down this route, however, is that it is not well laid out and hence calls for far greater risk taking of the unknown variety. As NWS move down to lesser numbers and eventually to zero, how would inter-State security look? Would conventional wars become easier and more rampant with the disappearance of deterrence? Would not some countries still be prone to cheating on their commitments of not developing nuclear weapons? Would the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free regime be able to stop every incident of nuclear terrorism?

1.24 Unfortunately, there are no easy or definitive answers to these questions. Nuclear disarmament may not be the panacea for all ills afflicting international security. However, the manner in which it is pursued and the ultimate outcome is certain to create conditions of greater harmony and cooperative security. On the other hand, if nuclear disarmament is not achieved, it can be said with utmost certainty that as new actors emerge and multiple nuclear poles crystallize, the game of deterrence would get more complicated. Also, given the nature of contemporary human habitation in mega cities, any use of nuclear weapons – deliberate or unintended, state, non-state or a hybrid version – would mean catastrophic damage of unimaginable proportions. Hence, the criticality of a credible nuclear disarmament plan cannot be underestimated.

1.25 Given that, we need to recognise that the world is divided broadly between two distinct approaches to disarmament – the “direct approach” and the “gradual approach”. Those supporting the “direct approach” seek to abolish nuclear weapons in one go – through a Nuclear Weapons Convention or some treaty to this effect. A majority of NNWS are supportive of this approach.

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<sup>10</sup> See footnote 3 above.

1.26 The NWS and the Western countries, on the other hand, tend to support a “gradual approach” in which nuclear dangers and risks, proliferation, arms control etc are to be pursued as initial steps leading to an atmosphere for disarmament, in other words of gradually reducing nuclear armaments to eventually get to low numbers. None of the NWS is actually talking of Zero as yet. Bilateral and coordinated cutbacks in arsenals of the two major nuclear weapons possessors, who together make up nearly 95 per cent of the entire nuclear stockpile worldwide, is deemed to be the first step in this direction. So it is that the New START is considered a significant step as it will bring US and Russia to the level of 1550 warheads with only 700 launchers each. The next steps are identified as reductions in their tactical nuclear weapons and then further cutbacks. Other NWS are expected to join this process at some stage when the American and Russian arsenals have fallen closer to their levels. The position of the other three NWS are spelt out in Chapter V, but it is generally believed that those among them who are willing to reduce their nuclear arsenals or have declared their intention of doing so would bring their weapons stock down to about 500 nuclear weapons. In this context, it may be seen that the Final Document of the NPT review conference 2010 merely ‘noted’ the UN Secretary-General’s proposal on ‘a Nuclear Weapons Convention or agreement on a framework of separate mutually reinforcing instruments, backed by a strong system of verification’. It did not endorse UNSG’s proposals.<sup>11</sup> Thus there is still reluctance on the part of many countries, particularly the P5, to accept or even concede the desirability of a Nuclear Weapons Convention. Instead, the key approach adopted by P5 seems to be to take practical steps to reducing nuclear armaments, containing their spread and averting accidental or unintended use of nuclear weapons along with measures to lower international or bilateral tensions and leave it to an indefinite future to target complete nuclear disarmament as an achievable goal.<sup>12</sup>

1.27 On the other hand, there is a growing realization that a “direct approach” with issues of non-proliferation, arms control, verification etc embedded along its way is what the world

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<sup>11</sup> However, it ‘noted’ in the context of the previous sentence in the same paragraph that ‘...all States need to make special efforts to establish the necessary framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons.’ See point B iii in Annexe IX. This is a marked shift by the NWS who had only supported the step-by-step approach until the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

<sup>12</sup> See Annexe IX for relevant excerpts of the Final Document, NPT RevCon 2010. Full document available at [www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/](http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/)

needs today. As Barry Blechman, co-author of ‘*Elements of a Nuclear Disarmament Treaty*’ has pointed out:

...piecemeal control efforts will never work; we have to think more boldly if we are to achieve global nuclear disarmament.<sup>13</sup>

1.28 This presents an opportunity for India to re-champion the cause of complete disarmament. The concept of a Nuclear Weapons Convention comes closest to the processes and goals of time-bound, non-discriminatory, universal, verifiable and phased disarmament advocated in the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan and updated through WP 06. There is growing international convergence, at least in civil society the world over,<sup>14</sup> on the basic tenets of India’s 1988 conceptualisation which linked non-proliferation and arms control to the goal of disarmament, and stressed pursuing disarmament in a phased manner without losing sight of the final goal of elimination.

### **India-Specific Reasons**

1.29 Now to the 19 India-specific reasons for India to play a leading role in global disarmament:

**First**, the very fact that we are an SNW would make us the first of the States armed with nuclear weapons to argue the case for their time-bound elimination. In the five decades before 1998, India championed global disarmament and criticized the NWS’ reluctance in negotiating the elimination of nuclear weapons; now, after becoming a nuclear-armed nation it has an opportunity do this by example. It would be only consistent with its past history to support and lead the cause of nuclear disarmament. Indeed, the very fact that we do have a nuclear weapons arsenal and still seek negotiations aimed at the elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide makes our

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<sup>13</sup> Barry Blechman, “Stop at START”, New York Times, 18 February 2010. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/opinion/19blechman.html> (Blechman is a fellow at the Stimson Centre and Co-Editor of *Elements of a Nuclear Disarmament Treaty*.)

<sup>14</sup> See Annexe VIII for a detailed chart. This is also analysed in Chapter X.

position today more rather than less credible than it was two decades ago. Then there was the suspicion that our advocacy of nuclear weapons elimination was a cover to cloak our intention of acquiring nuclear weapons ourselves, especially in the view of those who believed our objection to joining the NPT was not because of the high-minded reason of its being an unequal treaty so much as with the ulterior motive of going nuclear without being restrained by NPT obligations. Now that we are a declared SNW, the sincerity of our intention of seeking a world without nuclear weapons would appear so much more genuine.

**Second**, in pre-Pokhran days, when India was in an advocacy mode, it had very little to bring to the negotiating table (while making tall demands on others – particularly, the NWS). That is no longer the case. In seeking abolition of nuclear weapons now, India would be doing so as a ‘State with Nuclear Weapons’ ready to close down its own shop along with everyone else.

**Third**, the best security for India lies in universal nuclear disarmament. Nuclear weapons have, in fact, complicated India’s security requirements in its immediate neighbourhood. It is not unilateral but universal nuclear disarmament that is being advocated. Not only would the terrible consequences of nuclear conflict involving our country<sup>15</sup> be obviated, the risk of accidental or unauthorized nuclear use by radical elements in power or in collusion with some non-State actors would also be obviated. Moreover, the not inconsiderable resources so released could be diverted to development and defence in such proportions as may be desired or decided.

**Fourth**, with the Cold War over two decades ago, and processes for reducing nuclear arsenals gathering steam, the salience of doctrines of mutually assured destruction to maintain the nuclear balance are losing their strategic and political appeal. While States and public opinion in NWS/SNW are still far from vigorously advocating Global Zero, the insecurities of the Cold War that fuelled the logic of

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<sup>15</sup> See Chapter XI on consequences and India’s preparedness.

nuclear escalation and mutually assured destruction are in decline. A 2008 worldwide survey, quoted in the IDSA Task Force Report, “Nuclear Disarmament: The Way Forward”<sup>16</sup> suggests that except for Pakistan public opinion is in favour of a time-bound elimination of nuclear weapons. No information was available for North Korea. Therefore, even if advocates of total elimination are somewhat ahead of NWS/SNW governments, they seem, by and large, to be backed by public opinion in those and other countries.

**Fifth**, most NWS have moved in the direction of reducing nuclear arsenals or indicated their readiness to do so. They have also taken or suggested measures to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in their defence strategies and diplomatic postures, although none is as yet committed to the goal of nuclear weapons elimination in any time-bound sense.

**Sixth**, in the higher profile that President Barak Obama has given to questions of nuclear disarmament in his justly celebrated Prague speech than has been heard from the head of the world’s leading NWS since the end of World War II, reinforced by the latest US Nuclear Posture Review<sup>17</sup>, there is a chink, if not a window, of opportunity.

The US Nuclear Posture Review 2010 categorically declares that the US ‘will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non nuclear weapon states’ party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear proliferation obligations. In respect of other States, the Review acknowledges that US nuclear weapons could still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack on it or its allies and partners. It, however, goes on to stress that such use of nuclear weapons would only be considered in ‘extreme circumstances’ and further contends that it will work to establish conditions

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<sup>16</sup> *Nuclear Disarmament: The Way Forward*, IDSA Task Force Report, April 2010, p. 45.

<sup>17</sup> See Annexe X for a one-page summary of the US NPR prepared by PNND. For the full text of US NPR, see <http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf>

under which the sole purpose of nuclear weapons would be to deter nuclear attack on the US and its allies and partners.

**Seventh**, civil society, notably in the NWS themselves, has become much more vocal and activist than they were two decades ago in pressing not just for non-proliferation but also for elimination, and are beginning to see the symbiotic relationship between elimination and non-proliferation. Many have gone far beyond demonstrations, petitions and seminars to preparing Action Plans of their own, which are highly, if not entirely, compatible with the essentials of RGAP.

**Eighth**, the reversal of positions signalled by, first, Robert McNamara's celebrated *Foreign Policy* article in 2005<sup>18</sup> and then *The Wall Street Journal* article of 2007<sup>19</sup> by the "Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse", Henry Kissinger and George Schultz (Republican), and Sam Nunn and William Perry (Democrats) are straws in the wind which even of the wind has changed in more recent times (cf. Henry Kissinger's back-peddalling), still indicate a softening of the hardened mindsets of a quarter century ago.

**Ninth**, the vacuum caused by India withdrawing from a leadership position in the global disarmament movement in the last decade or so since we became an SNW has been occupied by many other countries, some like Ireland, Norway, Germany, Austria, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand who are or were members of military alliances that rely on nuclear umbrellas; others from neutral countries like Switzerland; and many from the Nonaligned Movement including Costa Rica, Malaysia, Egypt and Iran, to name but a few.

**Tenth**, it is largely because of the relentless advocacy of elimination by these countries that the UN Secretary-General has come out with his Five-Point Plan, a plan that is

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<sup>18</sup> Robert S. McNamara, 'Apocalypse Soon', *Foreign Policy*, 5 May 2005 at [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2005/05/05/apocalypse\\_soon](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2005/05/05/apocalypse_soon)

<sup>19</sup> George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, "A world free of nuclear weapons", *The Wall Street Journal*, 4 January 2007

compatible with most of the key concepts of RGAP 1988. Being neither a civil society initiative nor a Governmental one, the SG's proposal carries considerable prestige and authority and provides a valid basis for further multilateral action in this regard.

**Eleventh**, it is again the activism of these nations that set the stage for the special UN Security Council meeting convened under President Obama's chairmanship in September 2010, significantly titled "Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament" that hinted through the Preamble to UNSC Resolution 1887<sup>20</sup> 'to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons' and established a linkage between nuclear disarmament and the promotion of international stability, peace and security premised on 'the principle of undiminished security for all.' Without going so far as to endorse the goal of elimination or indicate the forum and modalities of negotiating a Nuclear Weapons Convention, it still amounted to progress, albeit incremental. In these matters, all progress is likely to be glacial, but it is noteworthy that even when a glacier moves a little, its impact is profound. So, with the agenda of nuclear weapons elimination.

**Twelfth**, the progress registered at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, in sharp contrast to the ominous silence on these questions and indeed the reversals that had occurred at the previous 1995, 2000 and 2005 review conferences, shows a certain measure of (growing) influence of State and non-State actors who advocate elimination and see the connection between commitment to elimination and prospects for non-proliferation, providing yet another chink, if not window, of opportunity for those who favour time-bound elimination. Thus, for example, the Final Document commits the NWS to 'undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons', as also to accept 'the unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals'.<sup>21</sup> Words, true, not action,

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<sup>20</sup> Text and details of UNSC Resolution 1887 available at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9746.doc.htm>

<sup>21</sup> Same as Footnote 12, see Annexe IX for details.

but then the NWS have also agreed to report back on the progress they have achieved in this direction. The pot, at any rate, has been kept boiling.

**Thirteenth**, is the return to the forefront of the Nonaligned Movement signalled by their more strident and united voice of the Nonaligned at the last NPT Review Conference, especially in the backing they gave the chairman, Egypt, on the question of the Middle East Nuclear Free Zone and the verbal concessions wrung out of a recalcitrant but powerful opposition in securing language that can be used to leverage the cause of elimination. Were the Nonaligned Movement to concert its position in time for the preparations of the next NPT Review Conference, and were India to play a prominent role in defining the Nonaligned position, even without India participating in the next NPT Review Conference considerable momentum might be imparted to the basic ideas contained in RGAP.

**Fourteenth**, are the efforts of those States who refuse to be thwarted by the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and have kept the flame burning at multilateral inter-State conferences, which, it is true are limited not universal but open-ended to accommodate all who are willing to join this coalition of the willing. These include the Ten Country Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), formed in 2010, who, meeting in Berlin in April 2011, regretted that even one year after the NPT RevCon no concrete action had been taken on nuclear disarmament. It needs to be noted that the joint communiqué did not mention the Nuclear Weapons Convention, a significant if surprising omission since individually, if not collectively, the Ten have at one time or the other supported the SG's initiative.

**Fifteenth**, is the concern generated by the threat of terrorists accessing nuclear materials or even nuclear weapons. This is what was responsible for the Summit convened by President Obama last year, which India attended without being party to the NPT (the question was not raised – a first of sorts!) While the conference was not focused on the elimination of nuclear weapons as the key to eliminating terrorist access to such weapons, the concern with nuclear terrorism also provides a chink, if



not a window, of opportunity for India and others to push the cause of nuclear weapons elimination within a reasonable framework of time.

**Sixteenth**, the joint communiqué issued by Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and President Obama at the end of the visit to India by President Obama in November 2010<sup>22</sup> dwelt in unprecedented detail on issues of nuclear disarmament (as did President Obama's Address to the Joint Houses of Parliament<sup>23</sup>) that India could – and should – press for the inclusion of global disarmament in the agenda of the India-US Strategic Partnership dialogue.

**Seventeenth**, this alone will trigger the possibility of India using such other bilateral forums as exist, or can be created, for India to become a key interlocutor with all concerned parties, at the inter-governmental level or civil society activists and the global academic community, on the ideas contained in RGAP, initially bilaterally but with a view to multilateralizing the dialogue in the fullness of time and, with luck, getting discussions, if not negotiations going in the CD, as a first step towards negotiations in the CD, which remains the only recognised inter-governmental forum for the negotiation of issues relating to disarmament, even if it is, at the moment, deadlocked. **In effect, India will be launching a new global process to prepare the way for global negotiations for a legal ban on nuclear weapons.**

**Eighteenth**, India today has a strategic relationship with nearly every major country and hence the possibility of broaching the desirability and feasibility of universal nuclear disarmament in a series of bilateral dialogue leading eventually to multilateral talks and, eventually, multilateral negotiations. As a rapidly emerging economic powerhouse, India has caught the attention of the world and it is time to bring the attention of the world to this security imperative.

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<sup>22</sup> Full text of joint communiqué available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/08/joint-statement-president-obama-and-prime-minister-singh-india>

<sup>23</sup> Full text available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/08/remarks-president-joint-session-indian-parliament-new-delhi-india>

**Nineteenth**, India faces the biggest and most tangible dangers from nuclear use – whether through a deliberate delivery of the warhead in conflict, or through the risk of nuclear terrorism. For most of the NWS, the classical mode of inter-state deterrence is passé. But for India, this is the reality of the day. Therefore, to disentangle the security knot of sub-conventional terrorism and overt nuclear conflict, India’s interests are best served in universal nuclear disarmament.

1.51 These 19 points are argued out in detail in the chapters that follow. Suffice it to note here that, unlike in 1988, it is no longer a matter of India saying *Ekla Chalo Re*. In the intervening quarter century, much has happened to make RGAP, or large parts of it, acceptable to a much larger number of States and people than were prepared to listen at the time of its presentation.

1.52 Yet, the hurdles on the way are not to be under-estimated:

- Whatever President Obama’s personal inclinations, a substantial section of the Washington, DC establishment is far removed from his position, so much so that the President himself has had to hedge his larger goals with conditionalities that almost negate the goal: the road ahead is, therefore, long, pitted with pot-holes and treacherous, but the US President himself is prepared to walk along with us at least some of the way
- While between the US and the Russian Federation there is a measure of agreement on reducing nuclear arsenals, the question of elimination is nowhere on the agenda. This also means reluctance on the part of other NWS and SNW (other than India) to bring elimination centre-stage on the nuclear disarmament agenda
- Internecine differences and apprehensions between and among NWS and SNW, not to mention between NWS and SNW (and those regarded in some circles as aspiring SNW), stand in the way of meaningfully pushing for time-bound elimination

- Many potential international friends and allies of RGAP prioritise NPT over RGAP and still seem to want to ostracise India within the international nuclear community
- The impending assumption of the chairmanship of NAM by Iran will seriously affect the impact of NAM on the US particularly and, more generally, on UNSC and Western thinking on resolutions moved by Iran, albeit in the name of the Movement of Nonaligned Countries
- Many in India would see our future less in terms of reverting to our past championship of disarmament and more in terms of being aligned, or at least being in conformity with the NWS, given that we are, after all, an SNW aspiring to recognition as an NWS and became an SNW because we believed nuclear weapons were crucial to our national security
- Bilateral differences with China and especially Pakistan might lead many in India, as also in those countries, to treat the nuclear deterrent as the irreversible red line of national security and apprehend this being diluted or downgraded through a leadership position in global disarmament before the resolution of outstanding political and border issues
- The CD is deadlocked and while positions on FMCT are fiercely argued within and outside CD, there is no real effort being made to end the deadlock and return the CD any time soon to the negotiating table
- Elimination is regarded as “unfeasible” even by many of those who seek it; gradual reduction without making elimination or, worse in their view, time-bound elimination is their preferred goal
- While CTBT and FMCT are essentially non-proliferation measures, many in the international community often regard them as steps towards nuclear disarmament. For instance, the Final Document of the NPT Review Conference 2010 accords an ‘essential role’ to CTBT in the context of nuclear disarmament. Most countries place major emphasis on progress on CTBT coming into force as well as commencement of negotiations of FMCT as necessary preconditions for even discussing the elimination of nuclear weapons, let alone negotiating a binding convention or treaty in this regard. Several

proposals including the 5-Point Proposal of the UN Secretary-General as well as NAM's plan of action on disarmament aim at nuclear disarmament through CTBT and FMCT. Yet, the fact of the matter is that these measures, of and by themselves, are essentially stand alone measures not linked in any binding manner with the goal of nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, India has long held that it will not stand in the way of the entry into force of the CTBT, and has also declared its willingness to engage in negotiations on FMCT at Geneva.

1.53 Notwithstanding these hurdles, the Group notes that the Government of India is committed to the path outlined in RGAP 1988 as is evident from several statements by the Prime Minister in Parliament quoted in Chapter II. The Group are also persuaded that the dangers to our country and her people and, indeed, to all humankind and life on our Planet from the continued existence of nuclear weapons is so great that it is imperative for India to revive the ideas contained in the RGAP, as modernized and rendered contemporary through the 7-point Plan presented by India in the Working Paper it circulated at the UN General Assembly in 2006 and subsequently at the CD.

1.54 To this end, the Group has analysed in detail the positive and negative factors indicated above in the chapters that follow and then suggested in the last chapter a Roadmap and specific Recommendations on how best to carry forward the ideas contained in RGAP 88.

## CHAPTER II

### INDIA AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

#### Six Decades Of Consistency

#### **Mahatma Gandhi**

India's consistency in pressing for universal nuclear disarmament begins with Mahatma Gandhi's revulsion at the first use of nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945:

I did not move a muscle when I first heard that the atom bomb had wiped out Hiroshima. On the contrary, I said to myself, 'Unless the world now adopts non-violence, it will spell certain suicide for mankind.'

#### 2.2 The Mahatma urged:

The moral to be legitimately drawn from the supreme tragedy of the Bomb is that it will not be destroyed by counter-bombs, even as violence cannot be destroyed by counter-violence. Mankind has to get out of violence only through non-violence. Hatred can be overcome only by love. Counter-hatred only increases the surface as well as the depth of hatred.

#### 2.3 Writing in his magazine, *Harijan*, on 7 July 1946, about a year after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Gandhiji said:

It is being suggested by American friends that the atom bomb will bring in Ahimsa (non-violence) as nothing else can. It is meant that its destructive power will so disgust the world that it will turn it away from violence for the time being. This is very like a man glutting himself with dainties to the point of nausea and turning away from it only to return with a redoubled zeal after the effect of nausea is well over. Precisely

in the same manner will the world return to violence with renewed zeal after the effect of disgust is worn out.

2.4 How prescient! For a while, from time to time, there has been a surge of public opinion and governmental concern over nuclear weapons even in Nuclear Weapons States, the sad fact is that such sporadic surges of anti-nuclear weapons sentiment have generally given way to acquiescence or even assertion of the need for such weapons. This only validates the next paragraph in Gandhiji's article of July 1946:

So far as I can say, the atomic bomb has deadened the finest feeling that has sustained mankind for ages. There used to be the so-called laws of war which made it tolerable. Now we know the naked truth. War knows no law except that of might.

2.5 Returning again to this theme on 16 November 1947, a few months after India became independent, Gandhiji wrote:

In this age of the atom bomb, unadulterated nonviolence is the only force that can confound the tricks of violence put together.

2.6 When asked whether the atomic bomb had not rendered nonviolence obsolete, Gandhiji returned an emphatic "No", adding:

On the contrary, nonviolence is the only thing that is left in the field. It is the only thing that the atom bomb cannot destroy.

### **Jawaharlal Nehru (Prime Minister, 1947-64)**

2.7 Jawaharlal Nehru envisaged a twin-track policy. On the one hand, India had to harness its scientific and technological talent in the campaign for what was then called "Atoms for Peace" and, on the other hand, India had to be in the forefront also of the campaign for nuclear disarmament. As he said on 13 November 1945:

The revolution caused by discoveries having to do with atomic energy can either destroy human civilization, or take it up to unheard of levels.

2.8 Hence the Nehruvian emphasis on India mastering nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes at the same time as he warned, as he did in a letter to Eleanor Roosevelt, that:

...such weapons appear to me so evil in every way that their use can only result in greater evil.

2.9 While vigorously pursuing civil uses of nuclear energy, disarmament remained in the foreground of his policies. Indeed, as early as 1940, Jawaharlal Nehru, in a confidential note penned for the use of the inner councils of the Congress Party had written:

Both because of our adherence to the principle of nonviolence and from practical considerations arising from our understanding of world events, we believe that complete disarmament of all national states should be aimed at, and is in fact an urgent necessity if the world is not to be reduced to barbarism.

2.10 Jawaharlal Nehru's reaction to the dropping of the atom bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki paralleled Gandhiji's. He expressed his dismay at the 'disastrous path that modern civilization is following', and added:

Two great wars have brutalized humanity and made them think more and more in terms of violence. What progress, scientific, cultural and in human values we have made, is somehow twisted to the needs of violence.

2.11 Equally sharp and unambiguous was Nehru's reaction to the American atomic test at Bikini Atoll in 1946. Writing in the Congress Party's newspaper, *The National Herald*, he said:

This is not the way to lay the foundations of peace... For this is surely the way to madness.

2.12 In 1954, after the atom bomb had been overtaken by the hydrogen bomb, Jawaharlal Nehru, told the Indian Parliament, stressing the point that ‘the way of the atom bomb is not the way of peace or freedom’ :

We have maintained that nuclear (including thermonuclear), chemical and biological (bacterial) knowledge and power should not be used to forge these weapons of mass destruction. We have advocated the prohibition of such weapons, by common consent, and immediately by agreement amongst those concerned, which latter is at present the only effective way to bring about their abandonment.

(Lok Sabha, 2 April 1954)

2.13 Arguing against validating nuclear weapons through doctrines of deterrence, Nehru held that the advent of thermonuclear power has:

totally destroyed any validity that might have existed in the concept and policies of the balance of power... these weapons, and the magnitude in which they will be employed, have erased the differences between the capacity to inflict punishment and of receiving the same; for the side that employs them is not immune from the lethal effects of their own offence. It is a dangerous illusion to believe that nuclear weapons have brought us peace.

2.14 India thus became perhaps the world’s leading proponent of nuclear disarmament, the component elements of which were described in the following words by Nehru:

Disarmament must include the prohibition of the manufacture, storage, and use of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the progressive limitation of conventional weapons.



2.15 He foresaw too the root cause of nuclear proliferation, telling the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference in London, February 1955:

as nuclear bombs become relatively easier and cheaper to make, the danger would increase that smaller countries might possess them, and we should live in constant apprehension that some irresponsible country would be in a position to set fire to the world.

2.16 Moreover, Nehru underlined the incompatibility between a world bristling with nuclear weapons in the hands of a few and the world order envisaged in the Charter and institutions of the United Nations Organisation:

The accumulation of destructive power and the military alliances that subserve them... cut right across the conception, the purpose, the procedures and the machinery provided and contemplated in the United Nations Charter.

2.17 UN General Assembly resolutions moved by India in concert with like-minded countries, including the unanimous 15<sup>th</sup> anniversary resolution on disarmament of 1958, the orientation of the Movement of Nonaligned Countries (NAM) towards disarmament as a principal plank of Nonalignment, and the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 are among the enduring contributions that India under Nehru made to the cause of disarmament.

**Indira Gandhi (Prime Minister, 1966-77, 1980-84)**

2.18 On 18 May 1974, India carried out an underground nuclear explosion experiment at a depth of 100 metres in the Rajasthan desert. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, clarifying to the Indian Parliament that 'this experiment was part of the research and development work which the Atomic Energy Commission has been carrying on in pursuance of our national objective of harnessing atomic energy for peaceful purposes', said:

No technology is evil in itself; it is the use that nations make of technology which determines its character. India does not accept the principle of apartheid in any matter and technology is no exception.

2.19 This view was in keeping with the point made by Mahatma Gandhi:

That atomic energy, though harnessed by American scientists and army men for destructive purposes, may be utilized by other scientists for humanitarian purposes is undoubtedly within the realm of possibility.

2.20 And no one better realized this than Jawaharlal Nehru who initiated our programme of Atoms for Peace at the very dawn of Independence:

It is perfectly clear that atomic energy can be used for peaceful purposes, to the immense advantage of humanity. It may take some years before it can be used more or less economically (but) the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes is far more important for a country like India whose power resources are limited than for an industrially advanced country.

2.21 In this light, having rejected the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1967 (NPT) as an unequal treaty and undertaken the nuclear explosion at Pokharan in 1974, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi went on to lead the most significant disarmament initiative of the Eighties – the Five-Continent/Six-Nation Initiative – the tone for which was set by her immortal address to the Seventh Non-Aligned Summit in New Delhi at which she asked the key question:

‘Can there be peace alongside nuclear weapons?’

2.22 She answered the question herself:

Each day, each hour, the size and lethality of nuclear weapons increase. The hood of the cobra is spread. Humankind watches in frozen fear, hoping against hope that it will not strike. Never before has the earth faced so much death and danger. The

destructive power contained in nuclear stockpiles can kill human life, indeed all life, many times over and might prevent its reappearance for ages to come. Terrifying is the vividness of such descriptions by scientists. Yet, some statesmen and strategists act as though there is not much difference between these and earlier artillery pieces.

2.23 She then joined the Six-Nation appeal broadcast on 22 May 1984 which said:

The probability of nuclear holocaust increases and warning time decreases and the weapons become swifter, more accurate and more deadly. The rush towards global suicide must be stopped. We urge (a) halt (to) all testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, to be immediately followed by substantial reductions in nuclear forces. We are convinced that it is possible to work out the details of an arrangement along these lines that takes into account the interests and concerns of all, and contains adequate measures for verification. This first step must be followed by a continuing programme of arms reductions leading to general and complete disarmament...

**Morarji Desai (Prime Minister, March 1977-1978)**

2.24 In a statement to the UN Committee on Disarmament in 1976, Prime Minister Morarji Desai made clear:

The much vaunted nuclear deterrent has failed to put an end to the arms race. In fact, it has stimulated further competition, involving vastly destructive weaponry. The commitment to disarmament must therefore be total and without reservations, although in actual implementation, having regard to the hard realities of the situation, we may accept the principle of gradualness in a time-bound programme...

**Rajiv Gandhi (Prime Minister, 1984-1989)**

2.25 On becoming Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi quickly established himself as an impassioned campaigner for universal nuclear disarmament, a campaign which reached its apotheosis in the Action Plan for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free and Nonviolent World Order he presented to the United Nations in 1988.

2.26 The Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan combines a practical roadmap towards universal, non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament (leading to general disarmament) and sustaining this by basing the world order on the principles of non-violence. The heart of the Action Plan lies in its emphasis of both a “Nuclear-Weapons-free” world and a “non-violent world order” to sustain it.

2.27 Rajiv Gandhi’s Action Plan was the culmination of forty years of intensive exploration of the road to nuclear disarmament. The heart of the Action Plan lay in the elimination of all nuclear weapons in three stages over a period of twenty-two years. 23 years have passed with no progress even in the direction of the first stage. But abstracting from the specific time lines suggested in 1988, the three stages continue to remain valid. These are:

- First, a binding commitment by all nations to eliminate nuclear weapons in stages within a specific time frame.
- Second, the participation of all Nuclear Weapon States in the process of nuclear disarmament, while ensuring that all other countries are also part of the process.
- Third, the demonstration of tangible progress at each stage towards the common goal.

2.28 The Action Plan further required that with a view to sustaining a world free of nuclear weapons, negotiations be undertaken to establish a comprehensive Global Security System under the aegis of the United Nations. To once again quote Rajiv Gandhi:

When we eliminate nuclear weapons and reduce conventional forces to minimum defensive levels, the establishment of a nonviolent world order is the only way of not relapsing into the irrationalities of the past. It is the only way of precluding the recommencement of an armaments spiral. Nonviolence in international relations cannot be considered a Utopian goal. It is the only available basis for civilized survival, for the maintenance of peace through peaceful coexistence, for a new, just, equitable and democratic world order.

2.29 The arguments brought forward by Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 bear repetition even now, notwithstanding the enormous changes that have taken place in the international scenario over the last two decades and the fact that in the interim India herself has moved from being a threshold nuclear power to a full-fledged NWS:

**First**, now as in 1988, nuclear war will mean the extinction of thousands of millions of human beings and the end of life as we know it on our Planet Earth. To quote from the opening lines of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's statement to the UN General Assembly when introducing his Action Plan, lines that have since been frequently quoted:

In the last nine decades the ravenous machines of war have devoured nearly a hundred million people... Nuclear war will not mean the death of one hundred million people, or even one thousand million people. It will mean the extinction of 4000 million, the end of life as we know it on our planet Earth... Humanity is at a crossroads. One road will take us like lemmings to our own destruction. That is the path indicated by doctrines of nuclear deterrence, deriving from traditional concepts of balance of power. The other road will give us another chance. That is the path signposted by the doctrine of peaceful co-existence, deriving from the imperative values of nonviolence, tolerance and compassion.

**Second**, the relentless march of nuclear weapons technology renders ever more obsolete the pre-nuclear calculus of war and peace. As Robert S. McNamara has pointed out in a celebrated 2005 article in *Foreign Policy*, there are nearly 10,000 strategic offensive nuclear warheads in deployment worldwide, half of them by the United States with 'the average US warhead (having) a destructive power 20 times that of the Hiroshima bomb.'

**Third**, as Rajiv Gandhi told the UN:

There can be no iron-clad guarantee against the use of weapons of mass destruction. There have been used in the past. They could be used in the

future. And, in this nuclear age, the insane logic of mutually assured destruction will ensure that nothing survives, that no one lives to tell the tale, that there is no one left to understand what went wrong and why.

**Fourth**, as for the argument that since the consequences of nuclear war are widely known and well understood, therefore nuclear war just cannot happen, it is again worthwhile to revisit Rajiv Gandhi's answer to that argument:

History is full of miscalculations. Perceptions are often totally at variance with reality. A madman's fantasy could unleash the end. An accident could trigger off a chain reaction which inexorably leads to doom.

The cautionary point made by McNamara in this regard is worth repeating:

The whole situation seems so bizarre as to be beyond belief. On any given day, as we go about our business, the President (of the United States) is prepared to make a decision within twenty minutes that could launch one of the most devastating weapons in the world.

**Fifth**, again quoting from Rajiv Gandhi:

There is also little logic to the argument that as nuclear weapons have been invented, they, therefore, cannot be eliminated. There are several conventions already in operation relating to biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction. Only nuclear weapons remain outside the purview of a universal ban on weapons of mass destruction. The Action Plan signposts the stages by which nuclear disarmament too can be secured.

**Sixth**, it remains as true today as it did in 1988, that, as Rajiv Gandhi put it:

There is nothing more dangerous than the illusion of limited nuclear war. It desensitises inhibitions about the use of nuclear weapons that could lead, in next to no time, to the outbreak of full-fledged nuclear war.

2.30 In 1988, the challenge of the Action Plan was essentially to doctrines of nuclear deterrence. That was at a time when two relatively well-matched “super-powers” were assuring their mutual survival by ensuring their mutual destruction. Now that hostility has given way to normalization of relations between the two principal NWS, and all the self-certified NWS recognized by the NPT are promoting the best of relations among themselves, it is not so much the argument over the validity of deterrence doctrines as the need for the continued existence of weapons of mass destruction that takes centre-stage in consideration of issues of nuclear disarmament.

2.31 Who are these weapons to be used against? Terrorists is one answer. But terrorists are non-State actors - and nuclear weapon are for use, if they are for use at all, only against hostile States or peoples. No one could suggest that the right response to a terrorist strike from a terrorist hideout could be a nuclear response. Indeed, the continued existence of large reserves of nuclear weaponry is the very treasure trove from which the terrorist hopes to filch his weapon of terror. Terrorism has, of course, to be fought but nuclear weapons can hardly be the weapon of choice. And let us remember Rajiv Gandhi saying at the UN:

The balance of nuclear terror rests on the retention and augmentation of nuclear armouries... Nuclear deterrence is the ultimate expression of the philosophy of terrorism: holding humanity hostage to the presumed security needs of a few.

2.32 The threat of nuclear proliferation will remain so long as an unequal world nuclear order legitimises the possession of such weapons in some hands, and those hands threaten the use of these weapons as a way of containing the threat of proliferation. The present juncture of a world without acute rivalries among the NWS is the right juncture at which India should consider taking the lead, through bilateral and multilateral diplomatic channels and a public

relations campaign with and through an awakened civil society within and outside India, to promote an international dialogue which might eventually lead to the negotiation of a treaty at the Conference on Disarmament and endorsed by the United Nations, which incorporates the key concepts of the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan 1988.

**P.V. Narasimha Rao (Prime Minister, 1991-96)**

2.33 Speaking at the Special Commemorative meeting of the 50<sup>th</sup> session of the UNGA on 24 October 1995, India's Prime Minister Narasimha Rao said the world, bristling with nuclear weapons, cannot be secure. Rao maintains that 'deterrence is a false belief' since the possession of nuclear weapons by some countries prompts other countries to acquire them as well, thus leading to nuclear proliferation 'which is impossible to police for all time.' According to Rao, the idea of a permanent number of nuclear weapon states is 'unrealistic and self-defeating.' Rao appeals to the UNGA to 'take credible steps for the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons within a stipulated time frame' and notes that the Acton Plan suggested by India in 1988 can be an 'appropriate starting point.'

**Atal Behari Vajpayee (Prime Minister, 1996, 1998-99, 1999-2004)**

2.34 After the nuclear tests of 1998 Prime Minister Vajpayee announced a further moratorium on underground nuclear test explosions and clarified:

These tests do not signal a dilution of India's commitment to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament.

United Nations General Assembly, September 1998

2.36 In response to Unstarred Question number 8051 in the Lok Sabha (Lower House) on 17 May 2000, the Minister of State for External Affairs, Shri Ajit Panja, confirmed that the Government of India had taken cognizance of, and subscribed to, the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan, and in response to another Unstarred Question bearing number 1738 dated 29 November 2000, affirmed:



The idea of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in a specified framework of time is integral to the 1988 Action Plan for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free and Nonviolent World Order. A Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons (which India had proposed) is part of Phase-I of the programme contained in that Action Plan.

**Dr. Manmohan Singh (Prime Minister, 2004-09 and 2009-)**

2.36 Soon after the nuclear weapons test at Pokharan in May 1998, the Indian National Congress affirmed that the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan remained the “sheet anchor” of the external dimension of the Party’s nuclear weapons policy. The Party then undertook an exercise to update and present in treaty language a draft convention incorporating the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan. This draft was formally submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the Congress President in 2001.

2.37 In his statement to Parliament on 29 July 2005, the Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, said:

Our commitment to work for universal nuclear disarmament, so passionately espoused by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, in the long run will remain our core concern.

2.38 Subsequently, replying to a debate in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House) on 17 August 2006, the Prime Minister said:

Our commitment towards non-discriminatory global nuclear disarmament remains unwavering, in line with the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan. There is no dilution on this count. We do not accept proposals put forward from time to time for regional non-proliferation or regional disarmament. Pending nuclear disarmament, there is no question of India joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons State, or accepting full-scope safeguards as a requirement for nuclear supplies to India, now or in the future.

2.39 He further added:

Our support for global nuclear disarmament remains unwavering. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had put forward an Action Plan in the 1988 UNGA Special Session on Disarmament. We remain committed to the central goal of this Action Plan, that is, complete elimination of nuclear weapons leading to global nuclear disarmament in a time-bound framework.

2.40 The Prime Minister's latest statement on the subject is the message he sent the Global Zero summit meeting in London on 22-23 June 2011 in which he said *inter alia*:

India has been steadfast in its support for *global, non-discriminatory, verifiable* nuclear disarmament. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi presented a visionary Action Plan for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free and Non-Violent World Order. This Action Plan sets out a roadmap for achieving nuclear disarmament in a *time-bound, universal, non-discriminatory, phased* and verifiable manner... The goal of nuclear disarmament can be achieved by a *step-by-step* process underwritten by a *universal commitment* and an *agreed multilateral framework* that is global and non-discriminatory. Progressive steps are needed for the *de-legitimization* of nuclear weapons. Measures *to reduce nuclear dangers arising from accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, increasing restraints on the use of nuclear weapons and de-alerting* of nuclear weapons are essential steps. There is need for a *meaningful dialogue among all states possessing nuclear weapons to build trust and confidence and for reducing the salience of nuclear weapons* in international affairs and security doctrines. This campaign can be taken forward by forging a *renewed consensus on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Public awareness and support is vital* to generate and sustain an irreversible momentum until we reach our *cherished goal of a world without nuclear weapons*. (Emphasis added to identify key elements)

2.41 All the key elements that constitute India's stand on nuclear weapons are comprised in that short statement. It will thus be seen that for sixty years India has been consistent in pleading for universal disarmament.

2.42 To this end, the Indian delegation to the 2006 of the UN General Session Assembly circulated a Working Paper through which it reminded the international community that the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan 'provided a holistic framework seeking negotiations for a time-bound commitment for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons to usher in a world free of nuclear weapons and rooted in non-violence.' With this in view, the Working Paper calls on the international community 'to build a consensus that strengthens the ability of the international community to initiate concrete steps towards achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament based on the following elements:

- Reaffirmation of the unequivocal commitment of all nuclear weapon States to the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons;
- Reduction of the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines;
- Taking into account the global reach and menace of nuclear weapons, adoption of measures by nuclear-weapon States to reduce nuclear danger, including the risks of accidental war, de-alerting of nuclear-weapons to prevent unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons;
- Negotiations of a global agreement among nuclear weapon States on 'no-first-use' of nuclear weapons;
- Negotiation of a universal and legally-binding agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons States;
- Negotiation of a Convention on the complete prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- Negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Conventions prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, leading to the global non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timeframe.'

## CHAPTER III

### RGAP '88 REVISITED

#### Present Relevance and India's Working Paper 2006

##### Introduction

This Chapter is divided into three parts:

- The **first** part identifies the basic principles that were encapsulated in RGAP 88 and which must form the bedrock of future initiatives on nuclear disarmament;
- The **second** part elaborates WP 06 and the nuances built into it;
- The **third** part elaborates some of the measures that can hold the world leapfrog into a new approach to disarmament as distinct from the current tendency to Nuclear Zero only as an eventual and unspecified consequence of stockpile reductions in nuclear weapons.

##### I. RGAP 88: Present Relevance

3.2 An Action Plan for Ushering in a Nuclear Weapon Free and Nonviolent World Order was presented in 1988 at the Third Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations by then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.<sup>1</sup> It envisaged a 22 year plan to progressively move the world towards elimination of nuclear weapons and greater cooperative security through a multi-pronged approach. While nuclear disarmament was indeed at the heart of this plan, it also included simultaneous steps towards reduction in conventional forces to minimum defensive levels, proscription of space weapon systems and control and management of arms race in new technologies.

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<sup>1</sup> The text of the Plan (referred to as RGAP 1988 in this report) is at Annexe I. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's speech is reproduced *in extenso* at Annexe II. See India's 2006 Working Paper at Annexe III.

3.3 If this Plan, the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan (RGAP) for short, had then been accepted, 2011 would have been the first year in a world free of nuclear weapons. But it is an irony of sorts that 22 years after the Plan was first presented, we are once again looking to it for guidance. It certainly proved to be an idea far ahead of its time, caught as the world then was in the tight embrace of the Cold War and nuclear deterrence based on Mutual Assured Destruction. Proposing a bargain to go beyond the NPT, which was due to expire seven years after his appearance at the UN, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi said:

This new treaty should give legal effect to the binding commitment of nuclear-weapon States to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2010, and of all the non-nuclear-weapon States not to cross the nuclear weapons threshold.<sup>2</sup>

3.4 Obviously, the USA and USSR were closed to the idea of engaging in any kind of moves that would entail the renunciation of an arsenal that they believed had averted war between the two. The idea of nuclear disarmament was not even considered worthy of lip service by the Superpowers and their allies. India, as the leader of a motley crowd of non-aligned nations, was the lone crusader for a world free of nuclear weapons.

3.5 22 years down the line, the circumstances are quite different. Nuclear disarmament is today more evident in the mind of the present US President, though Russia still remains sceptical. President Obama has expressed his personal support for initiating steps towards universal nuclear disarmament, but cautions that the process will be long and difficult. As different approaches and steps are being contemplated to realize nuclear disarmament, there is a lot that can still be derived from the RGAP. Of course, some of its recommendations, such as the conclusion of treaties banning chemical and biological weapons, have since been fulfilled. Yet, there are several others that still await fulfilment. But even more importantly, the fundamental principles on which the RGAP was built are still relevant. In fact, several Indian initiatives in recent times, most notably the seven steps that India has reiterated in international fora since

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<sup>2</sup> Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's speech at the SSOD-III, UNGA, 9 June 1988.

presenting them as a Working Paper to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly in 2006, draw their basics from the RGAP.

3.6 Nuclear weapons, more than any other weapons that mankind has had or renounced, have the potential to change the nature of power play or inter-state dynamics. Hence, nuclear disarmament cannot be conducted in isolation or alienated from parallel collateral measures that simultaneously reshape the premise and architecture of international security. This makes the challenge of nuclear disarmament so complex that nations are deterred from even contemplating the necessary steps. It appears far easier to retract into the comfort zone of the present reality than venture into the unknown alleys of a new world order. However, it is precisely the rising dangers with the continued presence of nuclear weapons that is today demanding a change in the nuclear status quo. And if this change has to be for a better and more inclusive international security rather than towards greater proliferation and nuclear terrorism, then credible, visible steps towards the elimination of nuclear weapons need to be taken now. And, in order for them to be successful and sustainable, these need to be anchored in the following principles.

#### *Universality*

In order to be viable, nuclear disarmament must necessarily be universal and equally applicable to all. Unilateral nuclear disarmament, whether voluntary or imposed, cannot be the answer for stopping further proliferation. Of course, there could be countries, as there have been, that do not feel the requirement for nuclear weapons and who unilaterally decide to give them up. South Africa made this decision for itself. But its move did not lead other nuclear weapon states to considering the abandonment of their arsenals. Nor did this stem proliferation to other States in the future. Therefore, in order to be meaningful and sustainable, nuclear disarmament has to be universally inclusive. Each country that has nuclear weapons or the capability to build weapons has to accept the commitment to eliminate its stockpile, while those that are non-nuclear have to commit themselves to remaining so. Therefore, every country has to be a part of the process of disarmament.

*Non-discriminatory*

*Uniformity of commitments is critical for the success of measures aimed at universal nuclear elimination. An equal measure of compliance to uniformly applicable verification procedures should be applicable to all states. This would be different from the case of the NPT, which has created two classes of states with varying levels of verification and compliance standards. In fact, by doing so, it has inadvertently created an adversarial relationship between non-proliferation and disarmament. For all countries to be subject to the same rigour for the implementation of measures that they must commit themselves to, it is necessary to premise disarmament on a singular standard of compliance which is non-discriminatory.*

*Verifiability*

In order to make up for the lack of trust among nations, and to foster this in the future, it is necessary that, as provided for in RGAP 88, measures towards nuclear disarmament are “underpinned by treaties and institutions, which insure against nuclear delinquency.” While it is true that the scope of verification measures may need to be different for possessors and non-possessors of nuclear weapons, both intrusiveness and stringency must be equal in principle, theory and practice. Only if disarmament is premised on this principle, can there be enough transparency in the process to foster confidence amongst states to stick to their commitments and remain committed in the long term.

*Collateral measures to enhance security*

Nuclear weapons have been perceived by nations as contributing to their security needs. As they give them up, there could be a natural tendency to lean on other types of crutches – conventional, space-based, defences etc – to make up for the perceived security deficit. Such moves would not only be counterproductive but also complicate further steps towards disarmament. Therefore there is a requirement to adopt a multi-pronged strategy to get to disarmament. This must include changes

in levels of conventional forces to minimum defensive levels, immediate steps towards banning weaponisation of outer space. As RGAP held, “The process would require a substantial reduction in offensive military capabilities as well as confidence building measures to preclude surprise attacks. The United Nations needs to evolve by the consensus a new strategic doctrine of non-provocative defence.” This would also necessitate renunciation of any arms race towards new technologies.

However, this may be easier said than done. Why would nations that give up the nuclear weapon not move towards acquisition of more and better conventional weaponry in order to bridge a perceived security deficit? The answer to this question may lie in the nature of collateral measures that are taken along with moving towards nuclear elimination. For example, if nuclear disarmament is *either the result of or results in more cooperative and secure inter-state relations, then countries will not feel the need to move towards build up of conventional capabilities*. Therefore, one cannot but emphasise the importance of a broadly consensually agreed upon verifiable process. Such a step would generate greater confidence as it progresses and would have a benign effect on the international security climate. This trend could be further reinforced by a parallel process of conventional arms control akin to the Conventional Forces in Europe model.

### ***Acceptance and tolerance***

The RGAP was prescient in stating:

The root causes of global insecurity reach far below the calculus of military parity. They are related to the instability spawned by widespread poverty, squalor, hunger, disease and illiteracy. . . . The effort to promote security for all must be underpinned by the effort to promote opportunity for all and equitable access to achievement. Comprehensive global security must rest on a new, more just, more honourable world order.



Indeed, a culture of nonviolence and de-militarised international relations must be accepted as the principle for conduct of international relations in a world free of nuclear weapons. The new world order will have to be based on ‘respect for various ideologies, on the right to pursue different socio-economic systems, and the celebration of diversity.’ It is the threat of regime change or non-acceptance of a particular political or economic system that raises insecurities. With the end of the ideological rivalry of the Cold War, there does appear to be greater tolerance for different national approaches. As long as the basic humanitarian values are respected, countries must have the right to choose their path of existence. In fact, the new world order must show greater respect for the principles of coexistence, non-use of force, non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, and the right of every state to pursue its own path of development, all of which are enshrined in the UN Charter. India’s first Prime Minister used to emphasize the goal of peace over security. The reason behind this is well explained by India’s foremost strategic analyst Jasjit Singh in these words:

An environment of peace would naturally provide security, whereas mere security may or may not bring peace. For example, security in Europe during the Cold War was ensured for 45 years by something like 60,000 nuclear weapons, 94,000 combat airplanes, about 110,000 tanks and massive quantities of other weapons and military systems.

And yet despite all these security measures in place, peace proved to be elusive. The acquisition of nuclear weapons, whether as a national possession or through extended deterrence, brought security but not peace. Therefore, as Singh points out:

Peace has to be given a chance in shaping future paradigms.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Jasjit Singh, “Introductory Remarks to the New Delhi Conference”, in Manpreet Sethi ed., *Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World* (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2009), p. xvi.

It is in this context that India can bring a new paradigm to the understanding of inter-State relations. Cooperative security, in place of the current competitive security, is needed to meet not only the requirement of nuclear disarmament but also the many challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. An indication of this understanding can be found in the UN Security Council Resolution 1887, adopted on 24 September 2009 under the chairmanship of President Obama. It established a link between nuclear disarmament and the promotion of international stability, peace and security premised on ‘the principle of undiminished security for all.’ Can nations bring themselves to rise above existing paradigms of security to envision a different world order premised on cooperation and the objective of peace rather than security? Can we at least begin to talk, write and debate the contours of a post-nuclear world so that its appeal and advantages can begin to pervade wider spaces – geographical, and of the mind? And as mindsets change, so will the reality of the day. This is a fact proven in history and the abolition of well-entrenched systems such as slavery and apartheid bear testimony to this.

### *Time-bound but Flexible*

The delineation of phases or the adoption of a time bound approach has evoked much controversy. RGAP had recommended a three-stage plan to get to zero. The first and second phases were to last 6 years each while the final phase was to last a decade. However, over the years, many countries, such as France and Russia, have opposed the creation of ‘artificial time lines’. But the problem with no schedule is that it could remain open-ended without creating tangible benchmarks of progress. So, it would be far more helpful if some consensually agreed upon phases for implementation of steps were evolved.

## **II. Working Paper 06 and RGAP 88: A Comparative Analysis**

3.7 The Working Paper on Nuclear Disarmament placed before the UNGA in 2006 presented the following set of measures as steps towards the goal of a nuclear weapons free world:

- Reaffirmation of the unequivocal commitment of all Nuclear Weapon States to the goal of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
- Reduction of the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines
- Taking into account the global reach and menace of nuclear weapons, adoption of measures by Nuclear Weapons States to reduce nuclear danger, including the risks of accidental nuclear war, de-alerting of nuclear weapons to prevent unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons.
- Negotiation of a global agreement among nuclear weapon States on “no-first-use” of nuclear –weapons.
- Negotiation of a universal and legally binding agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons against Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.
- Negotiation of a convention on the complete prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
- Negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, leading to the global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame.

3.8 The nuances that distinguish WP 06 from RGAP 88 need to be understood in perspective.

**First**, RGAP envisaged a 22-year time-frame built around the idea that all Nuclear Weapons States make a binding commitment to eliminate nuclear weapons by a specific deadline and work towards that goal by demonstrating tangible progress in three phases, each of which comprises the discrete steps towards disarmament (CTBT, FMCT, PAROS, etc.).

In contrast, WP 06 sets out six preliminary steps before reaching the seventh stage of negotiating a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC). However, once that stage is reached in step 7 of WP 06, the NWC is conceived as securing ‘elimination of nuclear weapons within a *specified time-frame*’ (emphasis added). In other words, between RGAP 88 and WP 06, India has

moved from prescribing a “specific time-frame” to leaving it to negotiations to settle a “specified time-frame”.

In any case, there was nothing inflexible in the RGAP time-frame of 22 years had negotiations started, or even shown any signs of starting. Regrettably, the flexibility shown in WP 06 has also not resulted in any takers. Nevertheless, the “time-bound but flexible”<sup>4</sup> approach, combined with putting six elements of the RGAP phases ahead on taking up negotiations of a NWC “with a specified time-frame” might enable a wider consensus to be forged, but without sacrificing the end goal of time-bound elimination - for any commitment to elimination without a time-frame is no commitment at all.

Nevertheless, a modified approach anchored - in the principle of a time-frame but flexible approach to the staging of discrete measures of disarmament, as well as periodicity of that time-frame - would certainly assist India in working with all concerned, but with all deliberate speed, towards the greater goal.

**Second**, in his address to UNGA SSOD-III (9 June 1988), Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi said:

We propose simultaneous negotiations on a series of integrally related measures.

But we do recognise the need for flexibility in the staging of some of these measures.

Thus, while WP 06 does resort to ‘flexibility in the staging of some of these measures’, the Convention it proposes at the last stage, ‘for eliminating nuclear weapons’ is, in fact, to take place “within the specified time-frame”. Sadly, this flexibility has had no takers over the last five years.

3.9 Therefore, while there cannot and must not be any rigidity in negotiating on RGAP ideas with the gallimaufry<sup>5</sup> of countries with differing concerns, differing priorities and differing

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<sup>4</sup> See above in this Chapter, Section titled “Time-bound but flexible” on p. 47.

<sup>5</sup> Gallimaufry: hodge-podge; confused medley. See [www.dictionary.com](http://www.dictionary.com)

objectives, we, for our part, must also not lose sight of treating all seven points in WP 06 as being “integrally related” to the eventual goal on elimination. This is evident too from Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s most recent authoritative statement on the subject – his message to the Global Zero Summit in London (22-23 June 2011) where he lauds Global Zero on having supported, ‘like India... the global elimination of nuclear weapons in a time-bound framework.’

3.10 The same position has been clearly presented by India’s Permanent Representative to the CD, at the CD’s 2010 Substantive Session on 30 March, 2010.

Our support for a Nuclear Weapons Convention providing for elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time-frame was reiterated by India’s Prime Minister at the 63<sup>rd</sup> UNGA. This is in keeping with the goal enshrined in the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan of 1988.

3.11 The same formulation was repeated in the First Committee of the 65<sup>th</sup> UNGA by the Indian delegate on 15 October 2010. While drawing attention to the link between India’s 2006 Working Paper and the RGAP of 1988 he said:

...India suggested a number of measures in this regard, including... a Nuclear Weapons Convention for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, within a specified time-frame.

3.12 Thus, while there is no contradiction between RGAP 88 and WP 06, India’s present emphasis, as Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh has noted, is on placing before the international community ‘a set of practical measures’ to ‘stimulate a debate and promote consensus on the way forward.’ Moreover, again as the Prime Minister has stated, India does not hold that ‘there is a rigid hierarchy among the steps and a specific sequencing for their implementation.’ This signals that India is open to other measures that others might like to propose to achieve the goal of nuclear disarmament.

3.13 Against this background, the seven steps incorporated in WP 06 are elaborated below:

**First**, let us look at the initiative stated at point 2 — **Reduction of the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines**. The dilution of value or utility of nuclear weapons would indeed have to be a pre-requisite for their elimination from national arsenals. How can their salience be reduced? One way of leaching nuclear weapons of their perceived utility would be to restrict the role and the circumstances in which the weapon can be used. If there was a universal treaty or understanding delineating these two parameters, the weapons would be restricted to very limited utility, and over a period of time, it would be possible to discard them. Fortunately, the idea of reducing the role of nuclear weapons has for the first time found an echo among NWS in President Obama’s speech at Prague in 2009. Among the steps that he outlined for reaching a world without nuclear weapons was the acceptance of a set of measures to be taken by the US to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy. Thus, the Nuclear Posture Review 2010 of the US conceives the use of nuclear weapons only in ‘extreme circumstances.’

An articulation of a narrow role for nuclear weapons holds the promise of disarmament as against doctrines that ascribe a multi-role utility to them. Several countries see them as a weapon:

- to offset their conventional military inferiority (Russia and Pakistan);
- to deter chemical and biological weapons (USA, Russia, France and India);
- to guard against regime change (North Korea);
- to retain prestige and status (UK and France); and
- to deter interference in the conduct of their foreign policy (Russia and China).

Each one of these perceptions enhances the utility of the nuclear weapon beyond its primary purpose of nuclear deterrence and hence motivates others to reach out for them. Therefore, as a first step, it would be necessary to undertake some redrafting of nuclear doctrines to reduce

the role of nuclear weapons if clearly defined. India, in this regard, leads by example since its nuclear doctrine prescribes but a narrow role to nuclear deterrence.

**Second**, the proposal at point 4 — **Negotiation of a global agreement among nuclear-weapon States on “no-first use” of nuclear-weapons** would also serve as a critical step towards nuclear disarmament. This would provide an assurance from every country that it would not be any first to introduce nuclear weapons into a conflict. Since there will not be any first use, this would effectively mean that there would be no use of nuclear weapons and hence a reduced dependence on the weapon in national security strategies over a period of time.

Of course, there are critics of the NFU who dismiss it as nothing more than a declaratory policy that means little once hostilities break out between nuclear nations. Such criticism, however, tends to overlook the fact that the adoption of NFU automatically translates into a certain kind of nuclear force posture, strategy and deployment pattern that ensures that the promise of NFU is kept. Doctrines that ascribe a war-fighting role to nuclear weapons envisage ‘first use’ to retain the military advantage and, therefore, adopt “launch on warning” or “launch under attack” postures, as also “pre-emption”. To undertake pre-emption both sides need a large infrastructure in the form of command and control, early warning, etc. NFU, on the other hand, frees the nation of such requirements. It allows for greater response time for self and a more relaxed posture for the adversary since he is liberated from the “use or lose” syndrome.

In fact, it must be highlighted that a universal NFU would be even more relevant as the number of nuclear weapons is reduced. With small nuclear forces, the temptation to launch a disarming first strike would be high because of “use them or lose them” compulsions. But an NFU posture would remove this temptation for self and the adversary. If the adversary is under constant fear that a nuclear strike is imminent, his own temptation to use nuclear force would be higher. Therefore, substantive reductions in warheads accompanied by acceptance of NFU would significantly contribute to preparing for a world without nuclear weapons.

Overall, an NFU has the potential to lessen inter-State tensions, increase mutual confidence and thus reinforce a cycle of positives. It would enhance the inclination towards non-proliferation

by sending a strong signal of the diminishing utility of nuclear weapons. This would be a first of its kind agreement amongst all NWS and would be of significant substantive and symbolic political value. It would lessen the drive of each NWS for new and modernized nuclear arsenals and thus lower inter-State tensions.

Meanwhile, NFU would allow the NWS to retain the notional sense of security that they derive from their national nuclear arsenals. NWS would only pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, but could always retaliate to inflict unacceptable damage. They would have the theoretical freedom to possess the weapons but would pledge not to use them first. Gradually, the desire to possess or improve an unusable weapon would lessen, making it easier to give up the weapon. Therefore, this step would work towards enhancing the gradual irrelevance of the nuclear weapon, especially when reinforced by a ban on the use or threat of use of the weapon, quite as on the pattern and experience of the 1925 Geneva Convention.

**Third, let us look at point 5 — Negotiation of a universal and legally binding agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.** In order to keep States which fall outside the nuclear umbrella non-nuclear, the NWS have provided an assurance or a guarantee not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons as instruments of pressure, intimidation or blackmail against States that have formally renounced these weapons. However, none of the NWS has actually made these assurances available unconditionally or as part of a binding legal agreement. For instance, nearly all, except China<sup>6</sup> maintain the right to use nuclear weapons to respond to attacks by an NNWS in alliance with or in association with other NWS.

The conclusion of a legally binding agreement that pledges the non-use of nuclear weapons against NNWS would reduce the attractiveness of the weapons for the non-possessors, whether allies or non-allies of other NWS, and would eventually remove the need for extended deterrence since NNWS would not fear a nuclear attack from other NWS. Therefore, security assurances would both provide credible guarantees of non-use of nuclear weapons against NNWS as also provide the benefit to NWS of not having to immediately renounce their nuclear arsenals,

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<sup>6</sup> There is some doubt as to whether the Chinese NFU applies to territories outside its present possession which it claims as its own, such as India's Arunachal Pradesh. Asked about this, the Chinese representative at the Global Zero Summit in London, 2011, denied that any such conditionalities applied to the Chinese NFU doctrine.



thus allowing them to maintain their notional sense of security until they are ready for the last step.

**Fourth**, one can consider point 6 of the seven measures — **Negotiation of a convention on the complete prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons**. It is noteworthy that India has been tabling a resolution to this effect in the UNGA since 1982.<sup>7</sup> The resolution aims at prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, a step that can substantially reduce the prospect of nuclear use and contribute towards the creation of a climate for a subsequent agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons in *toto*.

In case all NWS were to commit themselves under a convention to not using nuclear weapons and that any country using them or threatening to use them would face commensurate retribution and total boycott by all the countries of the world, it would make these WMD significantly less potent, indeed useless. The value of nuclear weapons would fall instantly and further proliferation would voluntarily stop. None would want to acquire weapons that could not be used, not even in war, and hence not as a deterrent either. Consequently, the unique security status that nuclear weapons are deemed to provide would no longer seem worth aspiring for. Meanwhile, even “rogue” states would no longer have any use for these weapons for fear of serious reprisals. Therefore, a total ban on the use of nuclear weapons would directly strike at the very root of their utility.

Interestingly, the UN General Assembly has periodically considered resolutions to this effect. As far back as in 1961, it had adopted a declaration by a vote of 55 to 20 with 26 abstentions stating that the use of nuclear weapons was contrary to the ‘spirit, letter and aims of the UN’. The US and NATO had then opposed it contending that in the event of aggression, the attacked nation should be free to take whatever action with whatever weapons not specifically banned by international law. India has long been proposing the resolution mentioned earlier for a multilateral, universal and binding agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons through an international convention. Predictably, the P5 have opposed the resolution

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<sup>7</sup> UN General Assembly Resolution 63/75 (L.15).

and propose instead a step-by-step process that embraces unilateral, bilateral and multilateral measures.<sup>8</sup> Ironically, Japan, for all its abhorrence of nuclear weapons, also abstains for reasons similar to those voiced by the US.

Meanwhile, the existing ‘Advisory Opinion’ delivered by the International Court of Justice in 1996 on the legality/illegality of use of nuclear weapons by a nation has not clearly removed the ambiguity over the issue.<sup>9</sup> The Court did conclude unanimously that a threat or use of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter and that fails to meet all the requirements of Article 51 on self defence would be unlawful. However, it could not conclude definitively whether such an act would be generally contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict and particularly to the principles and rules of humanitarian law, and also whether the act would be legally justified in an extreme circumstance of self defence when the survival of the state is at stake. NWS have taken advantage of this ambiguity in order to maintain nuclear arsenals for deterrence. However, the Court’s conclusion that there is no specific law prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons itself demands that the lacuna be removed through the enactment of a law or a convention.

A convention banning nuclear use, would, in fact, send an important signal to all concerned constituencies – it would devalue the weapon substantially as a currency of power and status; it would reduce the likelihood of a nuclear exchange between NWS; it would reassure the NNWS and reduce their temptation to acquire these weapons for deterrence; it would reinforce the taboo against nuclear use and this would influence non-state actors too.

3.14 It is evident from the above elaboration that India’s Working Paper 06 has sought to bring a dimension of practicality to moving towards disarmament. Small steps have been suggested for their easy acceptability as also their inherent potential of nuclear weapons gradually falling into disuse, thereby enabling countries to shed them from their national arsenals, while

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<sup>8</sup> See “Appendix: Summary of Resolutions”, *Disarmament Diplomacy* <<http://www.acronym.org>>

<sup>9</sup> However, Justice Christopher G. Weeramantry of Sri Lanka, who delivered the renowned judgment, is on record as holding that there is no ambiguity whatsoever about the Court’s view that any use of nuclear weapons would constitute a breach of international humanitarian law.  
[http://www.gsinstitute.org/mpi/pubs/A6F\\_Berlin\\_final.pdf](http://www.gsinstitute.org/mpi/pubs/A6F_Berlin_final.pdf)

remaining steadfast in maintaining that the seven steps are to be considered integrally and must eventually lead to a NWC which provides for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time-frame.

### Dealing with the existing non-proliferation agenda

3.15 As a country that has chosen to remain outside the NPT and which was eventually forced to declare itself a State with Nuclear Weapons, India has reasons to be sceptical about the dominant arms control paradigm which confuses non-proliferation with disarmament and sees the universalisation of a treaty like the NPT as a necessary condition for disarmament. Having said that, India has no objection to non-discriminatory and verifiable arms control and disarmament treaties which take as a starting point the current global realities, rather than the nuclear theology of the 1960s. The NPT has *de facto* allowed the P5 to maintain their nuclear weapons in exchange for a general obligation to disarm. The other part of the NPT bargain – the unrestricted right of the NNWS to the peaceful use of nuclear energy – is today coming under strain as the US and its allies seek to impose additional conditions, especially on the nuclear fuel cycle and sensitive (i.e. dual-use) nuclear technology.

3.16 Against this background, and with a view to promoting the flexibility it has recommended, the Group proposes:

#### **1. Sensitive nuclear exports**

In its agreements with the US and the 46-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group, India has undertaken not to supply enrichment and reprocessing technology and equipment to States that do not already possess these. While this commitment has gone down well with the West, developing and NAM countries which do not wish to compromise on their NPT-given rights to the full fuel cycle see this as a sign that India is in favour of a more restrictive international regime. On the other hand, however, India has also indicated it is willing to back a transparent and non-

discriminatory international fuel bank initiative as a supplier in order to ensure that States which choose not to develop their own ENR facilities are not handicapped in any manner.

## **2. FMCT**

India is committed to the negotiation of a “non-discriminatory, multilaterally negotiated and internationally verifiable” Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty at the Conference on Disarmament. Along with most CD member states, India is not in favour of the proposal made by some countries such as Pakistan that existing stockpiles also be brought within the ambit of the treaty (i.e. that it should be restricted to just a “cut-off”). With the CD paralysed by the opposition of Pakistan to the commencement of formal negotiations, the US has proposed taking the FMCT process outside the CD to an ad-hoc multilateral forum. This proposal has been opposed by Russia and China.

During the negotiation of the Indo-US nuclear agreement (including the NSG waiver process) some countries and NGOs sought to get India to agree to a moratorium on fissile material production pending the entry into force of an FMCT. While India is prepared to agree to a verifiable cut-off treaty, it has been reluctant to get dragged into making unilateral, unverifiable commitments of the kind some other NWS have made.

As in the Conference on Disarmament and elsewhere, India should continue to express support for convening negotiations on an FMCT and join other like-minded countries to ensure that the negotiation process gets underway at the earliest.

## **3. CTBT<sup>10</sup>**

As one of the countries included in Annex II, India must ratify the CTBT if it is to enter into force. So far, while most Annex II States have ratified the treaty, several others including the

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<sup>10</sup> For an alternative strategy please see Annex VI.

United States, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, Iran, Egypt, North Korea and Indonesia have yet to do so. Indonesia has begun the process of accession.

Shortly after the 1998 Pokhran nuclear tests, the Government of India announced a voluntary moratorium on further nuclear tests. This moratorium has been reiterated in joint statements with Pakistan and the United States, and the External Affairs Minister's letter to NSG States in September 2008. In addition, Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, when he was Prime Minister of India, said that India would not stand in the way of the CTBT entering into force, a statement seen around the world as an assurance that once all other Annex II States have ratified the treaty, India would do the same.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh modified this position slightly when he told the visiting Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama in December 2009 that an American and Chinese ratification of the CTBT might pave the way for India's accession.

As *The Hindu* reported:

Giving an account of his talks on the matter with Dr. Singh at the joint press conference later, Mr. Hatoyama told reporters that he had conveyed Tokyo's desire that India sign and ratify the CTBT. 'Globally there is a rising momentum of [the CTBT] entering into force. I expressed my hope that along with China and the USA, India will sign and ratify CTBT,' the Japanese leader said, adding: 'The [Indian] Prime Minister said with regard to the CTBT [that] should the U.S. and China sign, it will create a new situation.'

*The Hindu*, 30 December 2009

<http://www.hindu.com/2009/12/30/stories/2009123057570100.htm>

This formulation sits well with the belief in non-proliferation circles (including at the Preparatory Committee for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation) that the key to unlocking the CTBT's entry into force lies with the United States. China would follow soon thereafter. Pakistan would not accede without a sign from India. Egypt, Iran and Israel would have to come in together. Of course, India is likely to

examine closely the American and Chinese ratification and accession documents and will end up adopting the same definitions of what constitutes permissible activities under the CTBT.

3.14 The Group urges that New Delhi reiterate the message given by PM to Mr. Hatoyama in 2009. In other words, countries eager to see the early entry into force of the CTBT ought to direct their energies at the US Senate, whose ratification is needed. In the meanwhile, India will abide by its voluntary moratorium and not stand in the way of the CTBT entering into force.

## CHAPTER IV

### US AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT ISSUES

Meaningful progress in working towards a world without nuclear weapons is critically dependent upon the USA. This is due to its overwhelming international clout and its huge inventory of nuclear warheads - an estimated 9400 out of a global total of about 23000. In these circumstances, the US position in regard to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is of great import and merits evaluation.

4.2 For much of its history, the US has been totally averse to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. It engaged in a vigorous nuclear arms race with the USSR through the cold war, which resulted in nuclear warheads reaching a peak of about 70000 in 1985. In this period initially doctrines of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), designed to hold each others populations hostage to destruction, prevailed and later counterforce targeting came into vogue.

4.3 Through the Cold War, the US, of course, engaged in several arms control measures, some bilaterally with the USSR, others multilaterally. Notable amongst the former were the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Notable amongst the latter were the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Seabed Treaty and the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Indeed, the latter was used by the USA and the other nuclear weapon states both to curb horizontal proliferation and maintain their own monopoly of nuclear weapons.

4.4 In the lead up to the end of the Cold War, and following its termination, there were also some US-USSR/Russian bilateral nuclear disarmament agreements such as (SALT II), Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I, and Strategic Offensive Weapons Reduction Treaty (SORT) reducing nuclear weapon holdings of each country but leaving each with sufficient stockpiles to destroy the world several times over, because the reduced operational warheads will be moved into reserve. More significantly,

there was no endeavour to place these understandings in the wider context of a nuclear weapon free world. Worse still, US doctrines, despite the greatly attenuated Russian threat, came under the influence of Nuclear Use Theorists (NUTs) who envisaged the actual use of nuclear weapons for all manner of situations short of deterrence.

4.5 Thus the US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of 2002 considered the possible use of nuclear weapons (a) against hardened targets able to withstand conventional attack; (b) in retaliation against nuclear, chemical and biological attack and (c) in the event of surprising military developments. It contemplated a new triad of weapons comprising a mix of nuclear and non nuclear forces, defence systems and a responsive infrastructure comprising a hedge of nuclear weapons. It also advocated the building of new types of nuclear weapons, notably bunker-busters and low-yield weapons. Clearly, it viewed nuclear weapons as more usable than ever before.

4.6 In this backdrop, President Obama's calls for a world free of nuclear weapons constitutes a refreshing change from the past. Only once before has the USA seriously flirted with the idea of a nuclear weapons free world, first with the passage of the very first UNGA Resolution I(1) which called, *inter alia*, for the 'elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction' and then with the Baruch Plan presented in June 1946 to the UN Atomic Energy Commission, which was rejected by the Soviet Union as the US was not prepared to give up its monopoly on nuclear weapons until every aspect of it had taken effect. Two of the more notable conditions insisted upon by the US were that all phases of development and use of atomic energy would be under the control of an International Atomic Development Authority and that penalization for violation of the commitment not to weaponise would be exercised by the UNSC without the veto power.

4.7 Mention must also be made of the Reagan-Gorbachev Geneva summit of 1985 and their follow up meeting in October 1986 in Reykjavik where there was a substantial & meaningful meeting of minds between the two on nuclear disarmament. At the Geneva summit, the two agreed that a 'nuclear war cannot be won and must never be waged' and Reykjavik paved the



way for deep cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the two countries, as later concretised in the 1988 INF Treaty and the 1991 START I Treaty. However, the two sides could neither come to agreement on the issue of ballistic missiles and missile defence, they did not even attempt to address the issue of their respective non-strategic nuclear arsenals much less the issue of complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

4.8 In advocating a world free of nuclear weapons President Obama, in his 5 April 2009, Prague speech not only stated that this may not be achieved in his lifetime but also underlined that as ‘long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our Allies.’ Nevertheless, in this speech he also recognized that the existence of thousands of nuclear weapons was the ‘most dangerous legacy of the Cold War’, and that while the threat of global nuclear war was down, the risk of nuclear attack was up due to proliferation and terrorism. Accordingly, unlike any other US leader ever before he went on to assert that the US was committed to a nuclear weapon free world and in this endeavour it would take the lead. President Obama not only asserted the overarching goal but also spelt out the trajectory, which US policy would take towards this end of which the most notable elements may be detailed as follows:

- Reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy;
- Reduction in the US nuclear arsenal and, towards that end, the conclusion of a new START agreement with Russia;
- START to be followed by further reductions and all nuclear weapon states to be included in this endeavour;
- US ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT);
- Conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT);
- Strengthening of NPT, *inter alia*, through better international inspections, ‘real and immediate consequences’ for violating the rules or trying to leave the Treaty without cause, and a ‘new framework for civil nuclear cooperation’ including an international fuel bank so that countries can access peaceful power without increasing the risks of proliferation;

- In order to ensure that terrorists do not acquire nuclear weapons, all vulnerable nuclear materials should be secured the world over and efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism promoted into durable international institutions.

4.9 While no progress has so far been made on US ratification of the CTBT, the conclusion of the FMCT, or involvement of other Nuclear Weapon States in drawing down of their nuclear arsenals, there has been some forward movement on the other points mentioned above which had been touched upon by Obama at Prague.

4.10 Most heartening has been the reduction in the salience of nuclear weapons in US doctrines. This is evident from the US Nuclear Posture Review 2010 which categorically declares that the US ‘will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states’ party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear proliferation obligations. In respect of other states, the Review acknowledges that US nuclear weapons could still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack on it or its allies and partners. It, however, goes on to stress that such use of nuclear weapons would only be considered in ‘extreme circumstances’ and further contends that it will work to establish conditions under which the sole purpose of nuclear weapons would be to deter nuclear attack on the US and its allies and partners.

4.11 The follow on US-Russia START agreement has also been concluded and ratified by the USA. It awaits ratification by Russia. It places a cap of 1550 accountable strategic warheads and 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear capable heavy bombers. The draw down is to be achieved in seven years and is relatively modest particularly in strategic warheads as under SORT the reductions to be achieved by 31 December 2012 had been pegged at between 1700 and 2200. Moreover, START does not address the non-strategic nuclear arsenals of the two countries. The US Nuclear Posture Review 2010, however, indicates that the US will forgo the MIRVing of its deployed ICBMs.

4.12 The convening by President Obama of a Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010 to ‘discuss steps... to secure loose nuclear materials; combat smuggling; and deter, detect, and disrupt attempts at nuclear terrorism,’ was a further indication of his intent to carry through on the promises made by him in his Prague speech. A detailed work plan was adopted at the Summit building upon the many instrumentalities already in place and reinforcing the centrality of the IAEA in the area of nuclear security. Above all, the Summit symbolized the USA commitment to play a leadership role in addressing the nuclear threat.

4.13 UNSCR 1887 personally sponsored by President Obama in September 2009 seeks to strengthen the NPT. It calls for the universalisation of the Treaty, is focused on horizontal proliferation by a further tightening of restraints on non-nuclear weapon states but gives scant attention to nuclear disarmament with only two of the twenty nine operative paragraphs dealing with this issue. It is, however, significant that at the May 2010 NPT Review Conference, a world free of nuclear weapons was unambiguously articulated as the goal of nuclear disarmament. Acknowledged nuclear weapon states also committed themselves to continuing to work together to accelerate concrete progress on nuclear disarmament. Efforts to include a timeline for a negotiated nuclear weapons convention failed, but the disarmament action plan does include a timeline whereby the nuclear weapon states should report on their disarmament activities at the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee meeting. Furthermore, it was agreed that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

4.14 It is evident from the foregoing that President Obama has so far, by and large, acted upon what he promised at Prague in terms of working towards a nuclear weapon free world. While this is commendable, one needs to note that there are two flaws in the Obama approach. First, it is centred on further strengthening the NPT which is a discriminatory Treaty and as Amitabh Mattoo puts it has ‘failed its own charter, and any attempt to resuscitate it will only erode the objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It is time to think of a new non-proliferation and disarmament architecture...’ Secondly, the Obama approach is too gradual and does not espouse the idea of immediately engaging in multilateral negotiations on a

Convention on seeking the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in a non-discriminatory and time-bound fashion. Nevertheless, given Obama's commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons, which is far greater than that of any of his predecessors, and given the fact that meaningful movement towards this objective can only come with US support, it would be prudent to lose no opportunity to engage with the US on this issue.

4.15 There is a ready forum for engagement on disarmament related issues with the US by way of the Strategic Security Dialogue chaired on our side by the Foreign Secretary. Our endeavour should be to persuade it to evolve a methodology and timetable for the achievement of a nuclear weapon free world through negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), which would also establish a new non-proliferation architecture replacing the NPT. In this exercise we enjoy an advantage over many others as there are many shared ideas that characterize our respective nuclear disarmament policies notably on securing nuclear weapons, steps to combat nuclear terrorism, a stop to testing, conclusion of the FMCT, reduction of salience of nuclear weapons in doctrines, creation of an international nuclear fuel bank etc, provided always that step-by-step measures are integrally linked to the end-goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons in a reasonable time-frame. Indeed, we should not hesitate to engage in step by step actions designed to promote nuclear disarmament which are being espoused by the US and which are in themselves unexceptionable as a means to cause the US to be more mindful of the logic of the positions espoused by us, but of course, we, for our part, should not hesitate either in linking step-by-step to the end-goals of RGAP 88. There has been a backlash within the US Establishment at Obama's efforts in support of the cause of a nuclear weapons free world, but this was only to be expected and it is for our diplomacy to keep the US on track towards President Obama; ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapon.

4.16 In engaging the US we need to repeatedly play on the concerns expressed by President Obama that as long as nuclear weapons exist there will always be the threat of their use and hence their early elimination is essential. We should also underline, as he has acknowledged, that as long as nuclear weapons exist their proliferation is likely to take place and terrorists will sooner or later gain access to them. Furthermore, we need to underline in our dialogue with the

US that its own security is much better served in a world free of nuclear weapons in the context of the tremendous conventional weapon superiority enjoyed by it over all other powers. In the years to come this superiority will only increase and weaker powers would be deprived of an equalizer by way of nuclear weapons.

4.17 Notwithstanding our efforts at persuading the US to move towards the Indian position on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, it is unlikely that they will make a major adjustment in the foreseeable future. However, we should endeavour to build incrementally on the common ground achieved in the matter in the joint communiqué issued during Obama's visit to India. Towards this end, we should attempt to at least push the US to endorse the idea of starting discussions without a negotiating mandate in the CD on the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. If this occurs, at least the ball will be set in motion for working towards a Convention on the Complete Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. In addition, we should consider exploring the idea of urging the USA to consider the following ideas:

- Adopting a more unqualified No First Use doctrine and calling on all other nuclear armed states to do likewise in the framework of an international convention: this will vastly reduce the salience of nuclear weapons;
- Concluding an agreement with Russia on the lines of the follow on START agreement for a substantial reduction of the thousands of non-strategic nuclear weapons in their inventories;
- Initiation of discussions with the other nuclear armed states for a freeze on their nuclear warhead inventories and evolving a methodology for draw down of these inventories in tandem with the draw down of US and Russian inventories;

4.18 On our part, we should be ready for agreeing to a number of initiatives proposed by the USA such as signing on to the CTBT provided they ratify it and other hold outs come on board. This should pose no problem as we have virtually forsworn testing. We should also push for early negotiations on the FMCT, joining the Container Security Initiative, examining the possibility of joining the Proliferation Security Initiative, etc. But in all this we should never

waver from the point of principle that the reduction and control of nuclear weapons does not amount to the elimination of nuclear weapons and that, therefore, there can be no guarantee of durable peace until we have a world without nuclear weapons. Tactical diplomatic considerations might oblige us from time to time to downplay this or state it in undertones, but we must remain steadfast in keeping our eye, and everyone else's eye, on a world order free of nuclear weapons and anchored in nonviolence.

## CHAPTER V

### NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES (OTHER THAN THE US) AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT ISSUES

#### China

China's official positions on nuclear disarmament can be summarized as follows. Beijing insists that it has long maintained a Non-First Use position and has called on other nuclear weapon states to follow suit. In addition, China has pledged negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states under the NPT and to various nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ). It opposes the deployment of nuclear weapons outside national territories of nuclear weapon states and calls for abandoning nuclear umbrellas and nuclear sharing policies. It has supported efforts to start negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT) and has signed but not ratified the CTBT. It is believed to have stopped producing weapon-grade highly enriched uranium and military plutonium, although it retains a stockpile sufficient for future expansion of its nuclear arsenal should the need arise. At the RevCon, the Chinese Ambassador, holding that this RevCon bears greatly on the prospects of international non-proliferation regime and the future of the international disarmament process, stressed the need to complete the CTBT and FMCT processes; negotiating an international treaty on No-First-Use (NFU); and adopt viable, long-term and phased actions towards nuclear disarmament. He also emphasized the newer obstacles to disarmament like Missile Defence programmes and upheld the right of NPT states to use peaceful nuclear energy.

5.2 Beijing in principle endorses the vision of a nuclear-free world; its known positions on related issues include:

- *CTBT*. China has yet to ratify the treaty but maintains a moratorium on testing. It calls for restraint on research and development of new types of nuclear weapons and reduction of their role in the national security strategy. China is actively involved

in the preparation for the treaty's entry into force and hosts twelve international monitoring stations in China. There have been no signs of Chinese plans to ratify the treaty. It should be noted that the PLA resisted the signing of the CTBT but was persuaded to accept the government position. Chinese officials say that US ratification will provide a positive environment for China.

- **FMCT** China reportedly stopped producing weapon-grade fissile materials in the early 1990s. Beijing's official position supports negotiation of a legally binding treaty, but Beijing has been unwilling to commit to a certified moratorium. Chinese analyses suggest that given the uncertainty generated by US missile defence plans, the growing gap in conventional capabilities, and space weaponization, there may be a need for future production to maintain a relative safety margin.

- **De-alerting and de-targeting** China maintains an NFU position and calls on other nuclear weapon states to follow suit. China's 2008 Defence White Paper suggests that only if it comes under nuclear threat will its nuclear missile force go into a state of alert. China's current strategic nuclear arsenals are reportedly separated from ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which are not fuelled. China has also pledged negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon member states of the NPT and NWFZ. In 1994, China and Russia signed a de-targeting agreement. China and the United States signed a non-targeting agreement in 1998 during President Bill Clinton's visit to China. Both agreements commit the parties not to target nuclear missiles at each other. The 2008 Defence White Paper reaffirms this position:

In peacetime the nuclear missile weapons of the Second Artillery Force are not aimed at any country.

However, with road-mobile ICBMs and a new generation of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines entering into service, this situation may change.



- **Materials security** China officially maintains that its nuclear arsenals and nuclear facilities are secured, and it has adopted a material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) program to enhance their protection against nuclear terrorism. It is also implementing provisions in accordance with its obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1540.
- **Arsenal reductions** China supports legally binding, verifiable, and irreversible nuclear disarmament measures and, in particular, calls on Russia and the United States to continue undertaking “drastic” cuts of their nuclear arsenals, with some suggesting a number below 1,000 for each. Chinese analysts note that the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, or the Moscow Treaty) does not fall into the category of irreversible nuclear disarmament because reduced operational warheads would be moved into reserve, so the total numbers will remain large.
- **Ballistic missiles** Beijing remains opposed to ballistic missile defences and has not indicated any interest in the proposal for multilateral missile defence and early warning arrangements. China continues to call for negotiation of a treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) due to its concerns over space being increasingly used as part of the US military dominance, in particular in C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) in support of its conventional long-range and precision strike capabilities and missile defences.
- **NPT** China supports the NPT and its three pillars, which emphasize peaceful use in addition to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Chinese analysts note the challenge of growing demands for civilian nuclear reactors and the potential for proliferation but have not engaged in detailed discussions on alternative international nuclear fuel cycle management proposals.
- **NWFZ** China supports the principle of NWFZ and has pledged unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them (or against non-nuclear

weapon states). Beijing's official position is that China respects and supports efforts by states to establish NWFZ.

5.3 **US and China** China's positions on nuclear arms control and disarmament are likely to be influenced by four aspects of US policy:

1) The overall strategic orientation of US nuclear doctrine, nuclear posture, and nuclear weapons use, especially where they may affect vital Chinese interests in the Taiwan Strait.

2) The perception of US efforts to develop new types of nuclear weapons, which are relatively low in yield and radiation and have enhanced ability to penetrate hardened underground facilities and therefore reduce the nuclear threshold.

3) US missile defence deployments in East Asia, which are regarded as a serious threat to China's strategic deterrence capabilities. Given the size and sophistication of its small nuclear arsenal, survival of a first strike is critical to maintaining the credibility and reliability of its deterrence. Despite Washington's assurance that it only wants a limited missile defence not directed at China, Beijing continues to seek - and this may well explain its current nuclear modernization efforts - to reverse the potential imbalance that could be caused by US missile defence plans.

4) Superiority of US conventional long-range, precision-guided weapons that could, Chinese military and civilian experts fear, support a disarming non-nuclear first strike, leaving China effectively defenceless.

These concerns may well become significant impediments to Chinese participation in nuclear disarmament and certainly could strengthen the hands of opponents, both institutional and individual, to adoption of the measures and steps proposed in the Shultz *et al* articles and in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

In practical terms, these opponents' concerns about the possible negative impact of these measures on Chinese security act as strong disincentives to negotiating an FMCT or ratifying the CTBT.

Clearly, *limited proposals relating to nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation* are more acceptable to Beijing than far-reaching disarmament steps, since nuclear terrorism and WMD proliferation pose serious threats to China.

China's support of an FMCT and its ratification of the CTBT will largely be conditional on its assessment of future needs for nuclear weapons development, which in turn is influenced by its threat perceptions and coincidence in its defence capabilities, nuclear as well as conventional. The more coincidence it has in its conventional military capabilities and a survivable nuclear arsenal, the more likely it is to engage in multilateral nuclear disarmament processes. At the same time, China continues to shun bilateral or multilateral negotiations on freezing—much less reducing—its nuclear arsenal, citing the large gap that continues to exist between its arsenal and those of the United States and Russia.

**5.4 Engaging China:** For carrying forward the ideas contained in RGAP 88, it is essential that we engage with China. It is understood that the Special Political Representatives (SPR), who were initially appointed to deal only with border issues, have now been encouraged to widen their dialogue to take other issues of high political importance. The Group recommends that issues of nuclear disarmament be incorporated into the SPR's dialogue.

## France

### 5.5 Disarmament and Commitments to Reduce Arsenal Size

- Legal obligation to pursue global disarmament under Article VI of the NPT.
- Presumably disassembled 175 warheads associated with four systems removed from service.

- Then-President Chirac's new nuclear plans for 1997-2002 announced in February 1996 resulted in dismantling several weapon systems.
- Reduced its nuclear arsenal by half in nearly 10 years.
- No nuclear weapons in reserve.
- Cessation of plutonium production in 1992, and of highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons in 1996.
- Decided to shut down and dismantle its facilities for fissile material production and testing sites.
- Completely dismantled its ground-to-ground nuclear component.
- Voluntarily reduced the number of its missile launching nuclear submarines in service by one third.

#### *Future Commitments*

- In support of negotiating verifiable FMCT. The treaty should not cover existing stockpiles.
- In his speech given on March 21, 2008, President Nicolas Sarkozy announced a cut of one-third of the air-based nuclear weapons including missiles and aircrafts. He announced the total number of nuclear warheads was less than 300.

## **5.6 Nuclear Weapons Policies**

### *1. Nuclear testing*

- Last test on January 27, 1996 at Fangataufa (South Pacific)
- March 26, 1996: signature of the Rarotonga Treaty, creating a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in the South Pacific (in force since September 20, 1996)
- Signed and ratified Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (ratification deposited since April 6, 1998).

2. *Use of nuclear weapons*

- Retains first use policy.
- Negative Security Assurances to NWFZ treaty members: Committed not to use nuclear weapons against states parties to Tlatelolco (1968, covering Latin America and the Caribbean), Pelindaba (1996, covering Africa), and Rarotonga (1985, covering the South Pacific) treaties. Has not signed the Bangkok Treaty (1995, covering South East Asia. All NWS are required to sign its Protocol whereby they undertake not to violate this treaty and not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. None have signed.).
- Acknowledged the commitments of the NWS to negative security assurances in UN Security Council Resolution 984 (1995).
- Absolute guarantee of no use or threat of use of nuclear weapons except in an extreme circumstance of legitimate self-defence.

***Nuclear disarmament: France's concrete commitment***

What France has done

What France has decided

What France proposes with its European partners

5.7 France's actions in the areas of proliferation control, arms control and disarmament are guided by constant principles: to strive for a safer world and a more just international order founded on the rule of law and collective security, to prevent threats to peace, to respect the right of self-defence, to opt out of the arms race and move towards general and complete disarmament. In accordance with the objectives of the NPT in terms of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament, with which it has associated itself, France has taken significant unilateral measures. As the French President reiterated on 21 March 2008 in his speech at Cherbourg, France bases its concept of deterrence on the principle of strict sufficiency. France has always made sure to maintain its nuclear arsenal at the lowest possible level, compatible with the strategic context.

What France has done

5.8 France has an exemplary record - and unique in the world - regarding nuclear disarmament: France was, along with the United Kingdom, the first State to have signed and ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the first State to have decided to shut down and dismantle its facilities for the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, the only nuclear weapon State to have transparently dismantled its nuclear test site in the Pacific, the only State to have dismantled its ground-to-ground nuclear missiles, the only State to have voluntarily reduced by one-third the number of its nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN).

What France has decided

5.9 In 2008, the French President announced the reduction by one-third of the number of nuclear weapons, missiles and aircraft of the airborne component. After this reduction, the total French arsenal will comprise fewer than 300 nuclear warheads, i.e. half of the maximum number of warheads that France had during the Cold War. By providing this information, France is completely transparent, because it has no weapons other than those in its operational stockpiles.

5.10 As an additional demonstration of a desire for transparency, the French President decided to invite international experts to come and observe the dismantling of the facilities for the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons at Pierrelatte and Marcoule. France organized this tour on 16 September 2008 for representatives from more than 40 Member States of the Conference on Disarmament, and on 16 March 2009 for non-governmental experts. This is the first time that a State with nuclear weapons has opened the doors of its former military nuclear facilities.

5.11 In addition, France has worked constantly and concretely for disarmament at the international level. During France's presidency of the European Union in 2008, it resolutely committed itself to ensuring that Europe draw up, for the first time, ambitious disarmament initiatives.

## **What France proposes, with its European partners**

5.12 Based on proposals made by the Head of State at Cherbourg, France, together with its European partners, put forward an action plan for disarmament, endorsed by the 27 Heads of State and Government of the European Union in December 2008, with a view to the 2010 NPT Review Conference:

- ▶ the universal ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the completion of its verification regime, as well as the dismantling as soon as possible of all nuclear testing facilities, in a way that is transparent and open to the international community;

- ▶ the opening without delays or preconditions of negotiations for a treaty to ban the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, and the establishment of an immediate moratorium on the production of these materials;

- ▶ the development of confidence-building and transparency measures by the nuclear powers;

- ▶ further progress in the discussions under way between the United States and Russia on the development of a legally binding arrangement post-START, as well as an overall reduction in the world stock of nuclear weapons in accordance with Article VI of the NPT, in particular by the States that possess the largest arsenals;

- ▶ the taking into account of tactical nuclear weapons, by the States that possess them, in the overall processes of arms control and disarmament, with a view to their reduction and elimination;

- ▶ the opening of consultations on a treaty to ban short- and medium-range ground-to-ground missiles;

- ▶ the accession to and implementation of The Hague Code of Conduct by all States;
  
- ▶ beyond that, mobilization in all other areas of disarmament

5.13 **Engaging France:** As one of the P5 it is essential to engage France. Like India, France believes in comprehensive disarmament, which is entirely consistent with RGAP 88. France differs with India in the emphasis on the steps to be taken to reach that goal. It believes non-proliferation is a crucial first step. Since France believes that nuclear deterrence has served it well for over 50 years, it is likely to be one of the last to give up nuclear weapons. This distance has not stopped India and France from having a vibrant Strategic Dialogue. Except for its positions on NFU and an NWC France has much in common with India's Working Paper of 2006.

## **Russia**

### 5.14 **Disarmament and Commitments to Reduce Arsenal Size**

- Legal obligation to pursue global disarmament under Article VI of the NPT.
  
- Under the New Start Treaty that entered into force on 5 February 2011, the United States and Russia agreed to reduce their deployed strategic warheads to no more than 1,550 each; to deploy no more than 700 ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers; and to limit ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers and heavy bombers to no more than 800 whether deployed or not.
  
- Reduced arsenals under INF and START I
  
- On the whole, as of 1 January 2010, Russia had eliminated about 1,600 launchers of ICBM, and SLBM, 3,100 ICBMs and SLBMs, 47 nuclear submarines, and 67 heavy bombers.



*Future commitments*

- Russia supports a verifiable FMCT, provided that it does not cover existing stockpiles.
- Russia is not ready to set a target date to start negotiations with the United States on reducing tactical nuclear weapons, while the United States is seeking negotiations within a year after the entry into force of the New Start Treaty.

**5.15 Nuclear Weapons Policy**

*Nuclear testing*

- Has observed nuclear testing moratorium since 1990.
- Signed and ratified CTBT.
- Party to PTBT (banning nuclear tests in atmosphere, in outer space, and under water).

*Use of nuclear weapons*

- Retains first use policy.
- Negative Security Assurances to NWFZ treaty members: Committed not to use nuclear weapons against members of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga. Has signed but not yet ratified Pelindaba. Has not signed Bangkok.<sup>1</sup>
- Acknowledged the commitments of the NWS to negative security assurances are set out in UN Security Council Resolution 984 (1995).
- In the new Military Doctrine issued in February 2010, the criteria for the use of nuclear weapons have become tighter. It allows the use of nuclear weapons when the very existence of Russia is under threat.” The 2000 Doctrine allowed the use of nuclear weapons “in situations critical for the national security.”

5.16 The Russian leadership regards nuclear disarmament as a distant goal, a theoretical rather than practical notion. This attitude is based on the belief that nuclear weapons support an important mission in the context of national security policy. Thus, Russian disarmament

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<sup>1</sup> Same as in the case of France, except not ratifying Pelindaba, the African NWFZ Treaty.

policy primarily concentrates on the near-term goal of maintaining a stable strategic balance with the United States at a reduced level of nuclear weapons.

5.17 Controversy over missile defence has emerged in recent years as the central stumbling block to engaging Russia on arms control.

5.18 Concern about China is probably one of the reasons behind the Russian initiative (now a joint US-Russian proposal) to make the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) multilateral. Although Russian officials do not publicly point fingers at China, behind closed doors they freely admit that China's growing sub-strategic nuclear capability is a concern.

5.19 With regard to *tactical nuclear weapons* (TNW), Russia has remained almost completely silent. TNW are barely mentioned; when they are, they are linked to the withdrawal of US TNW from Europe. Because this class of weapons apparently does not have a place in Russian nuclear strategy (TNW are only promoted by conservative nongovernmental experts, never by officials or active-duty military), it appears that Russia views Western interest in them as a lever with which to achieve withdrawal from Europe of US TNW, one of its long-standing objectives.

5.20 *Current official Russian policy foresees that reliance on nuclear weapons will decrease in another ten to twelve years, thanks to a policy of "asset substitution"—the replacement of nuclear with conventional deterrence.* While it is doubtful that the conventional rearmament program can be implemented in that period of time, the overall orientation toward viewing nuclear deterrence as a temporary fix for security problems is an encouraging sign. At the very least, it suggests that current policy is not set in stone and that the Russian government may be amenable to the vision of a non-nuclear world, if only in the distant future.

5.21 **Engaging with Russia:** Precisely because it will require a great deal of persuasion to bring Russia round to seriously even considering RGAP ideas, it is for India to leverage its

long-standing and time-tested relationship with Russia to secure their engagement. Regular consultations at the Foreign Secretary and higher levels are well-established feature of the India-Russia relationship. It would be of the essence to match the engagement on RGAP into engagement with Russia, for these are the two NWS in whose hands is to be found the key to achieving disarmament.

## **United Kingdom**

### **5.22 Disarmament and Commitments to Reduce Arsenal Size**

- Legal obligation to pursue global disarmament under Article VI of the NPT.
- During the 1970s, size of arsenal peaked at around 500 warheads. Currently estimated to be fewer than 160 operational warheads.
- The last of 100 WE 177 A/B Nuclear Gravity Bombs (NGB) dismantled at AWE Aldermaston in 1998.
- Since dismantling the last Chevaline warhead (used on Polaris SLBMs) in 2002, no further cuts undertaken.
- In March 2009, then UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced that ‘Britain has cut the number of its nuclear warheads by 50 % since 1997’ and noted that ‘our operationally available warheads now number fewer than 160.’
- In May 2010, Foreign Secretary William Hague announced to Parliament that the UK’s overall stockpile of nuclear warheads will not exceed 225 and it will retain up to 160 operationally available warheads.

#### *Future Commitment*

- In support of negotiating verifiable FMCT negotiations without preconditions. The treaty should not cover existing stockpiles.
- On February 5, 2008, at the Conference on Disarmament, then UK Secretary of State for Defence Des Browne illustrated its concrete plan on how to

contribute to dismantling nuclear warheads including a technical cooperation initiative between the UK's Atomic Weapons Establishment and the Norwegian government to develop technology to verify warhead dismantlement. Both the United Kingdom and Norway presented an update to their findings at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

### 5.23 **Nuclear Weapons Policies**

- In 2006, the United Kingdom decided to renew the nuclear submarines used as launching platforms for the UK's Trident nuclear missile system. Nevertheless, the UK is considered as the strongest supporter of multilateral disarmament among the nuclear weapon states.
- In May 2010, Defence Secretary Dr. Liam Fox stated that 'Openness and transparency are essential if we are to move towards multilateral disarmament. This is an important step forward and a significant contribution from the UK Government to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference... We remain committed to the nuclear deterrent and I welcome the opportunity to review the circumstances in which our weapons could be used.'
- 'The UK has a vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, in partnership with everyone who shares that ambition, we intend to make further progress towards this vision in the coming years.' — Then UK Secretary of State for Defence Des Browne, February 5, 2008 at the Conference on Disarmament. Des Browne, now Lord Browne, has, since Labour's defeat, become very active in civil society on nuclear disarmament issues.

### *Nuclear Testing*

- Observed nuclear testing moratorium since 1991.
- Signed and ratified CTBT.

- Party to PTBT (banning nuclear tests in atmosphere, in outer space, and under water test).

#### *Use of Nuclear Weapons*

- Retains first-use policy.
- Negative Security Assurances to NWFZ treaty members: Committed not to use nuclear weapons against members of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, and Pelindaba. Has not signed Bangkok Treaty.
- Acknowledged the commitments of the NWS to negative security assurances in UN Security Council Resolution 984 (1995).
- Foreign Secretary William Hague stated that ‘The UK has long been clear that we would only consider using nuclear weapons in self-defence, including the defence of our NATO allies. However we are prepared to look again at our declaratory policy to ensure that it is fully appropriate to the political and security context in 2010 and beyond, and we will begin this work now.’

5.24 The UK has been a strong advocate of multilateral disarmament and since the end of the Cold War has undertaken several nuclear arms reduction measures which have resulted in reducing the explosive power of the British nuclear arsenal by 75% and the UK becoming the only nuclear weapon state recognised under the NPT to have reduced its deterrent capability to a single system.

5.25 Under the Labour Government, this commitment to multilateral disarmament was frequently reiterated by both the then Prime Minister, Gordon Brown and the then Foreign Secretary, David Miliband and in 2009 the Government published two documents which set out the UK’s position and thinking with regard to achieving that long term aim: the February 2009 FCO policy information paper entitled *Lifting the Nuclear Shadow: Creating the Conditions for Abolishing Nuclear Weapons*; followed in July 2009 by the Cabinet Office document *The Road to 2010*.

5.26 The FCO policy paper concluded that the entire international community must agree on ‘an assertive and co-operative strategy’ if the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world is to be achieved. Specifically the paper suggested that three main sets of conditions need to be put in place before a state of global zero can even be considered, all of which broadly reflect the three pillars of the NPT: a watertight non-proliferation regime (which still exploits the benefits of nuclear energy); arsenals need to be reduced and an international legal framework which progressively tightens constraints on nuclear weapons needs to be constructed, while the technical, political and institutional challenges of moving to global zero without destabilising international security need to be addressed. Recognising the challenge of achieving those conditions, the document went on to set out what was considered attainable toward that larger goal over the immediate period ahead:

1. Stopping further proliferation and securing agreement among all NPT states that the way forward must include tougher measures to prevent proliferation and tighten security, and the implementation of such measures, including practical help to those states which need it.
2. Working with the IAEA to help states that want to develop a civil nuclear energy industry to do so in ways which are secure and minimise the proliferation risk.
3. Completing US-Russian negotiations and agreement on substantial reductions in their nuclear arsenals, complemented by the efforts of the other nuclear weapon states to keep their own forces to an absolute minimum.
4. Bringing the CTBT into force, banning all nuclear weapons test explosions and thereby constraining the development of nuclear weapons.
5. Starting negotiations, without preconditions, and subsequently making progress on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.
6. Starting discussions on the political, military and technical issues which will need to be resolved if global zero is to be achieved.

5.27 While *Lifting the Nuclear Shadow* set out the Labour government’s disarmament vision, *The Road to 2010* went one step further and set out the Labour government’s practical

agenda for action on the three pillars of the NPT (proliferation, disarmament and peaceful nuclear use) in the run-up to the nuclear security conference in Washington in April and the NPT Review Conference in May 2010. Specifically *The Road to 2010* identified the need to address:

• **Non-proliferation and disarmament**

- Increasing transparency with regard to nuclear weapons holdings and posture including by those states which are not signatories to the NPT.
- Dealing robustly with states that are in contravention of their NPT obligations and encouraging those states which are not party to the NPT to sign and ratify it.
- Ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which is regarded as a key milestone in the disarmament process.
- Taking forward the work that will enable negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty to begin. The UK has indicated that verification measures for the FMCT could be undertaken through its Nuclear Centre of Excellence.
- Strengthening the Proliferation Security Initiative.
- Establishing a Middle East WMD free zone.
- Developing new measures for tackling the financing of proliferation. The Counter Terrorism Act 2008, for example, gave the Government new powers to respond when the development of nuclear weapons overseas poses a risk to the UK. The UK is also taking the lead through the Financial Action Task Force to address how proliferation finance safeguards could be brought into the system of internationally agreed standards against illicit financing.
- Implementing effective export controls in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and universal adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocols.
- Establishing confidence building measures that would allow states to contemplate moving towards 'global zero', including moves to reduce the relevance of nuclear weapons in each nations defence plans, establishing new structures to manage international crises

and renewed dialogue on conventional arms control so the reduction of nuclear weapons does not prompt a conventional arms race.

- **Nuclear energy**

- Assisting states to utilise their rights under the NPT to peaceful uses of nuclear energy – through Nuclear Cooperation Agreements, the UK provides assistance to prospective civil nuclear states and provides substantial funding through the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund.

- Persuading all states to sign up to the IAEA Additional Protocol.

- Examining multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the establishment of an international fuel bank which would allow countries developing new nuclear programmes to reliably access the fuel and related services they need to generate power without the need to invest in enrichment and re-processing infrastructure thereby increasing the proliferation risk. Exploring this option on a regional basis and within the framework of the IAEA is regarded by the UK as a crucial approach. The UK would also establish a Nuclear Centre of Excellence to enable the UK to be at the forefront of international efforts to improve access to the peaceful use of nuclear energy while preventing nuclear proliferation. As noted above, it is also envisaged that the centre may play a role in the future in developing the verification mechanisms needed to support a future Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

5.28 *The Road to 2010* also argued that the decision to renew Trident is fully compatible with the UK's NPT obligations, because failing to renew the system would effectively set the UK on the path to unilateral nuclear disarmament, which is not required by the Treaty.

5.29 In its working paper submitted to the NPT preparatory committee in 2007 the Government also argued that the replacement of Trident equated to retention and not modernisation of its deterrent.



5.30 **Engaging the United Kingdom:** India should strongly take up RGAP elements in its existing strategic dialogue with the UK. France and the UK have a number of common approaches to disarmament issues, apart from being members of the P5. It will be a powerful ally in NATO should the US – India dialogue, including RGAP, proceed well. It is one country that is already putting together practical elements that will be required in a world without nuclear weapons, such as its efforts with the Norwegian government on developing technology to assist in the verification of warhead dismantlement. India and the UK could explore such practical possibilities as well.

## **CHAPTER VI**

### **SNW/NEAR-SNW AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT ISSUES**

#### **(Pakistan, Israel, Iran, DPRK)**

##### **Pakistan**

Pakistan became an SNW on 28 May 1998, following India's Pokhran-II explosion on 11 May 1998. Reports suggest that Pakistan may at present possess between 80 and 100 nuclear weapons and has suitable vectors to deliver them. Pakistan is also known to be diligently piling up fissionable material to bridge the gap with India and to improve her capacity to deliver bombs. The Pakistan authorities are categorical that their nuclear weapons programme is designed to counter the threat they perceive from India, both nuclear and conventional, it being further argued that their possession of nuclear weapons enables them to reduce the perceived disadvantage they have vis-à-vis India in conventional armaments. Moreover, Pakistan is increasingly truculent about the favoured terms being extended to India, but (thus far, at any rate) denied to them in matters of international nuclear commerce, with the Pakistani National Command Authority expressing "concern ov'r policies and trends of selectivity, exceptionalism and discrimination relating to strategic export control regimes'. The underlying message that is being passed through these statements is to press for "new membership criteria" for strategic regimes rather than 'discriminatory criteria, tailor-made to suit only one country.'

6.2 **FMCT** – In 2010 Pakistan adopted an intransigent position on the negotiations of the FMCT in the CD. In 2009, the CD had agreed on a programme of work and it was widely perceived that the body would finally be able to begin work on the conclusion of an FMCT. But, Pakistan expressed its opposition on the matter and blocked movement thereby leading to a breakdown of the consensus and a non-functional CD.

6.3 Pakistan's main objection to the FMCT pertains to the need to widen the scope of the treaty from only proscribing future production of fissile material to one that allows for "inclusion" and "reduction" of existing stockpiles. Pakistan argues that the FMCT could be deemed as a move towards disarmament only when it worked towards removing the existing asymmetries

in stockpiles of fissile material. Interestingly, Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the CD, Zamir Akram expressed the need for the CD to have '*a priori* knowledge of what we are seeking to negotiate – an FMCT which is a non-proliferation measure or an FMCT which is a disarmament initiative.'<sup>1</sup>

6.4 Frustrated by the Pakistani blocking of the CD, countries have been voicing the need for negotiating and concluding the FMCT in another forum. However, Pakistan has expressed its opposition to such a move. In its every statement at the CD over the last two years, Pakistan has maintained that the 'CD is the sole forum to negotiate disarmament agreements. Any attempt to take the FMCT out of the CD, will be an empty initiative.'

6.5 Meanwhile, Pakistan has been engaged in a rapid build-up of its fissile material stockpiles of both enriched uranium as well as plutonium. Pakistan is relatively new to the plutonium based weapons, but since 2007 feverish activity has been reported on the construction of its Khushab plutonium producing reactors as well as the reprocessing plant. There is little doubt that Pakistan is keen to bridge the perceived asymmetry on fissile material stockpiles with India or at least use that as a pretext to put the NWS on the defensive by articulating that 'it cannot agree to negotiations on a FMCT in the CD owing to the discriminatory waiver provided by the NSG to our neighbour for nuclear cooperation... as this arrangement will further accentuate asymmetry...'

6.6 **NPT** – In the past Pakistan has been known to criticize the NPT for being discriminatory, but for a long time it did maintain that it would join the treaty if India would. The position today, however, is quite different. Islamabad has become more vocal in its criticism of the treaty since India has been exceptionalised from its requirement to join the treaty and accept full scope safeguards for its entry into international nuclear commerce. Without naming any country, Akram in his statement to the CD in 2010 lambasted those that had concluded nuclear cooperation agreements with India for violating the NPT. In 2010, Pakistan declared that nuclear weapons

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<sup>1</sup> Statement by Ambassador Zamir Akram at the CD, Geneva, 18 Feb 2010.

were essential for its security and will not sign the NPT as a NNWS even in the case of India joining the treaty as NNWS<sup>2</sup>.

6.7 **CTBT** – On this Pakistan continues to maintain that it would consider joining the treaty once other major countries have done so. Pakistan voted for the CTBT at the United Nations in September 1996, but rejected signing the treaty on the grounds that India had not signed. Pakistan continues to maintain its old position on the CTBT which states that Pakistan was not the first to start nuclear testing; that it will not be the first to resume testing; and that it will not stand in the way of the implementation of the CTBT<sup>3</sup>.

6.8 **Nuclear Disarmament** – Until recently Pakistan largely adopted the same approach to nuclear arms control and disarmament as India. In fact, Islamabad often justified its inability to accept many an international treaty, like the NPT or the CTBT until India would do so. However, in the last few years and especially since the grant of the NSG waiver to India in 2008, Pakistan has adopted a more independent position on these issues and often argued that its national security interests would dictate its approach to arms control and disarmament, irrespective of the Indian position on the matter. In its official statements at the CD and elsewhere, Pakistan has expressed its readiness to engage in substantive negotiations on nuclear disarmament, which it describes as the '*raison d'être*' of the CD. Despite the lack of consensus on the FMCT, Pakistan argues that negotiations on nuclear disarmament could yet be started, and takes every opportunity to rub in the fact that the very first resolution of the UN General Assembly, I (1), imposed on all States the obligation to work towards the elimination of nuclear weapons; that Article VI of the NPT obliges NWS to begin negotiations 'in good faith' on eliminating nuclear weapons; and, hoisting the US with its own petard, by using the same argument of 'consensus' which the US has used to prevent the CD from taking up for negotiation the issue of elimination, to argue that in the absence of agreement by Pakistan, the CD cannot take up the negotiation of FMCT.

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<sup>2</sup> Ch. Viyyanna Sastry, "Pakistan against signing the NPT as a non-weapons State" *IDS Comment* March 8, 2010. Available at [www.idsa.in](http://www.idsa.in)

<sup>3</sup> Keynote Address by Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) Conference: 'New Leaders, New Directions', 18 June 2001, Washington D C

6.9 While, therefore, there is no question of unilateral nuclear disarmament, either by Pakistan or India, the only prospect of eliminating nuclear weapons from the sub-continent would be not through a South Asian Nuclear Free Zone, which both countries have rejected, but in the framework of an international Convention on Nuclear Weapons. Thus, while Pakistan justifies its nuclear arsenal almost exclusively in terms of the perceived threat from a 'hostile' India, Pakistan's spirited advocacy of UNGA Resolution I (1) and Article VI of NPT place India and Pakistan, curiously, on the same side of pressing for the elimination of nuclear weapons in a manner compatible with the principles, purposes, procedures and phases spelt out in RGAP 88 and India's 7-point Working Paper of 2006, as well as consistent with the UN Secretary-General's five-point proposal for a Nuclear Weapons Convention. Based on Pakistan's logic and desire to keep its nuclear weapons as a deterrent against India, Pakistan's likely response to initiatives to promote global nuclear disarmament might perhaps include the following elements:

- Stressing that the procedures must be universal and non-discriminatory
- Underlining that Pakistan will comply only if the same rules are applied to India
- Provided also that the proposed plan reduces warheads of all NWS and SNW to the same level within a common time-frame; and
- Provided also the US puts sufficient pressure on Pakistan to accept a Convention on Nuclear Weapons

6.10 Pakistan might also cooperate with a workable plan that prioritises:

- All NWS/SNW agreeing to de-alert nuclear weapons
- All NWS/SNW committing themselves to NFU
- All NWS/SNW initially downsizing their nuclear stockpile to a common minimum level – say, 50 weapons – and thereafter reducing weapons to zero by a fixed date.

Realistically Pakistan will play hard and take strong exception to any favours granted to India and avail of every opportunity to highlight the "threat" to Pakistan posted by India's growing military and strategic capability, while also using this capability to justify Pakistan's expansion of its own nuclear arsenal and resist international pressure on issues relating to nuclear terrorism and proliferation.

6.11 **Engaging with Pakistan:** In the resumed broad-based dialogue with Pakistan, there are arrangements already in place for discussing CBM, relating to the nuclear arsenals of both countries. The Group urges that the same forum be used to initiate a dialogue with Pakistan on issues relating to the reduction of nuclear arsenals, measures to prevent the accidental use of nuclear weapons, international disarmament issues and the ideas contained in RGAP 88.

## **Israel**

6.12 Given its unique existential challenge, Israel has adopted a rather unique approach to nuclear weapons and related issues. While the country has never accepted or rejected contentions about its possession of nuclear weapons, it is common knowledge that the country has a nuclear arsenal with land, air and sea based delivery systems. Israel is believed to have acquired this capability with the active help of France and with the knowledge and assistance of USA. In Israel's perception, its deterrence policy is intended to balance out the enormous asymmetry in terms of physical size, population, resources, and motivation of Israel's enemies to change the situation.

6.13 Meanwhile, there is no doubt that the presence of these weapons in the region is a source of insecurity and Egypt has led the demand on behalf of the Arab world for denuclearisation of Israel as part of the larger objective of creating a Middle East WMD Free Zone. The Middle East resolution passed on this in the 1995 RevCon of the NPT was the key to the agreement forged on the indefinite and unconditional extension of the treaty. However, no movement was seen on this and therefore 15 years, the region has grappled with the challenge of the possibility of Iran too developing nuclear weapons.

6.14 In the 2010 NPT RevCon, once again a strong call was made for the MEWMDFZ and the Recommendations of the RevCon have called for the convening of a conference of all countries of the region in 2012. The UN Secretary-General and co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution (Russia, USA and UK) have been entrusted the task of convening a conference of all the Middle Eastern countries in 2012 to deliberate on the modalities for creation of a

Middle East zone, which is free of WMD and their delivery systems. The terms of reference for the conference are to be derived from the 1995 Resolution and the UN Secretary-General and cosponsors of the Resolution have been tasked to identify a host nation for the conference and appoint a facilitator to support the implementation of the resolution. Progress made at this event is to be reported at the 2015 RevCon. The NPT RevCon 2010 also called upon the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and other relevant organizations to prepare background documentation for 2012, detailing the modalities for the regional WMD-free zone.

6.15 However, many questions remain on the feasibility of doing so. The biggest problem is perceived in the readiness of Israel to join the process. While paragraph 5 of the section on the Middle East in the NPT RevCon document recalls '*the importance of Israel's accession to the Treaty*', this language was included despite American reservations and is believed to have weakened American influence over Tel Aviv. This is especially so since in stark contrast with this singling out of Israel by name, the next paragraph that stresses '*the necessity of strict adherence by all States parties to their obligations and commitments under the Treaty*'. While in this case the reference is clearly to Iran, Tehran managed to keep its name out. This has obviously not gone down well with Israel and not surprisingly, the sections of the media in Israel the US and the West generally have criticized the US for having 'sacrificed' Israel at the altar of the NPT RevCon. Indeed, the US might have felt compelled to accept this wording in order to keep Iran and/or Egypt from taking the RevCon down the slippery slope of failure because had they not been appeased, they had the ability to block consensus on the Final Document. Israel, nevertheless, has openly expressed its unhappiness over the issue and indicated its dismissal of the call for a conference.

6.16 Even more difficult appears to be the prospect of the UNSG and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Middle East Resolution being able to bring together countries that do not even recognize each other to sit at the same table and carry out any meaningful negotiations. It is a reflection of the challenge at hand that not even a coordinator for the conference has been appointed yet and the US has expressed limitations on its influence with Israel. Meanwhile, the stand-off with Iran remains unresolved.

6.17 While Israel's position on its own nuclear weapons is based on a policy of ambiguity, one can discern some trends in its approach to international nuclear arms control and disarmament.

6.18 **NPT:** Not having joined the treaty, Israel has been critical of its achievements and indeed has denounced it for its lapses in Iraq, Libya and Iran. It is dismissive of calls for Israel's joining the NPT as a NNWS and questions why there should be such an insistence on joining 'a treaty that has proven its inefficiency'.<sup>4</sup>

6.19 **CTBT:** Israel signed the treaty in 1996 but is yet to ratify it. It has also established two auxiliary seismic stations on its soil as part of the treaty's monitoring network. In order for it to ratify the treaty, Israel has listed 3 main considerations – completion of the inspection system, including rules governing on-site inspections in order to rule out their misuse by countries; its right to equal status in the CTBT institutions such as the Executive Council that will determine policy; regional concerns.

6.20 **FMCT:** With a nuclear policy of opacity, Israel finds it difficult to accept an FMCT, especially if it includes verification mechanisms. The Israeli claim is that those who want it to join the treaty are in fact trying to circumvent its refusal to join the NPT by applying to her a comprehensive safeguards regime through a different treaty. Israel's claim is that the FMCT would at the present moment even be counterproductive to non-proliferation, because it will give states like Iran the ultimate legitimacy to produce fissile material, ostensibly for peaceful purposes, since the treaty would only ban fissile material production for weapons purposes.

6.21 **Nuclear disarmament:** Though largely supportive of universal nuclear disarmament as also a regional NWFZ, Israel conditions nuclear disarmament on comprehensive peace. While the position of the Arab states is that Israel's nuclear capabilities are destabilizing and must be addressed as a precondition to peace and security in the region, Israel's position is the exact opposite. It holds that 'the establishment of peaceful relations, reconciliation, mutual

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<sup>4</sup> Roni Sofer, "Signing NPT won't prevent nuclear armament", <http://www.ynetnews.com>, 5 June 2009.



recognition and good neighbourliness, and complemented by conventional and non-conventional arms control measures' is a precondition for establishing an NWFZ and achieving the vision of a WMD free zone.

6.22 As is obvious, Israel has little faith in the global instruments of non-proliferation. Its focus has been on inter-state and regional relations and on regional arms control arrangements, not on global treaties, as the basis for policy in the non-conventional domain.

6.23 Overall, it appears most likely that Israel would be far more interested in creation of conditions at the regional level that alleviate its security concerns than be really bothered by the state of the debate on universal nuclear disarmament at the global level. Its main concern lies in regional peace before it could agree to denuclearisation last.

6.24 **Engaging with Israel:** India's increasing engagement with Israel on defence matters provides a ready platform for general discussions on issues of nuclear disarmament, including the ideas contained in RGAP 88.

## **Iran**

6.25 Although there is confusion regarding the military status of Iran's nuclear programme, there is little doubt that in Iran nuclear-related infrastructure and technologies have advanced considerably over the years. Iran appears to be following a policy of complying with the NPT and building its civil nuclear energy programme in such a way that if the appropriate political decision is made, the know-how gained in the peaceful sphere could be used to create nuclear weapons. Whether Iran will switch its current civil nuclear programme to a military one will depend on the course of international politics in the future.

6.26 **NPT:** On 1 July 1968, Iran signed the NPT and ratified it in 1970 as an NNWS. From the early 1970s onwards, Iran had expressed a desire to establish an extensive nuclear power programme, stated to achieve a total nuclear energy production of 23,000 MWe, and hence was keen on establishing the entire fuel cycle activities within the country. While Iran has been,

therefore, the strongest proponent of the right of NPT NNWS to have mastery over the nuclear fuel cycle, this has since become the biggest bone of contention owing to its proliferation potential.

6.27 On 18 December 2003, in the face of considerable international concern, Iran signed the IAEA additional protocol, granting agency inspectors greater authority in verifying the country's nuclear programme.<sup>5</sup> But it withdrew from that commitment in 2006 when the US accused Iran of having engaged secretly in a nuclear weapon programme for the last 18 years and demanded international sanctions against Iran.

6.28 **Nuclear disarmament:** Iran maintains that this is the top most priority for it and hence supports its early consideration in the CD. Amongst the four countries under consideration, Iran is one of the few that has expressed a desire for achieving disarmament through the conclusion of an NWC. According to the Iranian Ambassador to CD in one of his statements in 2011. The 'Nuclear Weapons Convention, which provides an international legally binding instrument for a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is a long-sought aspiration and a ripe topic for negotiation in the CD.'

6.29 Interestingly, Iran has been hosting international conferences on nuclear disarmament in Tehran, which it claims have been attended by more countries than the Nuclear Security Summit called by the USA in 2010. The second of these conferences was held in June this year, in which Iran called for some 'practical mechanisms to disarmament'.

6.30 Till such time as an NFWF can be brought about, Iran urges the urgent conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States as a matter of priority through the establishment of an Ad-hoc Negotiation Committee in the CD.

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<sup>5</sup> "Iran Signs Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards", IAEA 18 December 2003, at <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2003/iranap20031218.html>

6.31 **FMCT:** Iran has expressed itself in favour of a comprehensive, non-discriminatory, internationally and effectively verifiable Treaty. Past production and existing stocks as well as the future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices must be covered under the scope of the Treaty. Explaining his country's position in the CD, the Ambassador has made it clear 'Any negotiation on the FMCT which doesn't include the stocks would have no content and consequently it is fruitless.' Given the Iranian threat perception from Israel which is believed to have a nuclear arsenal of about 200-250 weapons, this position is not really surprising.

6.32 **Engaging Iran:** At the time this Report is submitted (August 2011) few countries matter more than Iran in carrying forward the ideas contained in RGAP 88 – for contradictory reasons that are as positive as they are negative. The positive angle is that with its national position on nuclear disarmament almost indistinguishable from our own, Iran being in the NAM chair during the preparations for, and during, the 2015 NPT Review Conference, places NAM at an exceptionally favourable juncture for India through the Chairman to inject RGAP ideas into the disarmament discussions in that forum. With the CD in deadlock, the NPT RevCon is, for the present, the best forum for the pursuit of RGAP ideas on NPT's Article VI provisions on vertical disarmament, as the bargaining chip for keeping the other Articles of the NPT in operation. The negative point, of course, is that Iran is anathema to the US, without whose cooperation there is no possibility of any forward movement on disarmament. Faced with this Hobson's choice, India will have to leverage all her diplomatic skills to ensure that Iran as the NAM chair is distinguished from Iran as a nation in US/NPT RevCon consideration of NAM proposals on disarmament.

6.33 In this context, the recent statement of the outgoing Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao, on the desirability of raising bilateral relations with Iran to the strategic level, is welcome. Iran is an important member in West Asia and has vital trade links with India. India already has good Foreign Office Consultations with Iran, apart from close interactions at the NAM Working Group on Disarmament at the UN. In any case, there is no need for India to presume a negative response from the US in advancing its strategic relations with Iran. After all, if India

plays it right, it may well be the case that the US appreciates the constructive influence India may have on Iran as the Chairman of NAM in 2012.

## **DPRK**

6.34 `Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) clandestine nuclear weapons programme and its non-compliance with the NPT obligations, since the early 1990’s, have posed a serious challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and international security. DPRK has conducted two nuclear weapon tests and launched long-range ballistic missiles Taepodong-1 and Taepodong-2, with the capability to carry nuclear weapons, in 2006 and 2009 respectively. Over the years, it has developed strong nuclear and missile linkages with Pakistan and Iran. It developed its uranium enrichment programme with the help from Pakistan in exchange for transfer of ballistic missile technology. It has also helped Iran and Libya in developing their ballistic missile programme. It is also the prime suspect in providing support to Myanmar’s nuclear weapon programme. As an NPT signatory, its track record is also chequered. Its enter and exit policy with regard to the NPT, non-compliance with the NPT obligations, violations of the IAEA safeguards and verification system, non-implementation of various agreements for denuclearisation such as Agreed Framework of 1994, backing-out from its commitment to denuclearise as per the 2005 agreement following the Six Party negotiations and subsequently the 2007 agreement, and its indulgence in latent proliferation have cumulatively undermined and posed new challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime.<sup>6</sup> This has led to further tightening of the non-proliferation regime with proposals being considered for denial of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to the non-nuclear weapon states.

6.35 ` The UNSC responded to the DPRK nuclear missile and nuclear tests of July 2006 and October 2006, respectively by condemning it through the two UNSC Resolutions 1695 and 1718, demanding immediate suspension of missile testing and action by imposing economic sanctions against DPRK.

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<sup>6</sup>Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba, “Proliferation Rings New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime”, *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 2, Fall 2004, p. 5.

6.36 ` India reacted strongly to DPRK's first nuclear test on October 9, 2006 by describing the action as violating its 'international commitment' and 'jeopardising the peace, stability and security on the Korean Peninsula and in the region'. The official statement from the MEA also highlighted the danger of "clandestine proliferation". India, however, rejected any comparison between India and DPRK nuclear as the former was not a signatory to the NPT and has also never violated the IAEA safeguards. DPRK was not only a signatory to NPT but had signed IAEA safeguard agreement "in perpetuity" which barred Pyongyang from using any safeguarded material or facilities for non-peaceful purpose. DPRK's legal and political status could not be compared with that of India.<sup>7</sup>

6.37 `The Indian Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, on an official visit to Britain, responded to Pyongyang's nuclear test of 2006 saying that, 'DPRK's test was a violation of its international commitments'. In a joint news conference with the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, Dr Singh expressed India's 'deep concern' over the test and stated that 'a further erosion of the non-proliferation regime is not in our interest' and that India did not 'support the emergence of another nuclear state'. The Indian Prime Minister also underlined the clandestine nature of the DPRK nuclear programme and its close linkages with Pakistan when he said, 'The DPRK nuclear test highlights the dangers of clandestine proliferation. In fact India's own security has suffered due to clandestine proliferation linkages relating to our neighbours.'<sup>8</sup> India has been concerned with the linkages between Pakistan and DPRK in the missile and nuclear weapon developments.

6.38 India's stance on DPRK nuclear test was considered to be in divergence to the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) position which had expressed concern on the test but asserted that the test 'underscores the need to work even more vigorously towards the movement's goals of disarmament, including the elimination of nuclear weapons.' However, India has consistently espoused the cause of global nuclear disarmament along with the other NAM countries.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Siddharth Vardarajan, "India Condemns North Korean Test", *The Hindu*, October 10, 2006, available at <http://www.thehindu.com/2006/10/10/stories/2006101016811400.htm>

<sup>8</sup> "Press Conference with Prime Minister of India", Press Conference Transcript Office of Prime Minister, United Kingdom, available at [http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/page\\_10184.aspz](http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/page_10184.aspz)

<sup>9</sup> "Non-Aligned Nations Ask Moderation on N Korea", *Channel News Asia*, October 14, 2006, available at [http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp\\_world/view/235439/1/html](http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_world/view/235439/1/html), cited in "India Reacts to DPRK Nuclear Test: Defending the US – India Deal, Pointing Finger at Pakistan", WMD Insights, November 2006 Issue, available at [http://wmdinsights.com/110/110\\_SAI\\_India\\_ReactstoDPRK.htm](http://wmdinsights.com/110/110_SAI_India_ReactstoDPRK.htm)

6.39 India condemned DPRK's second underground nuclear test on May 25, 2009 as an unfortunate 'development of serious concern for the entire world' and as in the earlier first test termed it as 'violation of its international commitment'.

6.40 A serious dimension of DPRK's missile and nuclear weapon development programme has been its close collaboration with Pakistan and Iran. Pakistan and DPRK have emerged as the prime proliferators. China figures prominently in the proliferation network. The future of peace and stability in the East Asian region, to a large extent, is linked with the nuclear developments in DPRK.

6.41 DPRK's intransigence has complicated the security situation in East Asia and could result in chain reaction in Northeast Asia, impelling Japan and South Korea to reconsider their nuclear options. Even Taiwan might be tempted to opt in favour of nuclear weapons. It may encourage Iran to follow its footsteps and as Iran has a fairly well-developed nuclear programme, it may want to acquire nuclear weapons. Others who could follow suit could be Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

6.42 There is also a possible danger of DPRK transferring nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon technology to other countries, particularly, states with suspected nuclear programme and terrorist group such as Al-Qaeda etc. This would have serious implication for South Asian subcontinent as DPRK supposedly provided nuclear technology and equipment to Pakistan and the relationship is not known to have terminated.

6.43 **Engaging DPRK:** Notwithstanding our serious reservations over recent actions of the DPRK aimed at becoming and being recognised as an SNW, the Group recommends that as engagement does not amount to endorsement, India seriously consider bringing DPRK within the ambit of the global engagement on nuclear disarmament issues that this Report recommends.

## CHAPTER VII

### KEY NNWS AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT ISSUES

The chapter summarizes the positions of key countries active at the governmental level in promoting discussions / negotiations on nuclear disarmament (other than the five NWS and the four SNW / near-SNW who are discussed in earlier chapters):

#### **After the NPT Review Conference 2010<sup>1</sup>**

7.2 It would be useful to recall briefly the main provisions relating to Article VI on nuclear disarmament in the Final Document of the NPT Review Conference 2010. The Final Document also included an Action Plan containing concrete measures to be adopted by NPT members in fulfilling their obligations under article VI of the NPT.

7.3 The Final Document of the NPT Review Conference 2010 merely ‘noted’<sup>2</sup> the United Nations Secretary-General’s proposal on ‘a nuclear weapons convention or agreement on a framework of separate mutually reinforcing instruments, backed by a strong system of verification.’ It did not endorse the UNSG’s proposals. Thus, there is still reluctance on the part of many countries, particularly the P5, to even endorse the need for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, let alone discuss such a convention or negotiate it. This hesitancy is also shared in some measure by NATO countries, individually and collectively. Their approach is limited to taking practical steps to reduce nuclear arsenals and bringing them under more effective control, leaving elimination to take place in the fullness of time, if ever.

7.4 The Final Document emphasises the ‘essential role’ of CTBT in nuclear disarmament. Welcoming the strategic arms reduction agreement between the US and Russia, the Final Document advocates the need for reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines

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<sup>1</sup> See paras 79-96 of NPT Review Conference 2010, Final Document in Annexe IX.

<sup>2</sup> However, it ‘noted’ in the context of the previous sentence in the same paragraph that ‘...all States need to make special efforts to establish the necessary framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons.’ See point B iii in Annexe IX This is a marked shift by the NWS who had only supported the step-by-step approach until the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

of States. It expresses concern over the fact that the CD has not been able to start substantive negotiations on disarmament issues.

7.5 The Final Document endorses the 13 Practical steps of the 2000 RevCon. Therein lies the difficulty. The Middle East NWFZ, which essentially implies Israel giving up its undeclared nuclear arsenal, is difficult to realize. In 2012, a conference on MENWFZ is supposed to be held.

7.6 The document also adopted an Action Plan which includes *inter alia* the provision that the P5 will ‘report’ to the NPT RevCon PrepCom meeting in 2012 on the progress made by P5 in fulfilling their commitments undertaken at NPT RevCon 2010. Some of the commitments undertaken include:

- Eliminating all types of nuclear weapons.
- Accelerating the progress to implement the Practical steps agreed upon at 2000 RevCon.
- Reducing global stockpiles through bilateral, multilateral or regional agreements.
- Reducing the operational status of the nuclear weapons.
- Taking transparency and mutual confidence building measures.
- It was also agreed that CD should set up a “subsidiary body” to deal with nuclear disarmament.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Action Plan on Article VI, Final Document, NPT RevCon 2010. See Annexe IX for relevant excerpts.



7.7 The Action Plan provides the departure point for many countries on their positions on nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) held a debate on nuclear disarmament in Jan-Feb 2011 but its work remains blocked. The prospects of commencement of substantive negotiations remain bleak.

7.8 An analysis of the Action Plan shows that the issue of time bound nuclear disarmament, a key feature of RGAP, has been skirted. Nuclear disarmament remains an open ended enterprise. Further, most countries would like to see progress on CTBT coming into force as well as commencement of FMCT. But, the CD remains unable to start substantive negotiations on disarmament issues.

7.9 In the thematic debate on nuclear disarmament at the CD held in Jan/Feb 2011, several ambassadors spoke giving a snapshot of the respective countries' thinking on nuclear disarmament. The following is a summary of broad points made:

**Switzerland:** Regretting the 'modest' achievements in the field of nuclear disarmament, the Swiss Ambassador Luaber stressed on the need for adhering to the principles of 'irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency' in nuclear disarmament measures. He described nuclear deterrence as a major hindrance to nuclear disarmament and urged member-states to discuss the possibility of adopting security policies that do not rely on nuclear weapons in the immediate future.<sup>4</sup> Switzerland argued: 'ultimately, the question of banning nuclear weapons by a new convention – as proposed by the UN Secretary-General – must be addressed. Switzerland expects the final document of this conference to reaffirm the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons, and to encourage the discussion on a convention to ban nuclear weapons... In addition to military and legal considerations, Switzerland's aim is to bring the humanitarian aspect to the heart of the current debate on nuclear disarmament. In fact, it is necessary to ask the question at which point the right of States must yield to the interests of humanity. In the long term we must outlaw

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<sup>4</sup> Christian N. Ciobanu, "Thematic Debate 1: Nuclear Disarmament", the CD, 1 February 2011. [http://www.gimun.org/blog/disarmament/Thematic\\_Debate\\_1\\_Nuclear\\_Disarmament](http://www.gimun.org/blog/disarmament/Thematic_Debate_1_Nuclear_Disarmament)

nuclear weapons, especially by means of a new convention as the UN Secretary-General has proposed.’

**EU:** EU’s key position, expressed by Ambassador Iliopoulos of Hungary, is the fulfilment of Art VI of the NPT, overall reduction in global stock piles, irreversibility in nuclear disarmament, and call upon Annex II countries to sign and ratify the CTBT. The EU called for the completion of the CTBT’s verification regime and the complete dismantlement of all nuclear facilities.<sup>5</sup>

**New Zealand:** New Zealand called upon the CD to organise a ‘subsidiary’ body to address nuclear disarmament. Ambassador Higgie of New Zealand emphasized the New Zealand will ‘welcome the opportunity for substantive exchanges in the CD on the next steps of a multilateral nature towards nuclear disarmament.’<sup>6</sup> New Zealand welcomed the UN Secretary-General’s ‘strong push in his five-point plan for progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons.’

**Iran:** Iran supports a Nuclear Weapons Convention. The Iranian ambassador at the CD regretted that the NPT state signatories did not adopt a legal framework with specified timeline for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, including a nuclear weapons convention by 2025.<sup>7</sup>

**Sweden:** The Swedish Ambassador, speaking at the CD on 25 Jan 2011 expressed Sweden’s support for the NPT Review Conference action plan and reiterated Sweden’s commitment to nuclear disarmament. Sweden wants the deadlock at the CD to be removed and tangible progress to be made towards commencement of negotiations on FMCT. Swedish ambassador quoted his foreign minister as saying at the High-Level Meeting in September (2010), ‘Serious supporters of progress in multilateral disarmament and arms control work can no longer accept the lack of

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<sup>5</sup> *ibid* [http://www.gimun.org/blog/disarmament/Thematic\\_Debate\\_1\\_Nuclear\\_Disarmament](http://www.gimun.org/blog/disarmament/Thematic_Debate_1_Nuclear_Disarmament)

<sup>6</sup> *ibid*

<sup>7</sup> *ibid*

substantive negotiations in the CD.’ Mr Bildt added that tangible progress to address the issues – and in particular negotiations on an FMCT – must be achieved. Sweden also wants progress on removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. The ambassador said, ‘Sweden believes that it is important that the treaty is followed by talks aimed at a sharp reduction – and eventually, elimination – of tactical nuclear weapons.’<sup>8</sup>

**Japan:** After the NPT Review Conference, Japan has sought to reinvigorate the cause of nuclear disarmament. Supported by 89 countries, it submitted in December 2010 an enhanced draft resolution on nuclear disarmament, built on the NPT Review Conference, to the U.N. General Assembly. The resolution was adopted with an overwhelming majority. It also joined Australia and eight other countries to launch a cross regional initiative on nuclear disarmament. Japan’s basic position remains the early entry into force of the CTBT and the immediate commencement of negotiations on FMCT.<sup>9</sup>

**Ireland:** The Irish ambassador, in his statement at the CD on 1 Feb 2011, strongly came out in favour of nuclear disarmament. He said, ‘We see no justification for the acquisition or the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons and we do not subscribe to the view that nuclear weapons - or the quest to develop them - contribute to international peace and security.’ Pending the complete and verifiable elimination of all nuclear weapons, Ireland supports the taking of practical steps to prevent their further proliferation and avoid nuclear war. The ambassador said Ireland looked forward to the early implementation of the commitments given at the 2010 Review Conference.<sup>10</sup> In practical terms, Ireland supports the commencement of negotiations on FMCT, the early coming into force of CTBT and progress on negative security assurances for NNWS.

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<sup>8</sup>Swedish Ambassador’s speech at the CD on 25 January 2011. [http://www.swedenabroad.com/Page\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_122142.aspx](http://www.swedenabroad.com/Page_____122142.aspx)

<sup>9</sup> Details available at <http://www.lk.emb-japan.go.jp/eg/contents/culture/JFPU8.pdf>

<sup>10</sup> Irish Ambassador’s speech at the CD on 1 Feb 2011.

**Germany:** Germany joined Australia, Japan and other countries to launch a cross-regional initiative on nuclear disarmament. Germany's is keen that nuclear weapons should not fall into the hands of 'tyrants or terrorists'. Speaking at the Bundestag in April 2011, the German Foreign Minister stated categorically, 'There is nothing naive about disarmament. Disarmament does not endanger our security – it increases our security. It allows for greater global security and more stable peace around the world.'<sup>11</sup> However, its key positions are aligned with those of NATO and EU.

**Australia:** Australia has aligned its position with the 10-nation cross regional initiative<sup>12</sup> which came out with a joint statement on nuclear disarmament in April 2011. Australia is active on several technical issues at experts level. For example, the Australia-Japan Experts Side Event on FMCT Definitions addressed the issue of possible definitions in a future treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.<sup>13</sup>

7.10 The positions of the following states have been gleaned from various sources.

**Canada:** Canada's position was captured in an email response of the Canadian High Commission on 25 May 2011 in New Delhi in reply to a query from the Honorary Adviser to the Group:

The reference to International Humanitarian Law was part of the principles section of the 2010 NPT final document's Action Plan which all NPT State Parties, including Canada, agreed to by consensus. Canada agrees with the International Court of Justice that a threat or use of nuclear weapons should not be in violation of international humanitarian law. Canada supports the principle of creating a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) as the final step in a progressive, incremental effort to end the capacity of states to produce and develop nuclear weapons, and to reduce and eventually eliminate existing

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<sup>11</sup> German Foreign Minister's speech at the German parliament. [http://www.genf.diplo.de/Vertretung/genf/en/pr/Aktuelles\\_en/2011\\_04\\_11\\_20Abruestungsbericht\\_en.html](http://www.genf.diplo.de/Vertretung/genf/en/pr/Aktuelles_en/2011_04_11_20Abruestungsbericht_en.html)

<sup>12</sup> Details are further ahead in this chapter.

<sup>13</sup> The *note verbale* of 9 March 2011 by the Australian mission at the CD, <http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/605/15/PDF/G1160515.pdf?OpenElement>

nuclear stockpiles. Canada is taking action to urge all states to support the treaties that must first be in place before a NWC should be considered. These include the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Canada's priority is the negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, which is also called for in Ban Ki-moon's 5-Point Proposal.

**Italy** reaffirmed the need for nuclear disarmament and underlined its emphasis on non-proliferation and disarmament in the G-8's L'Aquila statement when Italy presided over the Group.

**Norway** called on the P5 to 'advance practical measures' to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security policies and lower their operational status, 'refrain from developing new categories of nuclear arms' and advocates 'the full elimination of tactical nuclear weapons' and 'active use' of 'proposals on how to move toward our overall objective of abolishing all nuclear weapons' specially mentioning proposals from the UN Secretary-General, among others.

**Brazil** considered 'commitment to the goal of concluding a Nuclear Weapons Convention outlawing this category of weapons entirely, with a well-defined time-frame, in line with the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions' to be a necessary component of a 'successful outcome of the work in this Main Committee.'

**Egypt** complained that 'the implementation of the Treaty in the field of nuclear disarmament remains below expectations,' Egypt argued that this 'confirms the need to create a legal framework to eliminate nuclear weapons through the conclusion of an international legally binding convention to eliminate nuclear weapons in a specified time-frame.'

**Indonesia** stated on behalf of the 110-NNWS group of Nonaligned Movement that ‘The consideration of a Nuclear Weapons Convention banning all nuclear weapons, as mentioned in Article VI of the Treaty, should begin and should be an integral part of any plan of action on nuclear disarmament to be adopted by this Conference.’

**Malaysia** has been at the forefront of a campaign for a nuclear weapons convention. Along with Costa Rica they have circulated a draft of NWC. At the NPT Review Conference they took the view that Nuclear Weapon States have a positive role to play in this regard and should demonstrate leadership by committing themselves to nuclear disarmament via implementation of commitments and undertaking agreed in 1995 and 2000, in a specified period of time culminating in the total elimination of their nuclear weapons, through the conclusion of a Nuclear Weapons Convention.<sup>14</sup>

**Chile** has said it should support the Secretary-General’s five-point plan and, in particular, lay the foundations for preliminary discussion of a Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

**Mexico** also took a pro-NWC stand at the NPT RevCon. Mexico said it expected unequivocal commitment by the NWS to achieve the destruction of their nuclear arsenals and to negotiate a convention that prohibits these weapons with a timeframe that provides certainty to the international community.<sup>15</sup>

**Costa Rica** has been at the forefront of a campaign for a NWC. Thirteen years ago Costa Rica and Malaysia presented a draft Framework Convention on Nuclear Weapons. This draft, which the Secretary-General considered a ‘good point of departure’, was updated and presented again to the First Preparatory Committee of this Conference in Vienna in 2007. Costa Rica feels that building on this draft we

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<sup>14</sup> For details, see <http://www.icanw.org/statements> accessed on 30.07.2011.

<sup>15</sup> *ibid*

could create an instrument capable of strengthening confidence in verification and ensure the supervision of processes, dismantling and definitive reduction of the nuclear threat.<sup>16</sup>

**Austria** believes moving from the dream of a world free of nuclear weapons to actual global zero will take time and much effort. It feels there are several promising ideas, like UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's five-point plan. Austria supports this plan and believes that the most effective way to move towards "global zero" is through a universal legal instrument, a 'Nuclear Weapons Convention', equipped with a strict multilateral verification mechanism. Austrian delegate stated at the NPT RevCon that if there was no clear progress towards "global zero", Austria would discuss with partners the feasibility of a global instrument to ban these weapons. For Austria the NPT remains the cornerstone of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. But a static regime that has lost its vision may benefit from fresh ideas.<sup>17</sup>

**South Africa** views the Final Document of the NPT RevCon as a compromise document and that is a small but significant step forward towards strengthening global security and creating a comprehensive approach to bring about a world free of nuclear weapons. South Africa attaches great significance to Nuclear weapons free zones.<sup>18</sup>

**Turkey** is a part of Western alliance system and an active member of NATO. It supports efforts for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Turkey's positions are very similar to the western positions. Turkish Ambassador's statement at the 2010 NPT RevCon did not make any reference to NWC while it emphasized CTBT, FMCT, START etc.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> *ibid*

<sup>17</sup> *ibid*

<sup>18</sup> Ambassador Leslie Gumbi's statement at First Committee of the UNGA on 5 October 2010, New York. <http://www.dfa.gov.za/vienna/speeches/5octsouthafrica.pdf> (accessed on 30 July 2011)

<sup>19</sup> Statement Turkish ambassador at NPT RevCon May 2010. [http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/statements/pdf/turkey\\_en.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/statements/pdf/turkey_en.pdf)

**Poland** is also a part of NATO. In his statement at the NPT RevCon, Polish ambassador highlighted the need for strengthening the NPT, welcomed arms reduction agreement START and emphasized the need for reduction of the arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons. Poland and Norway have given some proposals for the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons.<sup>20</sup>

**Netherlands** is for strengthening the NPT and supports the arms control approach to disarmament. The Foreign Minister of Netherlands summarized the country's position on nuclear disarmament in the following words at the 2010 NPT RevCon: 'The best way of forging broad-based measures on disarmament and non-proliferation is by strengthening the system of international treaties based on the NPT. The ideas underpinning the NPT are clear: states with nuclear weapons pledge to disarm; states without them promise not to obtain them, and all states have the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. These ideas remain as vital and relevant as ever. The conclusion of a new START agreement is an important step up the ladder, as it contributes to the overall reduction of nuclear weapons. The Netherlands warmly welcomes this agreement. The two largest nuclear-weapon states are taking their moral responsibility to lead the disarmament process. We all know how complex this process is, and we have no illusions that a world free of nuclear weapons can be achieved overnight.'<sup>21</sup>

**The United Arab Emirates** as part of the Arab group has tended to harmonise its position with that of Arab countries. It believes in universalisation of NPT, the coming into force of CTBT and strengthening of the safeguards systems. It also pays special emphasis on the 13 practical steps urged upon at the 2000 NPT RevCon.

7.11 Following the NPT RevCon, many countries have been concerned at the slow progress on the implementation of the Final Document action plan. They have sought to build pressure on the NWS to work towards nuclear disarmament. New initiatives have also been launched.

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<sup>20</sup> Polish Ambassador's statement at the NPT RevCon May 2010.

[http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/statements/pdf/poland\\_en.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/statements/pdf/poland_en.pdf)

<sup>21</sup> <http://www.netherlandsmission.org/article.asp?articleref=AR00000949EN>



## **Nuclear Weapons Convention and RGAP**

7.12 UNSG has come up with a 5-Point Proposal recommending a Nuclear Weapons Convention or a set of mutually reinforcing agreements and treaties. Many NNWS support UNSG's proposal for a nuclear weapons convention. However, the Final Document of NPT RevCon 2010 merely takes note of his proposals. NWS are lukewarm to the idea of NWC. India has advocated such a convention.

7.13 As gleaned from positions taken at the NPT Review Conference it would appear that many countries have come out in support of the NWC proposal of the UNSG. Several ambassadors from different member-states, including Pakistan, Algeria, Chile, Iran, South Africa, Indonesia, Egypt, Austria, and Switzerland voiced their views at the CD on the need for the international community to commence negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention.

7.14 However, then the NPT Review Conference 2010 Action Plan for nuclear disarmament has become a benchmark. The nuclear weapon countries have taken some commitments. They are obliged to report the progress they make on fulfilment of their Article VI obligations to NPT RevCon 2015 PrepCom in 2012.

7.15 The cause of nuclear disarmament got a fillip with President Obama's Prague statement in 2009 in favour of a world free of nuclear weapons. The statement though was qualified, as the President did not see too rapid a progress towards complete nuclear disarmament. But he expressed US commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons. This was a step forward.

7.16 RGAP 1988 was much ahead of its times. Not only did it address the issue of nuclear disarmament in a time bound manner (3 phases), it went beyond and dealt with the issues of international security. It placed nuclear disarmament in the context of general disarmament, prevention of arms race and enhancement of international security. The action plan was too ambitious and considered impractical by most countries. In short, there were no takers for the action plan. Further, at that time, India was a non-nuclear country and was not taken seriously.

7.17 It is clear from the official positions of the various countries that while at the rhetorical level the cause of nuclear disarmament is supported, there is not much political will to take big-

bang type of actions which the RGAP recommended. Most countries favour a step-by-step non-proliferation approach to nuclear disarmament.

7.18 However, as civil society will continue to play a major role in pressurizing governments to go for nuclear disarmament, the key principles of RGAP should be popularised among civil society pressure groups. The bold RGAP has several elements which would appeal to civil societies in many countries. Several non-governmental groups have suggested time-bound, phased approach to nuclear disarmament. At the official level, however, the RGAP may still be considered perhaps “too bold”.

#### **10-country Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI):**

7.19 This is an important new inter-governmental initiative on nuclear disarmament following NPT RevCon 2010.

7.20 In September 2010, these ten countries formed a group called the Cross-Regional Group on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and launched an initiative called the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI). They issued a joint statement in Berlin in April 2011. The NPDI joint statement regretted that even one year after the NPT RevCon no concrete action had been taken on nuclear disarmament. Endorsing the action plan adopted by the NPT RevCon on nuclear disarmament it calls for an early conclusion of FMCT, universalisation of CTBT, establishment of Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, standardized format for reporting on disarmament measures and universalisation of ‘Additional Protocol’. It is important to recognize, however, that the joint statement did not refer to the Nuclear Weapons Convention, which many countries, including the ten, are supporting, nor make any other explicit reference to elimination of nuclear weapons.

7.21 **Engaging these NNWS:** India thus has its work cut out on carrying forward ideas contained in RGAP 88 even to those countries that are considered to be in the vanguard of the global movement for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Happily, bilateral fora already exist with most of the countries to bring up and pursue the ideas contained in RGAP 88, as adapted and updated to the present. These are listed in Annexe IX.

## CHAPTER VIII

### NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT ISSUES

#### NAM and 2015 NPT Review Conference

##### Introduction

Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) enjoins all parties, the NWS in particular, to ‘pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control’ (and which, along with the operation of the rest of the Treaty, can be, and has been, reviewed every five years in terms of its Article VIII.3 ‘with a view to assuring that the purpose of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized’).

8.2 Thus, notwithstanding India distancing itself from the NPT, for the vast majority of nations of the world, it is the five yearly review process of the NPT that provides the main vehicle for discussions on non-proliferation and advancing itself towards the goal of nuclear disarmament. And, although the NPT review process takes place outside the official forums of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) and the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the NPT RevCon is, indeed the largest inter-Governmental forum where the nuclear disarmament question - total elimination of nuclear weapons included - is on the anvil (and on the basis of a legally binding obligation, it must be remembered; not just as a desideratum advocated by some eminent persons), it is by far the most weighty in terms of its influence and impact, inadequate though that impact may have proven to be in absolute terms for clinching any concrete action so far.

8.3 Not being a party to the NPT, India rightly stresses the non-universality of the NPT (and the consequent untenability of any calls for its universalisation, as were made at the 2010 Review Conference and rejected by India officially.) The country has understandably kept out of all deliberations associated with the NPT regime and, accordingly, not taken part in its review process either - neither previously nor this time after the 2010 Review Conference.

8.4 It is in India's interest to continue to closely observe developments within the NPT review process. The advances made therein may be creeping and miniscule and may be embedded, moreover, in a fundamentally flawed framework but they constitute the broad background within which nuclear disarmament issues (which have been a central concern of India's strategic security policy) are addressed by the rest of the world.

#### **The NPT Review Conference Process: Recent Background**

8.5 Following the discovery of Iraq's attempts at clandestine acquisition of weapons capability in the early 90s, the NPT (and its safeguards arrangements in the IAEA, with all their legalistic technicalities) gave the NPT an unprecedented salience, and brought both non-proliferation issues and nuclear disarmament to the centre of international security debates. As a result of these developments, the NPT's review process was turned into an active political battleground between the developed and developing countries amongst its membership. So also in the functioning of the IAEA, where the moves to tighten its safeguards arrangements, *inter alia*, through adoption of an Additional Protocol in 1997 authorizing the IAEA to check for "undeclared" nuclear activities and materials in the NNWS party to the NPT, *inter alia*, through "challenge inspections" have proved to be particularly contentious in the wake of the Iranian compliance conundrum, with a bearing on the NPT review process as well.

8.6 The infirmities in the NPT, which came to light at a time when it was approaching the deadline of its 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary in 1995 (which was known to carry with it a major question mark about its future — the uncertainty over extension of the period of its validity after the first 25 years), had the consequence of raising its profile and potential for *realpolitik*. Although it

was extended indefinitely at the 1995 Review Conference with no more than a promise by the NWS to make ‘systematic and progressive efforts’ for nuclear disarmament, the negotiating lesson (of the leverage that was inherent in the review process, but allowed to lie dormant and unexploited hitherto) could not have been lost upon the NNWS in the face of the anxiety of the US and other powers, NWS and others, to secure its extension in perpetuity. NAM, the largest grouping within the NNWS, tasted blood with its successful extraction of US acceptance of the long-standing Arab demand for an international Conference to facilitate a Middle East NWFZ that roped in Israel as well. It is no accident that the next RevCon in 2000 adopted the landmark ‘13 Practical Steps for Nuclear Disarmament’ spearheaded by the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) countries - which included, most notably, an ‘unequivocal undertaking by the NWS to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals’.

8.7 The 2000 RevCon set the tone for a new role for the five yearly RevCon focusing on the essential bargain of the NPT between the NWS and the NNWS – of the hard promise of non-proliferation versus the loose prospect of nuclear disarmament. As a result, the proposition that there was a clear link between non-proliferation and disarmament, hardly mentioned hitherto, slowly began to figure more and more prominently in the discourse, in implicit acknowledgement of the idea as one whose time may have come.

8.8 The Bush Administration’s repudiation of the 13 Practical Steps (and scant regard for arms control and multilateralism in general) at the failed 2005 RevCon, which was unable to reach any agreement at all, did result in a regression but the setback was temporary and partial. The trend of the *realpolitik* potential of the non-proliferation-disarmament link gaining increasing acknowledgement in the public discourse only gathered momentum, what with the DPRK and Iran break-out scenarios emerging to the fore during this period, alongside increasing recognition at the same time of the vulnerability of nuclear fissile materials worldwide to theft and consequent risks of nuclear terrorism.

8.9 By the time the US was ready to change over to the Obama Administration in end 2008, a spate of proposals cognizant of the near impossibility of any strengthening of the non-

proliferation regime without prior, or at least parallel, progress on the nuclear disarmament front were circulating amongst the strategic establishments of the US and other Western countries. Obama's Prague speech in April 2009 affirming 'America's commitment to... the security of a world without nuclear weapons' brought a certain gravity to such a prospect, however distant, as also the September 2009 Summit of the UN Security Council on "Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament" convened by the USA and chaired by Obama himself (even though it dwelt, almost entirely, on non-proliferation measures after beginning in the Preamble with talk of 'to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons'). These ideas, scattered and amorphous as they were, did the rounds in the open forum discussions and debates in the run up to the 2010 RevCon (in addition to concerns about Iran's non-compliance and about the DPRK imbroglio), which thus took place against the above background of both heightened expectations and wide-spread nervousness about the possibility of the NPT regime unravelling in the event of a repeat of the 2005 failure.

### **2010 Review Conference**

8.10 The outcome of the 2010 RevCon was somewhere in between those two extremes — it was unable to agree on the Final Document (FD), as a whole, but it was able to adopt the "Conclusions and Recommendations for Follow-on Actions" part of the FD by consensus. (That left the "Review of the operation of the Treaty" part outside the consensus – it, therefore, figures in the FD as the Conference President's understanding of what had transpired.)

8.11 The consensus part of the document (Conclusions and Recommendations for Follow-on Actions) consists of four Sections – one each on the so-called three pillars of the NPT (nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy) and one on 'The Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution'. The first of these sections contains, most notably, an *'action plan on nuclear disarmament, which includes concrete steps for the total elimination of nuclear weapons'* and a reaffirmation of *'the unequivocal undertaking of the NWS to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals... to which all States parties are committed under Article VI'*. (emphasis added.)

8.12 64 action points, 22 of them on nuclear disarmament-related aspects, are listed in the consensus document. Some of them are worth recalling here:

a) Action 1: Commitment to ‘the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons’

b) Action 3: Commitment (by the NWS) to ‘undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons’, ‘in implementing the unequivocal undertaking (by the NWS) to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals’.

c) Action 5: Commitment by the NWS to ‘accelerate concrete progress on ...nuclear disarmament...’.

These five Action Points are rounded off with a call to the NWS to ‘promptly engage’ on seven specific steps leading towards nuclear disarmament:

- overall reduction;
- all types of nuclear weapons to be covered;
- diminution of role in security concepts, doctrines and policies;
- prevention of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- Safeguarding the legitimate interest of NNWS in further reductions in the operational status of nuclear weapons;
- reduction of risks of accidental use and transparency.

The NWS are further ‘called upon to report the above undertakings to the 2014 NPT PrepCom and the 2015 NPT RevCon is to ‘take stock and consider the next steps of the full implementation of Article VI’.

(It is left to the NWS to decide how to ‘engage with’ these measures in the interim and ‘report’ on them by the time of the deadline.)

d) Action 6: The CD to ‘immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament’, ‘within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work’.

e) Action 20: All States parties to ‘submit regular reports, within the framework of a strengthened review process... on the implementation of the present action plan, as well as of Article VI...’.

f) Action 21: NWS ‘encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form... for ...voluntarily providing... information...’. UNSG ‘invited to establish a publicly accessible repository, which shall include the information provided by the NWS’.

g) Para B (iii) of Section on Nuclear Disarmament: Recognition accorded, for the first time in an NPT context, to the need for a Nuclear Weapons Convention: ‘the Conference notes the proposals for nuclear disarmament of the SG of the UN to, *inter alia*, consider negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention or agreement on a framework of separate mutually reinforcing instruments...’.

h) Para B (iv) of Section on Nuclear Disarmament: Recognition of the ‘legitimate interests of the NNWS in the constraining by the NWS of ...qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons’.

i) Para A (v) of Section on Nuclear Disarmament: Implicit acknowledgement of debate on the legality of use of nuclear weapons, which could be used as a tool for their (further) delegitimation : ‘deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and ...need for all States ...to comply with... international humanitarian law’.

8.13 It is notable, moreover, that the initial draft Report of Main Committee I on nuclear disarmament (which was released half-way down the Conference on May 14) had called for ‘the need to implement Article VI *within a time-bound framework*’ (emphasis added). It had further called upon the nuclear weapon states to ‘convene consultations not later than 2011 to accelerate concrete progress on nuclear disarmament...’. In addition, it contained a provision inviting the UN Secretary-General ‘to convene an international conference in 2014 to consider ways and means to agree on a roadmap for the complete



elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time-frame, including by means of a universal, legal instrument’.

8.14 Such categorical formulations could not, of course, be agreed upon for adoption because of frontal, often united, resistance from France and Russia mainly, and to a lesser extent the USA and China. (UK reportedly stayed out of the discussions, possibly for want of instructions from the newly formed Government.) On the idea of timelines and legal frameworks (which, according to one analyst, accounted for a good bit of the time and heat in the debate), the Final Document simply affirmed that ‘the final phase of the nuclear disarmament process should be pursued within an agreed legal framework, *which a majority of States parties believe should include specified timelines*’. [emphasis added.]

8.15 Yet, even though these core aspects were diluted drastically, what is notable is the very fact that they were brought up – in full cognition, obviously, of the high political value of the basic NPT bargain for all, the NWS in particular, and, concomitantly, of the immense negotiating leverage it afforded. And that is not something that is going to go away. It is another matter that the leverage could not be put to good use.

8.16 Moreover, the formulations on nuclear disarmament were not the only ones to be left weak in the finally agreed text. Those in the sections on non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy (where much ‘tightening’ of loose ends was sought by the US and other countries of the North) are even weaker in comparison to what was desired and pushed for. NAM countries (primarily, but NNWS from the South in general) were able to block all moves for strengthening the non-proliferation ‘tool box’ (as it has been termed by one empathetic European analyst) — declaration of IAEA’s model Additional Protocol as a (mandatory) standard for safeguards verification in particular – in retaliation for the absence of any comparably weighty commitment in respect of nuclear disarmament. Likewise, in respect of attempts to beef up the costs of withdrawal from the NPT (to prevent a recurrence of DPRK-like errant behaviour) and multilateralisation of the fuel cycle (to restrict the spread of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies). And

the most contentious non-proliferation issue – Iran’s non-compliance with its NPT obligations – could not even be pressed at the RevCon; the Western countries had to rest content with dealing with it outside the RevCon, in the UN SC just about the same time.

8.17 NAM’s readiness to play hard in the future – a clear pre-requisite for any significant advance – need not therefore be in doubt anymore; how far it can go in pressing its weight is, of course, another matter that will depend, apart from the incumbent Chair, on many factors, including the overall international situation by the time of the next RevCon. That gives India a major opportunity of making a weighty contribution even from the outside provided, however, India takes the lead in reorienting NAM to its primary objective since Belgrade 1961 – nuclear disarmament. India must dramatically raise its profile and invoke the crusading spirit with which its campaign for nuclear disarmament has traditionally been imbued.

8.18 In the light of the above, the half way house compromise outcome of the 2010 RevCon should be assessed positively in overall terms by disarmament activists worldwide who are serious about effecting change but feel bereft of levers for bringing it about. And not just because ‘ideas once regarded as a pipedream were now considered appropriate topics for mainstream debate’ (as one account has put it) but also because of the degree of *realpolitik* that could be brought into play by emphasizing the symbolic nature of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament and the ripening of public opinion worldwide. It may also be noted that there is talk of creating a multilateral (negotiating) forum of the P5 for nuclear disarmament issues and action too as evident as in the P5 meeting in Paris to follow up their first meeting in London in September 2009. This is not a small advance and can be attributed directly to the NPT review process having tasked the NWS to report on the results of their labours to the 2014 Prep Com, and then walk the talk at the 2015 RevCon.

8.19 With all this in the works, there is reason to hope that the 2015 RevCon can yet be made to take decisive steps for advancing towards agreement on an unambiguous commitment to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons within a specified time-frame. But the indispensable pre-requisite for this would be for India, as an SNW, to champion the cause and lead the way.

## CHAPTER IX

### EMERGING TRENDS IN THE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT DEBATE

After the celebratory noises on the 2010 NPT RevCon and President Obama's activism have settled down, it is time to take account of changing contours of the disarmament debate. This chapter looks into the recent disarmament initiatives and identifies the newer entry-points in the debate for India, a country that has always offered a consistent and comprehensive disarmament framework, going beyond the NPT.

#### Introduction

9.2 The challenge to put the nuclear genie back in the bottle has fuelled the imagination of the brightest of intellectuals, policymakers and concerned scientists in the last century. However, despite massive efforts and aspirations, the goal of nuclear disarmament remains distant. The primary reason behind this mismatch is the missing link between non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament and continued emphasis by the Nuclear Weapons States on the salience of nuclear weapons for security.

9.3 India foresaw these challenges. Its bid to combine the moral and practical dimensions of nuclear disarmament culminated in 1988 with Rajiv Gandhi's Action Plan for Disarmament. This 'Action Plan for Ushering in a Nuclear Weapons-Free and Nonviolent World Order' was perhaps the first cogent, time-bound and comprehensive proposal for nuclear disarmament and till date it remains the 'sheet-anchor' of India's nuclear policy.

9.4 The Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan focused on joining the twin problems of horizontal and vertical proliferation. 'The arms control approach has focused on the quantitative growth of arsenals. The disarmament approach must devise arrangements for controlling the continuous qualitative upgradation of nuclear and conventional weapons.'<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See Annexe II for Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's speech at the UN while presenting his Action Plan.

9.5 The essential feature of India's approach to nuclear disarmament has been to link it up with non-proliferation and arms control. It is remarkable that India stressed on the link between non-proliferation and disarmament not only in RGAP 88 when it was non-nuclear, but it has also continued this legacy in its nuclear posture even after conducting nuclear tests in 1998. In 2006, Indian Ambassador Jayant Prasad, speaking in the UN Commission on Disarmament, affirmed:

For India, nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are not mutually exclusive. Instead, they intersect and reinforce each other.<sup>2</sup>

9.6 In October 2006, India circulated a Working Paper in the UN CD that, in describing its seven essential steps towards global nuclear disarmament, emphasised on this link.<sup>3</sup> As recently as October 2010, India made a strong case in the UN General Assembly for linking non-proliferation to disarmament for a complete, universal and non-discriminatory approach towards a world free of nuclear weapons.<sup>4</sup> Through the joint statement by President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on 8 November 2010, India has successfully inserted the term 'universal and non-discriminatory' in the India-US global efforts to lead non-proliferation and disarmament.<sup>5</sup>

9.7 Even the leading scholars on disarmament agree that India is 'the most willing of all nuclear-armed states to participate in the global elimination of nuclear arsenals.'<sup>6</sup> India has supported the proposal to include the employment of nuclear weapons as a crime under the jurisdiction of the ICJ.

9.8 Leading international voices on disarmament such as Ambassador Richard Butler, Dr John Burroughs, Douglas Roche, Beatrice Finn, Alyn Ware, Jonathan Granoff etc. have

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<sup>2</sup> Ambassador Jayant Prasad's speech at the CD, 11 April, 2006. <http://www.un.int/india/2006/ind1223.pdf>

<sup>3</sup> India's Working Paper in UN CD, 6 October 2006. See Annexe III.

<sup>4</sup> Statement of the Indian representative to the UNGA First Committee, 15 October 2010. <http://www.un.int/india/2010/ind1753.pdf>

<sup>5</sup> Full text of joint communiqué available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/08/joint-statement-president-obama-and-prime-minister-singh-india>

<sup>6</sup> Gorge Perkovich and James Acton, "Abolishing Nuclear Weapons". *Adelphi Paper 396* (London: IISS, 2008)

expressed their optimism about India's role in global disarmament and have underlined that India's consistency would actually help us in leading the new efforts towards disarmament. No other country with nuclear weapons has this unique position.

### **According to Ambassador Richard Butler**

9.9 Today's circumstances are much transformed and provide the opportunity, and necessity for India to resume a leadership role:

1. While the existing control regime, principally the NPT, has served its purposes largely well, it is now widely recognized as being insufficient for the task of bringing into existence a secure world free of nuclear weapons.
2. The agreements that have been reached by India and the US have transformed the underlying situation: the shared commitment to a secure world without nuclear weapons; they acknowledged  
  
...responsibility to forge a strong partnership to lead global efforts for non-proliferation and universal and non-discriminatory global nuclear disarmament.

The determination to admit India into the four multilateral export control regimes serves to break the connections which had been drawn, previously between the restraint on acquisition of nuclear explosive capability, on the one hand, and access to the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology, on the other.

3. The expressed intention of the two major nuclear weapons states, US and Russia, to go on, beyond New Start, to seek further reductions in their nuclear weapons (of which they have held 90% of the global total).

9.10 . In these circumstances, there is no longer any contradiction between India possessing nuclear weapons, at this stage, and it pursuing its policy on nuclear arms control and disarmament and seeking a leadership role in that field.

**According to Douglas Roche, O. C. Canada**

9.11 Norway, Germany, and Belgium, all NATO members, are chaffing at the alliance restrictions. They are ready to join important link-minded countries, such as Austria, Switzerland, Brazil, and Chile, which have openly called for a convention. A group of non-aligned countries, led by Costa Rica and Malaysia, have already met to start the process of building support. When significant middle-power states enter the discussion, a new compact will be in the offing. India's presence would be a stroke of leadership. This will be a great help to President Obama in overcoming the objections he hears daily from those around him in Washington.

9.12 The urgency of the non-proliferation/disarmament scene make this a timely moment to not merely re-visit the issue, but demand a world spotlight for it. India and the NPT is not the point of this exercise; rather it is India's call for a global ban on all nuclear weapons, including its own. We can't wait for the processes of general and complete disarmament to occur before seriously considering nuclear disarmament. Rather, it is nuclear disarmament that must drive the processes of building peace and security. This requires the building of a new security architecture not dependant on nuclear weapons. There is no getting away from a multiple approach to nuclear disarmament, but setting the goal with effective steps related to the goal, for the elimination of nuclear weapons is essential.

**According to Jonathan Granoff, President, Global Security Institute**

9.13 India cannot end the threat posed by Pakistan without a global solution to nuclear weapons. India could not eliminate its nuclear arsenal even if the challenge of Pakistan were removed. China must cooperate in the disarmament process. China will not move forward without Russia and Russia will not move substantially toward nuclear disarmament without the United States. Thus a global solution alone can solve the regional threat India faces.

9.14 It must be made clear that zero is a process and not an event. The process of addressing the underlying reasons for developing the weapons, lowering the currency of the weapons, taking the practical steps to make us safer, and eliminating the weapons by and through law backed with verification and enforcement is the goal and the way to the goal. Even if there are no more physical weapons these processes must be enlivened and are the actual reason for and process of zero. The Rajiv Gandhi approach is fully consistent with this analysis. Perhaps, an Indian ministerial level group could be created to work out the best way to convene conferences and consultations of like minded states and civil society to advance a legal ban on nuclear weapons.

**According to Alyn Ware, Global Coordinator, Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (PNND)**

9.15 There are several reasons why India is well poised today to champion the cause of nuclear disarmament.

- a. India, as the world's largest democracy and one of the world's fastest growing economies, has the potential to become a leading political figure on the international stage. This could provide increased influence over the next few years, and could give added impetus to a renewed nuclear abolition initiative. Similarly, leadership by India on nuclear abolition would enhance the credentials of India in other international forums and organisations – something which would benefit India's position and interests in these forums/organisations.
- b. India has strong and unique connections with key States possessing nuclear weapons which would give India an opportunity to lead effectively:
  - i. With the UK, India has an historic relationship as a former colony. The UK has already started some preparatory work to support a process for nuclear disarmament, including joint studies with the Norwegian government and an NGO (VERTIC) on verification of

warhead dismantlement. The UK could thus be open to preparatory work with India on further verification requirements for global abolition.

- ii. With the US, India has developed strong political relationships and commercial links including in the nuclear energy field through the recent nuclear technology cooperation arrangements. India could use these relationships and links to initiate preparatory work with the US on key aspects of nuclear disarmament. This might include exploration of communications aspects of verification systems, space-based verification (both of which could provide commercial benefits once disarmament and verification systems are developed) and doctrinal aspects (e.g. moving towards sole purpose then prohibition of use - both of which are in line with the Indian 2006 plan and the US Nuclear Posture Review – and then exploring possibilities to also prohibit threat of use).
  - iii. With China and Pakistan, India shares a common commitment to a Nuclear Weapons Convention, even though there are still unresolved conflicts between the countries. India could demonstrate leadership by using this common commitment to initiate some cooperative preparatory work for a NWC between the three States, possibly focused on global security aspects of a nuclear weapons convention, which could then put political pressure on France, Russia, UK and USA to more seriously consider the idea of the NWC.
- c. India also has historical ties with the Nonaligned Movement which it could use to help bridge the divide between the NWS and the NNWS to help facilitate engagement by all in preparatory work for a NWC.



## **Recent momentum on disarmament**

9.16 After the failure of the 2005 Review Conference, there was deep and widespread anxiety over the issue of support for nuclear disarmament even from the realist quarters. The two op-eds in January 2007 and 2008 by the four American cold war veterans in *The Wall Street Journal* marked not only a resonance for a nuclear-free world in the realist camp, but also a bi-partisan consensus as Schultz and Kissinger are Republicans while Perry and Nunn are Democrats. The momentum in the US reached its culmination with President Obama's Prague speech and his Nobel peace prize.

9.17 Internationally, there has been a spurt of disarmament initiatives in the recent years. These include stand-alone as well as joint initiatives on part of various governments, disarmament models being advocated by prominent think-tanks and also the proposals by international civil society and peace movements. Apart from the several resolutions and working papers floated in the UN, several concrete proposals on nuclear disarmament appeared during the last year's NPT Review Conference- both inside and outside the conference.

9.18 However, this momentum for disarmament, visible in the run up to NPT RevCon, seems to have petered out. Obama's push to nuclear disarmament has been replaced by clamour for nuclear security. The four US diplomats themselves wrote a third op-ed in 2010 on how to protect American nuclear deterrence. Far from admitting the harsh realities of security compulsions and then also showing readiness to minimizing the US deterrent along the gradual way to nuclear disarmament, their article betrayed the ulterior objective that disarmament and arms control are just another tool in their grand-strategic arsenal: 'move in two parallel paths—one path which reduces nuclear dangers by maintaining our deterrence, and the other which reduces nuclear dangers through arms control and international programs to prevent proliferation.'<sup>7</sup> Despite raised hopes, the NATO's new 'Strategic Concept' (2010) declared in its Lisbon summit failed to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its operations. It, in fact, reinforced the organization's continued reliance on nuclear weapons – 'It commits NATO to

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<sup>7</sup> George p. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry a. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, "How to protect our nuclear deterrent", *The Wall Street Journal*, January 19, 2010 [http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704152804574628344282735008.html?mod=googlenews\\_wsj](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704152804574628344282735008.html?mod=googlenews_wsj)

the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons – but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance’.<sup>8</sup>

### **Disarmament and the 2010 NPT Review Conference**

9.19 The global debate on nuclear disarmament is primarily centred around the NPT. Characterized as the ‘cornerstone’ of not only the non-proliferation, but also the global disarmament regime,<sup>9</sup> the treaty in practice has more to do with limiting the spread of nuclear weapons than disarmament. Its Article VI, providing for ‘discussions in good faith’ on the elimination of nuclear weapons has been treated by the NPT-NWS as decorative language, more than an operational injunction. Indeed the global disarmament movement itself has started invoking this article only in the recent decade.<sup>10</sup> Since its first UNGA Resolution I(1) in fact, out of the ‘three pillars of the NPT’ namely non-proliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament, disarmament has been the weakest.

9.20 Despite popular aspirations of nuclear disarmament, the P5 countries avoided any meaningful discussion on disarmament in the successive NPT RevCons in the initial decades. In the 1995 Review and Indefinite Extension Conference, although a final document could not be agreed upon; the resolutions on CTBT, the Middle East NWFZ and Preparatory Committees towards the reviews of the Treaty were served as a package to keep the treaty from falling apart and extending it indefinitely. The 2000 RevCon saw adoption of ‘13 Practical Steps’ for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI. None of the steps however were realised in the next five years and the 2005 RevCon ended in a failure. In the run up to the 2010 RevCon, starting from the UN Secretary-General<sup>11</sup> and the President of the Review Conference himself,<sup>12</sup> there was a wider shadow of apprehension.

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<sup>8</sup> See “NATO’s New Strategic Concept”, [www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf](http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf)

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.disarm.emb-japan.go.jp/statements/Statement/kyoto020807.htm>  
[www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/SGAdvisory.doc](http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/SGAdvisory.doc)

<sup>10</sup> Gusterson, Hugh. “Finding Article VI” *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, 8 January 2007

<sup>11</sup> <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90856/6966909.html>

<sup>12</sup> [http://disarm.igc.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=340:defining-success-for-the-npt-review-conference-spring-2010&catid=145:disarmament-times-spring-2010&Itemid=2](http://disarm.igc.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=340:defining-success-for-the-npt-review-conference-spring-2010&catid=145:disarmament-times-spring-2010&Itemid=2)

9.21 In the run up to the 2010 Review Conference, the United States took several initiatives—the commitment in the Prague speech of President Obama, pushing through the UNSC Resolution 1887, the START-Follow on Treaty on nuclear arms reduction with Russia, the reduction in the salience of nuclear weapons in its recent Nuclear Posture Review, and the disclosure of the size of US nuclear arsenal right on the eve of the NPT RevCon to promote transparency. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton tried to sell this package of essentially arms control measures as demonstrable progress on disarmament to the NPT community. Selling these measures to the NPT RevCon, the US on the one hand, wanted smooth sailing in the review and on the other hand, it sought to garner support for stricter non-proliferation practices through enforcing compliance, making exit from the treaty difficult, and discouraging closed nuclear fuel cycles to make transfer of sensitive ENR technologies difficult.

### **Positions on disarmament in NPT RevCon 2010**

9.22 The P5 countries' joint statement in the 2010 RevCon referred to the consultation they undertook in September 2009 on confidence-building, transparency and disarmament and expressed optimism with recent advancements like signing of New START treaty, UNSC Resolution 1887 and reaffirmed their commitment to disarmament under Article VI.<sup>13</sup>

9.23 The US opening statement in the 2010 NPT RevCon just made a mention of disarmament in the context of supporting the NWFZ as they 'contribute to the President's non-proliferation and disarmament goals'. After the RevCon, US President Obama issued a statement welcoming the agreements reached at in the RevCon and lauded it as a step ahead towards his Prague agenda. However, he used this occasion to focus less on disarmament and to resist the 'singling out' of Israel in the Middle East WMD Free Zone.<sup>14</sup>

9.24 Russia, China and France made their statements on the second day of the RevCon. The Chinese Ambassador, holding that this RevCon bears greatly on the prospects of international non-proliferation regime and the future of the international disarmament process,

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<sup>13</sup> [http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/revcon2010/statements/5May\\_P5-full.pdf](http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/revcon2010/statements/5May_P5-full.pdf)

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2010/May/20100528230427ptellivremos0.3599163.html>

stressed on completing the CTBT and FMCT processes, an international treaty on No-First-Use and adoption of viable, long-term and phased actions towards nuclear disarmament. He also asserted the newer obstacles to disarmament like Missile Defence programs and upheld the right of NPT states to use peaceful nuclear energy. France also called for broader consensus on strengthening the NPT while promoting civil nuclear industry in the age of nuclear renaissance. Russia on its part lauded its recent treaty with the US on nuclear arms reduction. It underlined the need to seek an international architecture that could ensure legitimate right of the states to peaceful nuclear energy with reducing the proliferation risks.

Country specific positions have been enumerated in Chapter VII of this Report.

9.25 The 2010 RevCon of the NPT in its final document has called upon the NWS to ‘engage with’ disarmament related issues and ‘report back to’ the 2014 NPT PrepCom and 2015 RevCon which will ‘take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of Article VI’. The final document also promised a conference in 2012 for establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East (WMDFZ). Though this can be regarded as some concrete progress on disarmament as compared to the 2000 situation, France, Russia, UK, and the US, almost in a coordinated fashion, expressed their unhappiness against all concrete disarmament steps, particularly the action plan.

9.26 The UN NGO committee on disarmament, peace and security noted that ‘their interventions indicated their desire to receive lavish praise for their arms reduction measures since the end of the Cold War while refusing to commit to any additional concrete steps leading to actual nuclear disarmament.’<sup>15</sup>

9.27 The 2010 Review Conference’s Final Document, in an attempt to find a balance between nuclear proliferation and disarmament, ultimately preserves the status quo and misses the urgent need to link non-proliferation to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. The RevCon’s President Ambassador Libran Cabactulan himself admitted that the document was carefully drafted to meet the ‘red lines’ of all the NWS.<sup>16</sup> The promise of a 2012 conference

<sup>15</sup> Ray Acheson, The 2010 NPT Review Conference: Where Do We Go from Here? [http://disarm.igc.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=357:the-2010-npt-review-conference-where-do-we-go-from-here&catid=147:disarmament-times-summer-2010&Itemid=2](http://disarm.igc.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=357:the-2010-npt-review-conference-where-do-we-go-from-here&catid=147:disarmament-times-summer-2010&Itemid=2)

<sup>16</sup> *ibid*

on the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East was the concrete saving grace for the Review Conference.

## **Some recent proposals on disarmament**

9.28 In the run up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, several proposals for disarmament were floated at the international level – starting from the UN Secretary-General to different collectives of nations and then the international civil society. Some of the important proposals are described below:

### ***Five-Point Proposal by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon***

On 24 October 2008, the UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, launched a detailed proposal specifically on nuclear disarmament. This proposal included strengthening of the NPT, with the emphasis on action under Article VI, while ensuring security during disarmament through UN Security Council; strengthening governance of nuclear issues - through CTBT, FMCT, NWFZs etc; increasing transparency and accountability by reporting progress on disarmament commitments to the UN Secretariat; and a range of ‘complementary measures’ like eliminating chemical and biological weapons, space weapons and certain types of missiles, efforts against nuclear terrorism, besides conventional arms reduction and increased cooperation and peace in international affairs.

### ***The ICNND proposal: Eliminating Nuclear Threats***

The International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, floated jointly by Japan and Australia came up with a report charting out a phased, time-bound approach for the elimination of nuclear weapons. It proposed year 2025 as the ‘minimization point’ and suggested two phases of ‘minimization’ of nuclear weapons (short term: 2010 - 2012, long term: 2012 - 2025) and ‘elimination’ (beyond 2025: going to zero) of nuclear weapons. The first phase would primarily include

arms reduction; doctrinal devaluing of nuclear weapons; and credible and verifiable force postures ending in a situation where it becomes possible to persuade states to take final steps of abolition in the second phase.

***NAM ‘Plan of Action’ for disarmament:***

The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NAM) jointly floated a document called ‘Elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons’ on 28 April 2010, in the run up to the NPT RevCon 2010. The document welcomed the positive signals sent out by the NWS for a world free of nuclear weapons, but it emphasised the need for urgent and concrete measures. Highlighting the unrealized promises of 13 practical steps, and continued strategic reliance on nuclear weapons by the NWS, the NAM offered a time-bound nuclear abolition plan:<sup>17</sup>

**First Phase: 2010 to 2015**

1. Measures aimed at reducing nuclear threat::

CTBT, FMCT, transparent and less belligerent nuclear postures, multilateral legally binding negative security assurances, a convention unconditionally prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, an international conference at the ‘earliest possible date’ to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, full compliance, ratification and expansion of NWFZ treaties, establish NWFZ in the Middle East, implement the 1995 Resolution, stand down nuclear weapon systems from a state of operational readiness and measures to prevent the use of new technologies for upgrading the existing nuclear weapon systems.

2. Measures aimed at nuclear disarmament:

Full implementation by the NWS of their disarmament obligations – Article VI and 13 steps, conclusion of negotiations on further reductions of nuclear arsenals (START),

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<sup>17</sup> “Elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons”[http://isis-online.org/uploads/conferences/documents/NAM\\_Plan\\_of\\_Action\\_for\\_2010\\_NPT\\_RevCon\\_30April2010.pdf](http://isis-online.org/uploads/conferences/documents/NAM_Plan_of_Action_for_2010_NPT_RevCon_30April2010.pdf)

moratorium on protection of fissile materials pending conclusion of FMCT, formally commence 2010s as the ‘Decade for nuclear disarmament’ and begin realising its objectives.

### **Second Phase: 2015 to 2020**

Measures aimed to reduce nuclear arsenals and to promote confidence between States:

1. Entry into force of the treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons and the establishment of a single integrated multilateral comprehensive verification system to ensure compliance, including measures such as: separation of nuclear warheads from their delivery vehicles; placement of nuclear warheads in secure storage under international supervision leading to the removal of special nuclear materials from warheads, and; transfer of nuclear materials including fissile materials and delivery vehicles to ‘peaceful purposes’.
2. Preparation under international auspices of an inventory of nuclear arsenals, including fissile materials, nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles.
3. Progressive and balanced reduction of missiles intended for carrying nuclear warheads.
4. Recommendations by the 2020 Review Conference to declare 2020 as the ‘Decade for the total elimination of nuclear weapons’.

### **Third Phase: 2020 to 2025 and beyond:**

Measures aimed toward consolidation of a Nuclear Weapon Free World

1. Full implementation of the treaty to eliminate all nuclear weapons, and of its verification regime through completion of measures such as elimination of all nuclear weapons, conversion of all facilities devoted to the production of nuclear weapons to ‘peaceful purposes’.
2. Application of safeguards on nuclear facilities on a universal basis.

### ***New Agenda Coalition***

New Agenda Coalition - a group composed of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden formed in 1998 - played a historic role in the 2000 NPT RevCon by introducing the ‘13 practical steps’ towards nuclear disarmament. In the 2010 NPT RevCon, this group submitted a working paper that urged for concrete

progress towards disarmament – besides re-emphasizing the obligations made in 2000 RevCon, it called for the strengthening and universalisation of the NPT; denuclearization by the DPRK and its re-joining the NPT; ban on nuclear testing, fissile material and improvisation of nuclear arsenal; decreasing the readiness of arsenal; enactment of NWFZ and WMDFZ in various regions; and greater transparency and confidence building through universal negative security assurances.

### ***Non-governmental proposals for nuclear disarmament***

Besides the above-mentioned proposals floated by various governments, some significant proposals have been offered by international civil society, think tanks and peace movements. Some of these proposals are described below:

#### ***Hiroshima-Nagasaki protocol***

It is a proposed protocol, complimentary to the NPT, launched by Hiroshima mayor Tadatoshi Akiba at the 2008 PrepCom for the NPT RevCon of 2010. This Protocol called for earliest elimination of all the nuclear weapons from the earth. The protocol envisaged fulfilling of the Article VI promise by the year 2020. the protocol has 3 articles:

- Article- I: “clampdown” on all weapon-usable fissile materials – be they in weapons, reactors, or stocks – accompanied by a cessation of nuclear weapons acquisition and of all preparations for the use of nuclear weapons.
- Article – II: establishment of a negotiating forum open to all states, with the sole purpose of developing a Nuclear Weapons Convention or Framework Agreement for achieving nuclear disarmament in all its aspects by the year 2020.
- Article-III: strengthen the international control system and to continue to comply fully with their NPT obligations.

***The Mayors of Peace***, with the support of 512 cities from 42 countries, launched its 2020 vision campaign which aimed at:



- Adoption of the Hiroshima-Nagasaki Protocol by the 2010 NPT Review Conference
- Directly thereafter, an end to nuclear weapon acquisition and threats and, as soon as possible thereafter, a clampdown on all weapon-usable fissile materials
- Conclusion of a Nuclear Weapons Convention prior to 2015 NPT Review Conference
- Securely destroy all nuclear weapons by the 2020 NPT Review Conference

### **The Global Zero Initiative**

9.29 In a gathering of more than 100 prominent civic, military and political leaders, Global Zero was launched in December 2008 in Paris. Their membership has now increased to 300.<sup>18</sup> Announcing a framework plan for disarmament, it urged for total abolition of nuclear weapons, starting with drastic cuts in the US and Russian arsenals. Global Zero proposal consisted of four phases:<sup>19</sup>

- Phase 1 (2010-2013): Reduction of the US and Russia arsenals to 1,000 each
- Phase 2 (2014-2018): US-Russia reduce their arsenals to 500 weapons each; stringent non-proliferation and verification regime
- Phase 3 (2019- 2023): Negotiation of a Global Zero accord, signed by all nuclear capable countries, for the phased, verified, proportional reduction of all nuclear arsenals to zero total warheads by 2030.
- Phase 4 (2023-2030): Bring all nuclear arsenals to zero total warheads by 2030 and continue the verification and enforcement system.

Global Zero have been exceptionally successful in mobilization media support.<sup>20</sup>

### **Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC)**

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<sup>18</sup> List of their most prominent members as on 18 August 2011 is at Annexe IV. Also online at <http://www.globalzero.org/full-list-signatories>

<sup>19</sup> The Global Zero Action Plan is reproduced at Annexe IV. Also at [http://static.globalzero.org/files/docs/GZAP\\_6.0.pdf](http://static.globalzero.org/files/docs/GZAP_6.0.pdf)

<sup>20</sup> Examples of media coverage of the London Summit ( 22-23 June 2011 ) may be seen at Annexe IV.

9.30 On the lines of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), a consortium of experts in law, science, disarmament and negotiation drafted a model Nuclear Weapons Convention,<sup>21</sup> which Costa Rica submitted to the UN Secretary-General as a discussion draft in 1997. In the 2007 PrepCom for the NPT Review Conference of 2010, The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICANW) floated an updated version of the model convention. The prominent supporters of NWC include the -

Dalai Lama

Hans Blix

Nobel laureate Jody Williams

Mayor of Hiroshima Tadatoshi Akiba

Former World Court judge Christopher Weeramantry

Former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser

Former UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Jayantha Dhanapala

Former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans.

9.31 A total of 140 countries have expressed support for the NWC, while 22 are yet to decide. 30 countries, including UK are opposed to it.<sup>22</sup> Why single out the UK? A survey conducted in 2008 estimated 76% international public support for nuclear weapons.

#### **Article VI Forum (Middle Powers Initiative)**

9.32 A program of the Global Security Institute, the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI), is dedicated to the worldwide reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. It advocates ‘a series of well-defined stages accompanied by increasing verification and control’. Through MPI, 8 international NGOs work in collaboration with “Middle Power” governments and canvass NWS on taking immediate and practical steps to reduce nuclear danger and negotiate nuclear abolition. The Article VI Forum facilitates high-level meetings between diplomats and

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<sup>21</sup> See for details [www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/nwc/nwc.pdf](http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/nwc/nwc.pdf)

<sup>22</sup> ICAN campaign overview, <http://www.icanw.org/files/ICAN-campaignoverview.pdf>

key leaders to discuss the political, legal, and technical requisites for a nuclear-free world. The Middle Powers Initiative had put forward recommendations on disarmament for the NPT RevCon 2010.<sup>23</sup>

**Other major recent international proposals on disarmament include:**

- European Union disarmament initiative [Sarkozy letter to Ban Ki-moon] (2008)
- Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice [Malaysia, UNGA Res 63/49] (2008)
- Norwegian initiative (2005)
- Nuclear disarmament (Nonaligned Movement, UNGA Res 63/46), 2008
- Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons (Japan, UNGA Res 63/73), 200
- British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Lifting the Nuclear Shadow*, (2008)
- Abolishing Nuclear Weapons [Perkovich/Acton, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 396] (2008)
- International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe (2007)
- NGO Response to Blix Commission (2006)
- Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (Blix Commission) (2006)

**Some recurring salient features of these proposals are:**

1. ***Phased/Time-bound approach:*** Global Zero: 2010-2030 (20 years), New Age Peace Foundation: 10-17 years, Mayors for Peace: Hiroshima-Nagasaki protocol: 2015/2020
2. ***Strengthening of the non-proliferation regime:*** Universalisation of NPT, IAEA Additional Protocols, denial of enrichment/reprocessing, stronger export control, FMCT, multilateral nuclear fuel cycle, punitive actions for non-compliant states.

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<sup>23</sup> For details, see [http://www.middlepowers.org/pubs/Revcon\\_Highlights.pdf](http://www.middlepowers.org/pubs/Revcon_Highlights.pdf)

3. ***Institutional/political reforms***: NWFZ, UNSC reforms, enhanced global security environment, participation of civil society, increased role for the UN/multilateralism
4. ***Newer/stronger disarmament measure***: Nuclear Weapons Convention, No First Use Treaty, legally binding negative security assurances, withdrawal of nuclear weapons from foreign soil
5. ***Effective Confidence building measures***: De-valuing nuclear weapons, reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, de-alerting/decreasing operational status, transparency in arsenals/fissile material
6. ***Some proposals also emphasize on offensive/pre-emptive steps*** such as: Missile defence, small, smart and improved arsenals and general arms-reduction

## **Practical Issues**

9.33 Perkovich and Acton have done a study on practical challenges before nuclear disarmament and they have identified three types of challenges:

*technical*, such as verification and monitoring of fissile material and nuclear fuel cycle;

*political–technical* issues like garnering confidence in international monitoring to avoid breaking out; and

*purely political* challenges of diplomacy.<sup>24</sup>

9.34 Many of the provisions advanced by Perkovich and Acton in their work are calculated to delay the disarmament process. For instance, they say that nuclear weapons can not be eliminated unless conflict situation in Taiwan, Kashmir, Palestine, and North Korea are resolved.<sup>25</sup> According to them, a nuclear weapons free world would be possible only if the Nuclear Weapons States are convinced that they would not require nuclear weapons to deter large scale military intervention. Unfortunately, nuclear disarmament would have to be delayed indefinitely if the world waits for the realization of a perfect security situation.

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<sup>24</sup> See footnote number 6, p. 107.

<sup>25</sup> For a critique of Perkovich and Acton's work, see: "Nuclear Disarmament: A Way Forward" *IDSA Task Force Report*, April 2010. See [http://www.idsa.in/system/files/book\\_NuclearDisarmament.pdf](http://www.idsa.in/system/files/book_NuclearDisarmament.pdf)

9.35 It has been argued in academic literature that nuclear weapons are beneficial to smaller or weaker powers which lack conventional forces to deter adversaries. Nuclear weapons are the providers of security. Without nuclear weapons, the world would be a far less stable place. Such logic, prevalent in the realist school of international relations, argues against nuclear disarmament.<sup>26</sup>

9.36 A number of practical issues would have to be addressed to for nuclear disarmament to be a reality and not remain just wishful thinking. These have been discussed at some length in the IDSA Task Force Report.<sup>27</sup> The report details the technical and politico-security challenges in negotiating an agreement on the elimination of nuclear weapons. Essentially it has been argued that the problem of verification is not insurmountable and the IAEA could be entrusted with this job. Further, several verification technologies are available to make verification effective. The 9 nuclear armed states can authorise enforcement mechanism. Violation can be graded into different categories and appropriate sanctions applied in each case. A few nuclear weapons may be in international control to deter the use or threat of use of nuclear force by clandestine weapon development.

### **An assessment of recent disarmament initiatives: Comparing with the RGAP**

9.37 There are broadly two separate and distinct approaches to disarmament – the direct approach and the gradual approach. Those supporting the direct approach seek to abolish nuclear weapons in one go – through a Nuclear Weapons Convention or some treaty to this effect. A majority of NNWS are supportive of this approach. The NWS and the western countries, on the other hand, support a gradual approach in which nuclear dangers and risks, proliferation, arms control etc are to be pursued as initial steps leading to an atmosphere for disarmament. However, the West has not been able to conclude even these pre-requisites, attributing it to some or other strategic concern. There is a growing realization that a direct

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<sup>26</sup> *ibid*

<sup>27</sup> *ibid*

approach with non-proliferation, arms control, and verification issues embedded along its way is what the world needs today. As Barry Blechman, co-author of ‘Elements of a Nuclear Disarmament Treaty’ has pointed out, ‘piecemeal control efforts will never work; we have to think more boldly if we are to achieve global nuclear disarmament.’<sup>28</sup>

9.38 This presents an opportunity for India to re-champion the cause of complete disarmament. The concept of a Nuclear Weapons Convention comes closest to the universal and comprehensive disarmament championed in the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan. There is a growing international convergence with the basic tenets of India’s conceptualization, i.e., linking non-proliferation and arms control to the goal of disarmament and pursuing disarmament in a phased manner while not losing sight of the final goal. The report by Global Zero envisaged complete elimination of nuclear weapons by 2025. The ICNND report is so defensive that it is titled ‘Eliminating Nuclear Threats’; not eliminating nuclear weapons. It favours a ‘minimization point’ in 2025. Why should the world wait up to 2025 to reach there? Why cannot the US and Russia swiftly pursue deep cuts, to 500 weapons each? The security establishments will always find some argument or other to retain, modernize and even use nuclear weapons. The Hiroshima Protocol is another well-thought initiative, but apart from civil society, such an agenda needs to be supported by States.

9.39 Over time, the Indian approach of a comprehensive, time-bound disarmament and the non-proliferation-arms control route to disarmament followed by the global mainstream, have inched closer to one another. The international community is, for her part, increasingly accepting the need for concrete and comprehensive steps to disarmament and India has accommodated non-proliferation concerns at the policy level.

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<sup>28</sup> Barry Blechman, “Stop at START”, New York Times, 18 February 2010.<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/opinion/19blechman.html> (Blechman is a Fellow at the Stimson Centre and Co-Editor of Elements of a Nuclear Disarmament Treaty.)

## CHAPTER X

### OFFICIAL, QUASI-OFFICIAL AND NON-OFFICIAL INITIATIVES

#### A Compendium and Comparative Analysis

##### I. Introduction

A very large number of proposals and initiatives for nuclear disarmament have been put forward, internationally, in recent times (please see Annexe VIII for a listing and a chart):

**Official**, i.e. those put forward at the inter-Governmental level (e.g. the September 2010 and April 2011 Berlin statement of the ten Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative nations, Seven Nation Plan of 2005, New Agenda Coalition ideas since 1998, the NAM Plan of Action on the eve of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, UN Secretary-General's Five Point proposal of 2008, Model Nuclear Weapons Convention circulated in the UNGA by Costa Rica and Malaysia in 2007, British 'Lifting the Nuclear Shadow' etc.);

**Quasi-official**, i.e. those sponsored by individual Governments but representing the views of independent experts and scholars etc appointed by them (such as the Tokyo Forum, ICNND set up by Australia and Japan, (Swedish) Blix Commission, Mayors for Peace: Hiroshima and Nagasaki Protocol, Canberra Commission) or advanced by former political and military leaders (as e.g. Gro Harlem Brundtland, Alan Juppe, Schmidt, Elbaradei and others) and

**Unofficial**, i.e. those emanating from non-Governmental bodies (advocacy groups such as the Article VI Forum, Global Zero Initiative, Roadmap for Abolition, Pugwash, International Physicians for Prevention of Nuclear War, International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, Abolition 2000, Nuclear Threat Initiative etc.).

10.2. Taken together, they form a veritable treasure trove of good ideas on nuclear disarmament related issues that can serve as valuable source material for working out an effective,

global, plan of action for nuclear disarmament, whenever the international community is able to reach agreement on the task of undertaking such an exercise in earnest.

10.3. In addition, there is the NPT aimed, avowedly, at curbing proliferation of nuclear weapons – the only treaty of its kind, even though not a universal one — which enjoins its members to exert themselves, inter alia, in favour of nuclear disarmament (and which has a five yearly review process to introspect on the impact/results of their collective commitment and endeavours in this regard). It is, strictly speaking, not in the category of initiatives/proposals for nuclear disarmament but has, nevertheless, to be considered along with them in any such reckoning as the present one because it too exerts influence on the nuclear disarmament process and discourse. And quite some influence, in fact.

10.4 This Chapter attempts an appraisal of the commonalities and contradictions between the approach of these initiatives and proposals and that of India, with a view to exploring possibilities of partnership in pursuit of the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. (The position in regard to the NPT is taken up in detail in the next chapter because of the weighty potential for effective action it offers India at the present historical juncture.)

## **II. Survey of Existing Initiatives and Proposals**

10.5. The chart in Annexe VIII (borrowed from a UN Office of Disarmament Affairs sponsored project — [http://cns.miis.edu/stories/100423\\_disarmament\\_proposals.htm](http://cns.miis.edu/stories/100423_disarmament_proposals.htm)) gives an overview of about 40 (post-1995) proposals, academically analysed for their contents in respect of (specific aspects of) the following five dimensions:

- (i) *their rationale, such as*
  - danger of use (of nuclear weapons)*
  - danger of proliferation to other state/non-state actors
  - illegality of use/possession
  - immorality, impracticality, military disutility



(ii) their operative provisions for disarmament (and collateral) measures, as e.g.

total elimination of nuclear weapons

no-first use/non-use of nuclear weapons

de-targeting

negative security assurances

prohibition of testing (CTBT etc.)

curbs on modernization of arsenals

curbs on delivery vehicles

transparency – of arsenals, fissile materials

verification mechanisms

(iii) their operative provisions for non-proliferation measures, as e.g.

universalisation of NPT

securing against terrorist and non-state actor access

export controls

dealing with non-compliance issues

(iv) the legal framework within which action/advance is envisaged, such as

Nuclear Weapons Convention

Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

(v) the political framework within which action/advance is envisaged, such as

Strengthened role of UN (for collective security arrangements), Special Conferences of the UNGA on disarmament, strengthened IAEA (for verification), etc.

Mechanisms for sharing of (best) practices conducive for creation of a positive global security environment

10.6. As will be seen from the scores on the Chart, there is considerable diversity amongst the various proposals, in the attributes or specific aspects they espouse, downplay or avoid touching upon altogether — deliberately or otherwise. This is not surprising because each

reflects the particular circumstances of its origins (timing, broader international context at the time of release, specific concerns of the sponsors and so on) and rarely a comprehensive, text book, exercise undertaken on a clean slate, starting from scratch, as it were, that might possibly have resulted in greater convergence amongst them all professing broadly the same objective – of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

10.7. Notably, many of them have been put forward by leading public figures or former military/civil officials/political leaders with first hand experience of nuclear weapons. As such, they carry a lot of weight, independent of their contents (which, it has to be said, are of uneven quality – in terms of the consistency, and clarity, with which they call for nuclear weapons to be done away with, and carry that call to its logical conclusion, viz. complete elimination and outlawing leading to abolition of these WMDs, as in case of biological and chemical weapons, without fear or favour).

[The most well known of them all is the ‘Hoover Plan’ put forward by the “Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse” from the US – Kissinger, Schultz, Nunn and Perry – in a series of (annual almost) articles in 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2011 that began by making the case for a change in (US) thinking on nuclear weapons, in favour of nuclear disarmament (and even doing away with these WMD altogether), if proliferation of nuclear weapons and military related technologies were to be checked effectively, but ended by back-tracking from that forthright position on the disarmament-non-proliferation link (and arguing, essentially, for retention of some nuclear weapons as a hedge against uncertainty, be it in a clever manner, without wanting to be seen by their publics to be regressing on their earlier espousal of the vision of a world without nuclear weapons).]

10.8. There is also the related question about the motivation underlying many of the proposals, particularly the official and quasi-official ones. The element of opportunism, and cynical calculation, in a barrage of proposals professing nuclear disarmament making their appearance (almost entirely from the establishments of the “North”) in the run up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, preventing a breakdown which was crucial (from their point of view) for sustenance

of the ‘non-proliferation regime’, could not remain hidden from most observers — at least not in India, with its long experience of grappling with the disingenuous arguments and sophistry (because of its discerning stand against the NPT going back to the negotiations in the mid-60s) that have bedevilled the discourse in the field of international security ever since.

10.9. Thus not all are unambiguous on the issue of (total) abolition of nuclear weapons – clearly the most important, and crucial, aspect from the Indian point of view - with many paying no more than lip-service to that objective and some even remaining silent (in operative terms), stopping at non-proliferation steps only. This has been taken as a touchstone for sifting the grain from the chaff, as it were — those not categorical on the issue of doing away with nuclear weapons altogether were not taken up for detailed examination. The list in Annexe VIII gives the remaining eighteen proposals/initiatives.

10.10 .Notable aspects (of these eighteen, and a few others, leaving the 2010 NPT Review Conference document aside which is examined in detail in Chapter VIII) are discussed below briefly, with a view to presenting a picture of their strengths and weaknesses from the Indian standpoint:

### **Official level proposals**

(a) UN Secretary-General (October 2008) : Carefully crafted to avoid ruffling any (member state’s) feathers, as appropriate for anyone in his position, the sub-text of this “five-point proposal” clearly points in the right direction (of abolition of nuclear weapons) even though it does not mention that as a goal, explicitly.

Recommends pursuit of nuclear disarmament by the NPT parties through ‘agreement on a framework of separate, mutually reinforcing instruments... or ...negotiating a nuclear weapons convention.’

Also commencement of P5 discussion ‘on security issues in the nuclear disarmament process’ within the Military Staff Committee of the UN SC (a novel idea, as these have not been held hitherto) and convening of a Summit on nuclear disarmament by the UN SC.

Other suggestions include ‘freeze (on) their own nuclear weapon capabilities’ and making of ‘their own disarmament commitments’ by ‘non-NPT states’; ‘new efforts to bring the CTBT into force’; greater transparency on nuclear arsenals etc, ‘global taboo ...on the very possession of (WMD)’ – nuclear weapons included herein, presumably, but not mentioned explicitly.

[French President Sarkozy’s response to the UN SG on behalf of the EU:

Smugly papers over the main issue of nuclear disarmament, apart from a clever play on words, by implicitly linking it to “general disarmament” and by invoking ‘an overall political and strategic perspective’ as the guide for action (which is essentially one of non-proliferation — the need ‘to move towards a safer world... (at) the May 2010 NPT Review Conference’, ‘universal ratification of the CTBT’, fissile materials treaty, ‘measures of confidence and transparency’ etc. – with the only mention of ‘elimination’ being in the context of tactical nuclear weapons and short and intermediate range missiles, that too eventually at the end of an (unspecified, indefinite) process, not immediately.]

The sole concession made to cater to the UN SG’s call for nuclear disarmament is ‘...beyond that, mobilisation in all the other areas of disarmament’ – that comes at the end of a list of what are termed as ‘concrete and realistic initiatives’ (as e.g. those listed above).

(b) Berlin Statement (2010 and 2011): Concern over proliferation main spur. Predicated on the NPT as the ‘essential foundation for the achievement of nuclear disarmament’. Makes ‘concrete proposals for action on key elements of the (2010 NPT Review Conference) Action Plan’, in effect overwriting the delicately balanced consensus of that document.

No operative provisions for advancing towards a ‘world without nuclear weapons’ – that is paid only lip service, backtracking from their categorical position of 2010; in fact, the 2011 statement makes no demands of the NWS whatsoever, beyond reporting of their arsenals.

(c) Seven Nation (2005): Concern over proliferation and nuclear terrorism is the main spur again. (Issued after the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference and the 2005 World Summit). Seeks universalisation of the NPT and early EIF of the ‘CTBT’. Weak on operationalisation of the ‘world without nuclear weapons’ ideal and makes no demands of the NWS whatsoever.

(d) New Agenda Coalition (1998): Categorical on the need for total elimination of all nuclear weapons of all states, with a clear cut “road map towards a nuclear-weapon-free world”. Forthright in calling upon ‘the Governments of each of the nuclear weapons states and the three nuclear-weapons-capable states to commit themselves unequivocally’ to that end and ‘agree to start work immediately on the practical steps and negotiations required for its achievement’. Unexceptionable to that extent.

Makes a pointed call, however, on ‘the three nuclear-weapons-capable states’ to ‘reverse the pursuit of their respective nuclear weapons’... *‘in order for nuclear disarmament to proceed’* (emphasis added). Also to ‘adhere to the NPT, and accede to the CTBT without delay or conditions’.

(e) Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) -1997, revised in 2007 by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons and re-circulated in the UN by Costa Rica and Malaysia:

Unexceptionable approach, with comprehensive prohibitions covering all aspects of nuclear weapons related activities so as to ensure their total abolition, as might be expected of a draft Convention of its kind.

However, it carries over the definition of “Nuclear Weapons States” as per the NPT (and of countries like India, Pakistan and Israel (and DPRK) as “nuclear capable states”) — with separate provisions applicable to, or pertaining to, “Nuclear Weapons States” in respect of not only destruction obligations (which would be understandable) but also in its provisions for membership of the Executive Council set up under the Convention and Entry-into-Force.

Makes a 'status' distinction, thereby, between the NPT NWS and later nuclear weapon states. Unexceptionable but for this aspect.

(f) The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons has done a detailed study of the positions of all members of the UN (both their Governments, based on their vote in the UNGA on the Indian resolution and on their statements in the CD and other important gatherings, as well as their publics, based on some public opinion surveys in each country) on the NWC idea, rating them on a four star scale. 54 are rated as four star i.e. 'Very supportive'. 88 'Supportive', 21 'Lukewarm' and 29 as 'Sceptical'. China is in the 3 star category (qualified support), while all the other four NWS are opposed to it, despite overwhelming support amongst each of their public. This last aspect deserves note, for the possible leads it could provide for the contemplated Indian initiative.

(g) 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document — 13 Practical Steps: Often cited (for the unequivocal undertaking by the NWS in it to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, as well as for other related, important, affirmations) but overtaken by the (strengthened) consensus of the 2010 Review Conference (examined in detail in Chapter VIII).

(h) NAM Action Plan of April 2010 (submitted to the 2010 NPT Review Conference):

Clear cut positions on all nuclear disarmament related issues finely chalked out in the course of intense (intra-NAM) negotiations during several NAM Summits. Time tested formulations therefore, beginning with the overall chapeau that: 'the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons'.

Lists a whole series of specific steps to that end. Careful to put in a caveat about sequencing (and prioritisation) of individual steps, declaring them all as 'inextricably inked', obviously in the full knowledge that it can make all the difference. Call for early entry into force of the CTBT, starting with ratification by the "nuclear weapon States" (not NPT defined NWS) should not therefore be problematic.

Calls for ‘an international conference at “the earliest possible date” to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time-frame, including . . . a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (Nuclear Weapons Convention)’.

Several effective collateral measures to reduce dangers in the interim until elimination/abolition.

Makes no distinction between “nuclear weapons states”, as e.g. NPT NWS or others.

Unexceptionable, and clearly the proposal of choice for India.

(i) In addition to these, there are the four UNGA Resolutions on nuclear disarmament (listed in Annexe VIII under Official Proposals) that are tabled, and adopted, every year by an overwhelming majority. An analysis of their operative provisions and preambular paragraphs, taken together, can naturally provide a good picture of the collective thinking of the community of nations, and the inter-play of their approaches to nuclear disarmament and international security issues (and serve as the base for brainstorming on fresh policy initiatives). These are, however, not discussed here because it would be tantamount to carrying coals to Newcastle — the UNGA Resolutions are voted upon every year after the greatest of scrutiny within the MEA, as indeed in other Foreign Offices, so all the intricacies and nuances of these would be well examined and so there may be no merit in their inclusion here.

### **Quasi-official proposals**

(a) Blix Commission (2006): Comprehensive approach, focusing on practical measures for reducing nuclear dangers in its 60 recommendations. References to non-proliferation (NPT) and disarmament obligations are balanced; does not seek to foist the NPT on non-parties.

However, key weakness lies in absence of any operative provision for elimination or prohibition of nuclear weapons, beyond asking all states possessing them to ‘address the issue of their continued possession of such weapons’, ‘commence planning for security without nuclear weapons’ and prepare ‘for the outlawing of nuclear weapons’, which it professes to advocate.

Also calls on India and Pakistan by name, nevertheless, to ratify the CTBT and join ‘those other(s)’ who are implementing a moratorium on production of fissile material for weapons purposes, without demanding the same of China (though, separately, it does seek the same from the five NWS).

(b) Canberra Commission (1996): Very good content, as in the Blix Commission, but does better by not fighting shy of calling for elimination and total abolition of nuclear weapons in unambiguous terms. Unexceptionable.

(c) Tokyo Forum (1998): Formed in the wake of the Indian and Pakistani tests of 1998. Addresses the basic nuclear weapons related issues very well, pragmatically but without losing focus on the complete elimination desideratum.

Forthright (and refreshing) in its approach, reflected *inter alia* in its recommendation that the NWS ‘reaffirm the goal of elimination and take ...concrete steps towards this end’ and call upon each of them to do their bit in parallel, without waiting for each other (and India and Pakistan not to make ‘the phased reduction and elimination ...even harder by building up their nuclear capabilities’).

Quite original in recommending that the CD ‘revise its procedures ...and carry out purposeful work, or suspend its operations’, arguing that, *inter alia*, the consensus rule should be given up.

Forthright in addressing the exclusion of the issue of sub-critical tests – that is rarely done – while urging all (US, Russia, China, India, Pakistan and others by name) to accede to the CTBT in order to bring it into force. Likewise, in respect of the issue of missile defences.

Recommendations include one to ‘stop and reverse proliferation in South Asia’, which is elaborated upon to make several demands on India and Pakistan, including urging them ‘to accede to the NPT as non-NWS’.

(d) Mayors for Peace: Hiroshima-Nagasaki Protocol (2008): Extremely good perspective predicated explicitly on the basic bargain of the NPT Article VI (going to the extent of



‘considering that... the discriminatory nature of the Treaty, wherein NWS parties are exempted from the prohibition on acquisition of nuclear weapons, is incompatible with pursuit in good faith of nuclear disarmament...’ and ‘that full equality before international law must be established by elimination of all nuclear arsenals...’).

Concise and pointed in its operative provisions for complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. Unique in placing all obligations on the NWS first, and only then on ‘other states parties to this Protocol possessing weapons usable fissile material...’.

More forthright and categorical in its operative provisions than most other proposals – ‘earliest possible’ (no later than 2015) ‘safe and secure storage’ of all nuclear weapons and fissile material, followed by negotiations for elimination of all weapons and delivery, launch and command and control systems aimed at a NWC no later than 2020.

(e) Juppé, Norlain, Richard, Rocard: Pour un désarmement nucléaire global (2009): Prompted by fear of proliferation, in the absence of nuclear disarmament, and thrust is accordingly on limited, instrumental use of the latter in the service of the former – weak in its operative provision for abolition of nuclear weapons (no time-bound element).

Makes bold to ask France not to shy away from assuming commitments.

(f) Claes, Dehaene, Michel, Verhofstadt: Towards a nuclear weapon-free world (2010):

Categorical on the basic question of abolition, even though proliferation of nuclear weapons was the main spur: (Like Obama), ‘we also want to make a plea for a world without nuclear weapons... No fundamental argument exists why this option is not feasible within a foreseeable time-frame. This problem... demands a new commitment of all nuclear weapon states... to achieve global zero’.

‘The nuclear weapon states must respect international agreements calling for the elimination of their arsenals, which they have not done to date despite the obligation to disarm contained in the NPT, signed by all formal nuclear weapon states.’

‘Beyond this (reductions in warheads, CTBT, FMCT, No-First Use, Prohibition of use etc), there is a need to begin multilateral negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention. This treaty has to prohibit nuclear weapons, just as chemical and biological weapons are prohibited, and this within a fixed time-frame.’

Despite this very good perspective, it focuses rather narrowly on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe in its operative provisions, possibly because of it was a newspaper article written for Belgian and European audiences.

(g) Nordli, Brundtland, Willoch et al A Nuclear Weapon-Free World (2009):

A forthright piece with a very good overall perspective, which, while lauding the Four Horsemen’s path-breaking revival of the idea of a NFWF, emphasizes that ‘we have to be serious both about the vision (of a NFWF) and about the (concrete) measures (to be taken to that end)... The goal must be a world where not only the weapons, but also the facilities that produce them are eliminated...’

‘The United States and Russia, which together account for more than 90 per cent of the world’s arsenals, must take the first steps. They should reduce their arsenals to a level where the other nuclear weapon states may join in negotiations of global limitations... All types of nuclear weapons - also the tactical ones - must be included in the negotiations. We urge Russia, which has big arsenals of tactical weapons, to accept this... Establishment of missile shields should be avoided, for they stimulate rearmament.’

Written on the eve of the 2010 NPT review Conference, it was a one-off piece of the authors for throwing their weight behind the then burgeoning initiatives. Unexceptionable in its approach but no sustained espousal or advocacy.

**Unofficial proposals**

(a) Article VI Forum, 2011 (Middle Powers Initiative): Fortright and earnest in seeking establishment of a world without nuclear weapons – early ‘enactment of a universal, verifiable, irreversible and enforceable legal ban on nuclear weapons’.

Advocates a ‘comprehensive rather than a piecemeal’ approach with involvement of all, not just states possessing nuclear weapons, and implementation of the UN SG’s proposal through UNGA adoption of a ‘resolution establishing a preparatory process for negotiation of a convention or framework of instruments for the global elimination of nuclear weapons’. (Draft Resolution for consideration of the UNGA prepared.)

Stresses the legal incompatibility of nuclear weapons with (existing) international humanitarian law as an imperative for achievement of a nuclear weapon free world.

All in all, unexceptionable in content. (Not clear, however, which “middle powers”, if any, support it, as claimed by its website.)

(b) Global Zero (2009): Fortright in calling for complete elimination, with emphasis on multilateral negotiations, recognising realistically that ‘ the only way to eliminate the nuclear threat (of proliferation and risks of nuclear terrorism) is to achieve the phased, verified, multilateral elimination of all nuclear weapons – global zero’ . Offers a ‘practical, end to end strategy’ for that purpose in a ‘four phased process for... a legally binding international agreement for eliminating all nuclear weapons’ .

Avoids use of the NPT term “Nuclear Weapon States”, sticking to “nuclear weapon countries” or “nuclear capable countries” (taking their definition as self-evident and suggesting treatment of all states with nuclear weapons or capability on par – including on the question of ‘putting the entire fuel cycle of all countries under international safeguards’ – unlike most other proposals).

Claimed, and considered, by many to be the foremost nuclear disarmament movement for its rapid growth since 2008 and success in innovative communication and reaching out to large sections of public opinion globally.

Good overall perspective.

However, the operational provision for negotiation of a global zero accord (legally binding international agreement) is placed in Phase 3 (2019-23), not upfront (even just to specify that as the objective of the exercise), while those for ‘other nuclear weapons countries’ (i.e. other than US and Russia) — as e.g. to freeze their arsenals and ‘commit to reductions proportionate to those made by the US and Russia or for all nuclear capable countries to ...sign/ratify CTBT’ — come upfront in Phase 1.

(c) Roadmap to Abolition 2009 (Nuclear Age Peace Foundation): A good, simple, four phased Roadmap to abolition of all nuclear weapons, as suggested by its name; the very first two elements of which (in Phase 1) are ‘US commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons’ and ‘US and Russia begin bilateral negotiations on ... elimination of their nuclear arsenals’, followed soon after by initiation of ‘negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Convention’. Subsequent sequencing of operational provisions is also more balanced (and less iniquitous) than other proposals.

Uses the NPT categorisation “Nuclear Weapon States” but only in a descriptive, and not normative, sense – its apportioning of responsibilities and obligations of all “nuclear weapons states” at various stages is (realistically) fair.

The elements ‘Complete the required ratifications of the CTBT so that it enters into force’ and ‘Achieve universal adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards’, however, come in Phase 2, before ‘Global conference... to sign Nuclear Weapons Convention’ in Phase 3.

(d) Getting to Zero (2011): Aims at ‘build(ing) belief in the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and advocacy of the steps required to move in that direction’. Forthright in declaring,

while supporting the US-Russia reductions of their strategic weapons by a third, that ‘a reduction of a third is a good first step; however, we need to abolish nuclear weapons completely’.

Not much information available, however, on specifics of their approach.

(e) The Abolition 2000 (Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons) Founded in 1995, after the NPT Review (and extension) Conference did not bring up the question of abolition of nuclear weapons on its agenda. Hence forthright in calling upon ‘the nuclear weapons states, declared and *de facto*, to take ...steps to achieve nuclear weapons abolition’ and urging ‘parties to the NPT to demand binding commitments by the declared nuclear weapons states to implement’ a series of specific measures as e.g. ‘Initiate immediately and conclude negotiations on a nuclear weapons abolition convention that requires the phased elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework’. (Brings in the idea that ‘when fully implemented, the convention would replace the NPT’.)

Does not hesitate to recognize that ‘this goal cannot be achieved in a non-proliferation regime that authorizes the possession of nuclear weapons by a small group of states. Our common security requires the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Our objective is definite and unconditional abolition of nuclear weapons.’

Also against nuclear energy, as such (i.e. for civilian purposes as well), however.

(f) Pugwash: Possibly the oldest, and most prestigious of all the advocacy groups in terms of its membership and pioneering initial work in fostering dialogue across the ideological divide during the Cold war, the functioning of this group of Nobel laureates and intellectuals seems to have fallen prey to routinisation and co-option by states. Omnibus inclusion of causes and concerns within its purview (perhaps to placate all members), and consequent loss of thrust in its activities.

Thus while the Eleventh (2007-2012) Quinquennium goals begin by listing the nuclear danger in clear terms (Pugwash is strongly committed to the goal of abolishing all nuclear weapons. It

is imperative that Pugwash constantly remind the international community of . . . and . . . propose concrete steps towards their elimination), the rest of the Document is long on description and analysis and short on prescription as to what needs to be done.

Action areas listed range from deeper cuts in nuclear arsenals, de-alerting and effective dismantlement of retired warheads to conventional weapons, small arms and land mines and include also economic deprivation, environmental deterioration, and resource scarcity and unequal access to resources, causes and motivations for terrorism etc.

The organisation's decision making also appears to be in difficulty – the document put out on a January 2010 meeting in Milan on the eve of the 2010 NPT RC covers various nuclear disarmament issues but is described on its website to be the sole 'responsibility' of two of its office bearers (and a Professor from the local host organisation), indicating failure to reach consensus on its contents.

(g) ElBaradei's Five Steps towards Abolishing Nuclear Weapons (2009): This forthright and cogently argued 2009 piece by the then Director General of the IAEA (and eminent lawyer), Dr. ElBaradei, stands out for the categorical statement it makes on the disarmament-non-proliferation linkage: 'the only way to prevent nuclear weapons from spreading and ultimately being used is to abolish them'.

Likewise, on double standards:

' . . . if leading world powers believe their security depends on having weapons that could annihilate our entire planet . . . how can we credibly expect other nations . . . to refrain from seeking the same weapons? . . . States with nuclear weapons . . . in particular, the five NWS party to the (NPT) . . . must show that they are serious about their 40 year old *legal commitment* to scrap all nuclear weapons . . . the division between nuclear weapon "haves" and "have-nots" is not sustainable in the long term' (emphasis added)

10.11. The approaches of the NAM Action Plan, Mayor's for Peace, Canberra Commission, Article VI Forum (Middle Powers Initiative), Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, Roadmap for Abolition Global Zero, Abolition 2000 and International Campaign for Abolition of Nuclear Weapons clearly stand out (in addition to those of leading public figures and former leaders, which are, however, more in the nature of opinion building pieces and not complete proposals as such) and should be the proposals of first choice, after ironing out some aspects, for coalition building for taking things forward. Their organizational strength (and suitability for joint action) and overall political orientation and clout, will, of course, need to be evaluated separately.

10.12. Overall, there is a lot in these proposals and initiatives for disarmament activists in India, as elsewhere, to laud and welcome – especially in the unofficial proposals, a number of which have been prepared by leading professionals with great commitment to realising the ideal of a world without nuclear weapons and are therefore not disingenuous. They are rich in content, in that they take on the various arguments advanced by the powerful security establishments of the NWS in favour of retention of nuclear weapons headlong, and demolish them forcefully. Also, over the years (since presentation of the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan at the UNGA SSOD-III in 1988), scholarly and expert understanding of the inter-connectedness of issues, and of their sequencing, has grown significantly, resulting in more complete and comprehensive proposals having been put forward. Any serious global exercise of drawing up a road map, or Plan of Action, for reviving and activating the nuclear disarmament process would immensely benefit from these works, all labours of love.

10.13. The same cannot unfortunately be said about some of the other proposals, official and quasi-official ones particularly. They suffer from (serious) lacunae or shortcomings in their conceptualization — from the Indian point of view, that rightly seeks embedding of all (professedly nuclear disarmament) steps in an overall context centred on complete elimination, leading to abolition, of all nuclear weapons of all nations in a non-discriminatory and time-bound manner. The faulty conceptualization stems, in most cases, from their acquiescence in the (unstated but inherently hegemonistic) positions of the NWS, reflected in their anxiety to steer clear of the red lines of the latter in the name of 'realism'. That leads them to leave the

question of abolition, or even outlawing, of nuclear weapons, out of their purview. Helpless in getting the NWS to accept restraints and responsibilities not to their liking, they concentrate their passion and proclivity for profiling and publicity on the others instead (viz. the “potential” nuclear weapon states)—i.e. the quintessential “non-proliferation” (or “arms control”) approach, which remains satisfied with reductions (from one absurdly high level to another somewhat less absurd level of arsenals) in the case of the two leading NWS while busily devising more, and better, ways of closing “proliferation risks” as e.g. through the CTBT and multilateralisation of the fuel cycle (unexceptional though these measures might be if appropriately contextualised).

10.14. This is not to argue for India distancing itself from such initiatives, much less for shunning them as unworthy of engagement because of their weaknesses or faulty conceptualisation. Even if there is a single positive aspect in a proposal – and quite clearly there is far more than that in almost every one of them - elementary united front tactics would dictate that it needs to be looked upon as a potential ally by any nation serious about making a difference to the nuclear disarmament process. The positives would need to be encouraged and built upon, while trying to bring around, or at least blunt the edges of, those aspects that do not, in the Indian view, serve the process well through a carefully crafted strategy of engagement with all actors active in the field, no matter what their plank or motives.

10.15. As might be expected, these proposals (have) exert(ed) varying degrees of influence on the (international) decision-making process, depending less on their intrinsic merits and appeal, and more on the political clout and push of their sponsors, timing (historical juncture) etc. In general, none can be said to have proven to be the ‘spark that set the prairie on fire’. This may not be due as much to lack of meritorious content though, it could safely be surmised, as to want of political will and inclination on the part of Governments, especially those of the NWS and their powerful allies, to look seriously at the content of such proposals hitherto, even after the Cold War, unless it suited them. (Individual elements of various proposals and initiatives floated from time to time have, of course, been picked up by the powers that be selectively, now and then – so in that sense they can be said to have served as repositories of ideas occasionally.)



10.16 .That was the fate of the RGAP too — not to receive any serious consideration at all, internationally, despite its conceptual clarity (and comprehensiveness of scope) and, at the same time, pragmatic phased approach cognizant of ground realities (that did not fight shy of imposing, i.e. accepting, obligations on the threshold states like India as well). In retrospect, and with the benefit of hindsight, it can be seen that what was lacking in it was not content but calculation: *realpolitik* levers capable of kick-starting, and driving, a nuclear disarmament process on their own steam or, in fact, even of compelling attention in any official multilateral forum.

[This is where the NPT process comes in, promising (as argued in Chapter VIII) far more efficacious possibilities of galvanising nuclear disarmament than any proposal or initiative on the anvil – official, quasi-official or unofficial, singly or in combination.]

10.17. In sum, therefore, there may be no need for the international community to invest energies in addressing afresh the “what” (needs to be done to get rid of the nuclear menace) question. There is enough material, analysed *ad nauseum* from every conceivable angle, for decision-makers to draw upon whenever they are ready. It is the “how” question — how to get nations, the basic units of international life – the NWS, really — to bite the bullet as it were and (collectively) take the steps necessary for actualising the vision of a nuclear-weapons-free world so elegantly spelt out on many an occasion in many a document – that requires pondering over in a brainstorming, out of the box thinking, mode.

10.18. For it is here that the world has been stuck for at least half a century now, unable to act on the call of the very first Resolution of the UNGA to do away with nuclear weapons *adopted unanimously* and amply re-iterated on many a subsequent occasion – in the Final Document of the First Special Session of the UNGA on Disarmament in 1978, also by consensus amongst all participants, as well as in a number of other documents of lesser occasions.

[This in spite of hopeful signs of movement towards that end in the early sixties, thick in the midst of the Cold War, reflected in the Zorin-McCloy Principles agreed between the USA and

the former Soviet Union in 1961 that included, most notably (for sceptics of the nuclear disarmament ideal in the now hardened security establishments of some NWS), not only ‘elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear ...and other WMD and cessation of their production’ and ‘elimination of all means of delivery of WMD’ but also ‘ a programme... (to) ensure that ...disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems’. These Principles no doubt formed the basis of the call by US President Kennedy in the UNGA in 1963 that ‘the (nuclear) weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us.’]

10.19 .Put differently, one might say that the need is not so much to re-invent the disarmament wheel as to find ways of imparting it momentum.

## CHAPTER XI

### CONSEQUENCES OF A NUCLEAR CONFLICT

OR

### NUCLEAR TERRORIST ATTACK

Nearly a year after the first and only nuclear attack in history that devastated the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Mahatma Gandhi said:

It is being suggested by American friends that the atom bomb will bring in Ahimsa as nothing else can. It is meant that its destructive power will so disgust the world that it will turn away from violence for the time being. This is very like a man glutting himself with dainties to the point of nausea and turning away from it only to return with a redoubled zeal after the effect of nausea is well over. Precisely in the same manner will the world return to violence with renewed zeal after the effect of disgust is worn out.<sup>1</sup>

11.2 It is the task of this part of the report to describe that ‘nausea’. No matter which way one looks at the impact of any nuclear conflict or incident, the results are the same - unacceptable losses. Quantifying and comparing losses would still need to be done, if only to prove how odious they are. The first part of this chapter looks at the consequences of a nuclear conflict and the second at the consequences of a terrorist incident.

#### ***Paucity Of Studies On Consequences Of A Nuclear Attack Or Incident***

11.3 The general consequences of a nuclear attack are well known, but Indian studies that focus on this possibility for the South Asian neighbourhood are hard to come by, at least in open source material. A nuclear attack would have immediate and long-term direct consequences and indirect ones. Direct consequences include the physical impact in the form of heat, blast

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<sup>1</sup> Mahatma Gandhi, *Harijan*, 7 July 1946, as quoted by Mani Shankar Aiyar in “Towards A Nuclear Weapons-Free and Nonviolent World Order”, Manpreet Sethi ed., *Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World* (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2009), p. 19.

and radiation. These in turn have consequences for civil defence. Both aspects are rarely to be found in any study in India. There are also indirect effects, such as climatic consequences, on which there is virtually no study in India.

### *Direct Impact and the Indian Response*

11.4 The history of India's nuclear weapons development has meant that any study the government may have undertaken in this regard remains a secret. One such governmental study is mentioned in George Perkovich's book on "India's Nuclear Bomb".<sup>2</sup> Perkovich claims that Prime Minister V. P. Singh tasked a secret committee on the advice of the scientific adviser to the Defence Minister, V. S. Arunachalam, to determine what India needs to do in response to one. This happened in 1989, Perkovich claims, after the nuclear "crisis" of that year. For the purpose of this chapter the details of that "crisis" are not relevant, but the steps taken following the crisis are. The committee was tasked to ensure the government survives and is able to deliver a retaliatory strike. It has been reported in the press that India has 2 bunkers to protect the union cabinet in the event of a nuclear strike.<sup>3</sup>

11.5 "Established procedures", it was assumed, would deal with the civilian part of the crisis that would ensue. No particular attention was given to handling a civilian crisis from a nuclear attack. "Established procedures" typically dealt with natural disasters and emergencies at nuclear facilities, not a nuclear attack. This may not be surprising, given that India has been a reluctant nuclear weapons power that believes these weapons are never to be used, though it meant that India's civil defence preparedness in the event of a nuclear attack would be very weak. Therefore, till 1989, the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was responsible only for local emergencies at facilities run by it. 18 Emergency Response Centres were primed for this task, but not specifically resulting from a nuclear attack. Its website only listed simple dos and

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<sup>3</sup> [http://www.abc.net.au/asiapacific/news/GoAsiaPacificBNA\\_951354.htm](http://www.abc.net.au/asiapacific/news/GoAsiaPacificBNA_951354.htm) quoted in R Rajaraman, Z Mian, A H Nayyar, Nuclear Civil Defence in South Asia: Is it Feasible? *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol XXXIX, Nos 46 and 47, November 20, 2004, p. 5023.

don'ts in the event of a nuclear accident.<sup>4</sup> The onus of managing the civilian population around nuclear facilities rested with local state administrations.

11.6 There are many city-specific studies of the effect of nuclear attacks in the world. One such example is GLAWARS or the Greater London Area War Risk Study, commissioned by the city of London in the 1980s. It looks at nuclear attacks on the UK of up to 90 megatons, with 10 megatons being used on London. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were in the 10 to 20 kiloton range. In India, one of the earliest books on the subject of nuclear attacks dealt with consequences in an Indo-Pak context, but accounts for only the effects of a nuclear blast in the 20 kiloton range, without considering its other physical repercussions, such as the effects from "heat" and "initial and long-term radiation" etc.<sup>5</sup>

11.7 From an Indian point of view, in the public domain, even 10 years after the 1989 "crisis", only one case study was available on the physical repercussions of a nuclear attack. M. V. Ramana of MIT wrote a paper in 1999, titled, "Bombing Bombay?"<sup>6</sup> Till date, it remains the only such study in open source literature. It estimates the impact of a hypothetical explosion over Mumbai with a bomb in the range of 15 to 150 kilotons. Based on various scientific parameters, and a population census figure of 1991, he concludes:

For a 15 kiloton explosion, the number of deaths would range between 160,000 to 866,000. A 150 kiloton weapon could cause somewhere between 736,000 and 8,660,000 deaths. In addition, there would be several hundreds of thousands of people who would suffer from injuries or burns. Many of them would die without prompt medical aid... These estimates are conservative and there are a number of reasons to expect that the actual numbers would be much higher. Further, these estimates do not include the long-term effects like cancers that would afflict thousands of people in the following years or genetic mutations that would affect future

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<sup>4</sup> Details at <http://www.dae.gov.in/cmweb.htm#top>

<sup>5</sup> General K. Sundarji, *Blind Men of Hindoostan: Indo-Pak Nuclear War* (New Delhi: UBS Publishers, 1993)

<sup>6</sup> *Bombing Bombay?: Effects of Nuclear Weapons and a Case Study of a Hypothetical Explosion*, IPPNW Global Health Watch, Report Number 3, M. V. Ramana, Security Studies Program, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA

generations. . . . The only guarantee that such a tragedy would never occur is complete elimination of nuclear weapons, both from the region and from the world, and the means to manufacture them.<sup>7</sup>

11.8 Given that Ramana uses census figures that are 20 years old, these numbers will only go up in any present-day analysis.

11.9 Another 5 years down the line since Ramana's study, a group of Indian and Pakistani scholars questioned, not surprisingly, whether nuclear civil defence was even feasible in South Asia.<sup>8</sup> While highlighting the many problems that India and Pakistan face as developing economies, they studied the impact of bombs of 10, 20 and 200 kilotons on cities, resulting in 'an inner zone around the nuclear explosion' of 1.5 kms to 3.5 kms radius. The upper limit of 200 kilotons was chosen based on a claim made after India's 1998 tests that one of the tests was of a hydrogen bomb with that yield.

11.10 The article also makes very useful comparisons of civil defence plans that the US, USSR, the UK, Sweden and Switzerland have drawn up. It shows:

. . . none of the major nuclear civil defence measures considered [blast and fallout shelters, evacuation, warnings and public education] and partly put into operation in Europe, the US and the Soviet Union, such as citywide evacuation or the provision of nuclear blast-proof or fallout shelters, are feasible in South Asia. Warning and communication systems such as sirens would have to be greatly improved beyond what is being contemplated in the few tentative announcements we have heard of so far in the subcontinent. . . . it is hard to imagine that the public in Pakistani and Indian cities would respond as civil defence planners might wish.<sup>9</sup>

11.11 The article bleakly concludes:

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<sup>7</sup> *ibid*, p. 39.

<sup>8</sup> See Rajaraman, Mian, Nayyar in footnote number 3.

<sup>9</sup> *ibid*, p. 5025.

Our analysis shows that for people unfortunate enough to be within this inner circle (1.5 to 3.5 kms) and exposed to the full impact of the explosion, there is no defence. The sort of civil defence measures that could possibly have saved them, such as nuclear bomb-proof shelters and evacuation, are simply not feasible in South Asia.<sup>10</sup>

11.12 It would be ‘fortuitous’ if any survive in this inner region. In this inner circle even if we go by the 1991 census figures that Ramana quotes the results are truly horrific. In 1991, Mumbai’s population density per square km was 16,461, Kolkata – 23,733, Bangalore – 21,129, Chennai – 22,077, Hyderabad – 17,168 and Surat – 13,483.<sup>11</sup> In 2008, Delhi’s population was estimated to be 16.96 million, which means an average density of population of 11,436 persons per square km, but if we narrow the estimate to specifics, then as per the 2001 census NE Delhi alone had the highest density of population at 29,397 persons per square km.

11.13 Given this reality, the authors suggest five measures that could be useful in the South Asian context. They are:

- a warning system to alert the population and seek shelter in a nearby building upon receiving such warning,
- emergency radio stations that instruct in shelters and act as radiation monitoring centres,
- stockpiling medical supplies at schools,
- ‘governments at the centre and in each major city must engage directly with their people about what would happen in case of a nuclear attack’, and
- move the discussion beyond the diplomatic, military and strategic circles to engage civil society at large and those involved in civil defence in particular.

Having said that, it is impossible to “test” if civil defence measures anywhere in the world are effective.

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<sup>10</sup> *ibid*

<sup>11</sup> See Ramana in footnote number 6, p. 51.

11.14 A year later, on 23 December 2005, the Parliament passed the Disaster Management Act, creating the National (NDMA) and State Disaster Management Authorities (SDMA), with the PM heading the former and the State Chief Ministers heading the latter. The NDMA is responsible for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) disasters. It also has 8 battalions of a National Disaster Response Force of which 4 handle CBRN cases. These 4 are stationed in NOIDA (covering Delhi), Kolkata, Arakkonam (Tamil Nadu) and Pune.

11.15 Now, in a post-Fukushima-disaster world, the Prime Minister reviewed India's nuclear disaster preparedness on 1 June 2011 in a meeting with the NDMA, where it was decided to go beyond 'design based accident possibilities', install hi-tech dosi-meters to detect radiation in 1000 police stations across 35 cities with a population of over 1 million each, and review the work of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) and the DAE.<sup>12</sup> It was decided to make the AERB an independent body. To ensure this, the AERB, which was created by an executive order, will now get statutory status through an Act to be introduced in the next session of parliament (monsoon, 2011?).<sup>13</sup> The move was necessitated due to the apparent conflict of interest with the AERB reporting to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which department's work it was meant to 'regulate'. 6 more battalions for the NDRF were to be created at the earliest. 4 vehicles with radiation data analysis capabilities and 1 CBRN surveillance vehicle are to be procured. The measures discussed also included a special project on Earthquake Risk Mitigation covering 239 districts across India in Zone IV and V categories. To ensure new earthquake resistant buildings, the NDMA has been tasked to prepare draft guidelines that can link bank finance for building projects, as part of a National Building Code, which the RBI will circulate to banks after it is approved. Similarly, insurance cover for such disasters is being increased through suitable incentives at the individual, regional and national levels. A national level exercise on the pattern of the Federal Emergency Management Agency of the US is to be carried out, initially involving Delhi, Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana and Uttarakhand.

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<sup>12</sup> From [http://ibnlive.in.com/printpage.php?id=155871&section\\_id=3](http://ibnlive.in.com/printpage.php?id=155871&section_id=3) accessed on 3 June 2011.

<sup>13</sup> Interview with Dr. Srikumar Banerjee, Chairman, AEC, by Raj Chengappa, The Sunday Tribune, Chandigarh, 19 June 2011, p. 12.



11.16 All these steps are more in the nature of dealing with nuclear incidents or accidents, rather than a nuclear attack, which requires a different order of preparedness, but they are all important. None of these steps, though, look at communicating and educating the general public regarding nuclear safety.

11.17 Most recently, Brig Anil Chauhan has written a book on *The Aftermath of a Nuclear Attack*, which, while touching upon the civil disaster management aspect, focuses mainly on capacity building required to help the military ‘fight and win in a nuclear scenario’.<sup>14</sup> The book argues that there are only two ways of ensuring security for the country. One is to go the whole hog and develop ICBMs and fusion bombs of several megatons that will wreak unacceptable damage on any adversary. This would, it is claimed, strengthen deterrence. Our present deterrence of mainly fission bombs in the kiloton range may not be adequate, according to the author. Bharat Karnad has argued on similar lines in his book, *Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security*. The other option of ensuring security is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the book argues.

11.18 With this logic, Brig Anil Chauhan delineates the work that the armed forces may have to do in the event of a nuclear attack. Civil defence would require a comprehensive approach to deal with a nuclear crisis, where civilians, the military, scientists, the government and NGOs join hands to deal with the nuclear crisis, he says. While the NDMA now has the responsibility of laying down policies, plans and guidelines for the management of disasters, there are no studies or guidelines available in India that deal with large-scale disaster that will follow a nuclear strike over a densely populated area.

11.19 The DAE maintains a Crisis Management Group (CMG) that visualises 4 types of nuclear emergencies at facilities it operates. Only one of them, an ‘offsite emergency’, concerns the release of radioactivity into the public domain.<sup>15</sup> The area covered is a zone of 16 kms radius around the nuclear facility. The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL)

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<sup>14</sup> Anil Chauhan, *Aftermath of a Nuclear Attack: A Case Study on Post-strike Operations* (Pentagon Press, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), 2010), p. 111.

<sup>15</sup> For details, see [www.dae.gov.in/cmweb.htm](http://www.dae.gov.in/cmweb.htm)

and the local district administrations are tasked to draw up response plans. The DAE also has Emergency Control Rooms (ECRs). There are two in Mumbai that work 24x7. The NDMA is building a network of Emergency Response Centres (ERCs) in cities whose population is over one million, so that there is a basic framework available in most cities to deal with nuclear emergencies.<sup>16</sup>

### Indirect Impact and the Indian Response

11.20 In the absence of any Indian source on the impact of a nuclear war or attack, this part of the report draws heavily from a study published in 2007 on the ‘*Climatic consequences of regional nuclear conflicts*’.<sup>17</sup> The study looks at the response of the climate system to a ‘regional nuclear war between emerging third world nuclear powers using 100 Hiroshima-size bombs on cities in the subtropics.’ The study finds that there is substantial cooling and reduction in precipitation lasting years that will disrupt global food supplies, although the net result is less dramatic than a full nuclear winter envisaged in an all-out war of major nuclear superpowers.

11.21 The policy implications of such climate change are spelt out as follows:

Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totalling little more than one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to global climate anomalies exceeding any changes experienced in recorded history. ... The subsequent end of the arms race and reduction of superpower tensions can be traced back to the world being forced to confront both the direct and indirect consequences of the use of nuclear weapons by the public policy debate in response to nuclear winter theory. The Soviet Union did not end until five years after nuclear warhead numbers began to drop steeply, and the end of the Soviet Union did not alter the slope of the decline. While significant reductions of American and Russian nuclear arsenals

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<sup>16</sup> See footnote number 14, pp. 140 – 164. The book calculates the requirements for civil defence in the event of a nuclear attack.

<sup>17</sup> A. Robock et al., “Climatic consequences of regional nuclear conflicts”, available at [www.atmos-chem-phys.net/7/2003/2007/](http://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/7/2003/2007/) published by Copernicus GmbH on behalf of the European Geosciences Union.

followed, each country still retains enough weapons to produce a nuclear winter. We find that several other countries now possess enough nuclear weapons to not only severely damage themselves and others directly by a regional nuclear war, but also to damage the rest of the world through significant global climate changes... the detailed consequences on agriculture, water supply, global trade, communications, travel, air pollution, and many more potential human impacts need further study. Each of these potential hazards deserves careful analysis by governments advised by a broad section of the scientific community.<sup>18</sup>

11.22 Brig Chauhan too does not look at any long-term indirect impact of a nuclear attack, even though he urges developing counter-force targeting capabilities for India. 'What if', he asks, 'the nuclear threat arises from local warlords, non-state players, satraps operating from semi-liberated areas or rogue and renegade elements of a failing state machinery?' Even if there are threats arising from non-state actors, India or its neighbours can ill afford long-term indirect consequences of a nuclear attack. In the absence of any scientific Indian evaluation available in open source literature, conclusions will have to be drawn using existing studies, such as Robock et al quoted above.

## **Conclusion I**

11.23 The one clear point that emerges from the above discussion is the need for public education on nuclear disasters and incidents, including a nuclear attack, and the need for a scientific Indian evaluation of the long-term, indirect impact of a nuclear attack or war. There is an easy public acceptance of the need to keep nuclear weapons for India's protection, but almost no awareness in the public mind of the specific consequences of a nuclear conflict. In such a scenario, talking publicly of concepts like deterrence or non-proliferation is easy, but difficult to talk of disarmament, especially as the India-US civil nuclear deal has been projected as reflecting India's prestigious status as a *de facto* nuclear weapons power, if not yet a *de jure* one. And given that India's nuclear doctrine is one of absorbing a first nuclear strike, it is necessary to raise public awareness of the consequences of a nuclear attack or incident and all that needs to be done to ensure public safety.

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<sup>18</sup> *ibid*, p. 2010.

11.24 This will automatically have a sobering effect on an unbridled development of nuclear weapons. Pending the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, it will prepare the populace for a possible non-state actor or terrorist led “dirty bomb” scenario.

### **Role of Non-state Actors**

11.25 As opposed to the paucity of Indian literature on what might be the consequences of a nuclear attack or incident, there is a surfeit of it regarding the dangerous possibility of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands, as described in the phrase, ‘non-state actors’. This is a reflection of anomalies in India’s situation. We have a robust nuclear doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons and their safety. We have barely begun to develop civil defence capabilities for nuclear emergencies, not including nuclear war. Yet, we lack our own understanding of any direct or indirect consequences of using such weapons, and nor are we prepared for the consequences of a large-scale nuclear disaster following a nuclear attack. Possessing nuclear weapons as a currency of political power and not for war fighting can be no excuse. It is now essential to keep the public informed of the nuclear dangers and take steps to mitigate them.

#### *Nuclear terrorism or non-state actors? The background*

11.26 “Non-state actors” is one such danger that has caught the public imagination in India, as opposed to a nuclear war in its neighbourhood, thanks to the violent acts of terrorism witnessed in the recent past. The attacks of 26/11 in Mumbai proved to be a turning point in this regard. It is also the first time that the phrase ‘non-state actors’ entered the Indian public lexicon, as Asif Ali Zardari, Pakistan’s president, used it to dismiss any Pakistani government complicity in those attacks.

11.27 In their celebrated 2007 article in *The Wall Street Journal* urging a world free of nuclear weapons, Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, William Perry and Sam Nunn drew attention to the dangers of ‘non-state terrorists’ getting hold of nuclear weaponry.<sup>19</sup> They warned that  
North Korea and Iran

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<sup>19</sup> George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, “A world free of nuclear weapons”, *The Wall Street Journal*, 4 January 2007.

...highlight the fact that the world is now on the precipice of a new and dangerous nuclear era. Most alarmingly, the likelihood that non-state *terrorists* will get their hands on nuclear weaponry is increasing. ... And non-state terrorist groups with nuclear weapons are conceptually outside the bounds of a deterrent strategy and present difficult new security challenges. (emphasis added)

11.28 The Mumbai attacks of 2008 brought home the danger to India with the phrase ‘non-state *actors*’, also reflecting the complexity of the inner workings of the Pakistani state, and therefore, easier for the general public in India to relate to it. Again, in the public domain more attention to this threat came in the form of WikiLeaks claiming to reveal secret US diplomatic cables. These cables suggested that ‘Al-Qaeda has been trying to stockpile “dirty” nuclear explosives and recruit rogue scientists to plot 9/11 like terror attacks in world’s major cities’.<sup>20</sup> Specifically relating the threat to India, the same cables revealed that India’s former National Security Adviser, M. K. Narayanan, had claimed in a meeting with visiting US Senators Russ Feingold and Bob Casey in New Delhi that there are increasing ‘white faces’ in the terrorist camps along the Af-Pak border and attempts by jihadi groups to acquire fissile material to ‘fabricate a crude bomb beyond a dirty bomb’.<sup>21</sup>

11.29 The US, in the run up to the NPT Review Conference of 3 - 28 May 2010 had also organised a separate Nuclear Security Summit in Washington DC on 12 - 13 April 2010. President Obama hosted 40 nations to the Summit ‘to enhance international cooperation to prevent *nuclear terrorism*, an issue which he has identified as the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.’<sup>22</sup> The Summit issued a communiqué and adopted a Work Plan to support it. The Work Plan uses the expression ‘non-state actors’ to describe ‘nuclear terrorism’. With that, the phrase has now entered the official Indian lexicon on nuclear safety. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said at the Summit:

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<sup>20</sup> “Qaida plotting ‘nuclear 9/11’, say Wiki cables”, *Times of India*, 3 February 2011, New Delhi edition, p. 22.

<sup>21</sup> “India warned of white faces in camps before 26/11”, *Times of India*, 4 February 2011, New Delhi edition, p. 11. The meeting is said to have taken place some 5 months before 26/11.

<sup>22</sup> Details available at <http://www.state.gov/nuclearsummit/>. Emphasis added.

The danger of nuclear explosives or fissile material and technical know-how falling into the hands of non-state actors continues to haunt our world. India is deeply concerned about the danger it faces. . . . The primary responsibility for ensuring nuclear security rests at the national level, but the national responsibility must be accompanied by responsible behaviour by States. . . . Clandestine proliferation networks have flourished and led to insecurity for all, including and especially for India. . . . Global non-proliferation, to be successful, should be universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory and linked to the goal of complete nuclear disarmament. We welcome the fact that the world is veering around to our view that the best guarantor of nuclear security is a world free of nuclear weapons.<sup>23</sup>

11.30 Though the Summit explicitly meant to remain ‘focused on the security of nuclear materials, leaving other broad topics such as non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful nuclear energy to different forums’,<sup>24</sup> its Work Plan expressed concern with proliferation issues. India used this opportunity to underline how ‘the dangers of nuclear terrorism make the early elimination of nuclear weapons a matter of even greater urgency’ and reiterated its call to the world community to work towards the realisation of a universal, non-discriminatory and time-bound elimination of nuclear weapons, as spelt out in the RGAP of 1988.<sup>25</sup> Indeed, the PM’s statement at the press conference in Washington DC was even more explicit:

After listening to the world leaders at the Summit, I feel a sense of vindication of India’s position. The intersection of international terrorism and clandestine proliferation affects our security directly. The concerns that we have been expressing for *decades* on the dangers of proliferation and risk of nuclear materials finding their way into the wrong hands are today finding widespread acceptance. (emphasis added)

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<sup>23</sup> Statement of 13 April 2010 available at <http://www.thehindu.com/news/resources/article396372.ece>

<sup>24</sup> See footnote number 22.

<sup>25</sup> See footnote number 23.

When India called for the total elimination of nuclear weapons in the 1950s our voice was not heeded. Today the world is veering around to the vision we had put forward of a world free from nuclear weapons. The world is beginning to see merit in pursuing universal, non-discriminatory and complete nuclear disarmament. We will continue to persevere in our efforts in this direction.<sup>26</sup>

11.31 In other words, the Indian PM was making clear that the world was waking up to a problem that India has been aware of for ‘decades’. Yet, there has been little public awareness of any preparations to deal with those dangers all this while. The NDMA came into being only in 2005, post the experience of the tsunami in India in 2004. And now, not just incidents like the Mumbai attacks of 26/11, but the even more recent developments like the Fukushima disaster in Japan and the attack on PNS Mehran near Karachi on 22 May 2011 have brought home to the Indian public its vulnerability to nuclear disasters, including nuclear accidents and incidents led by non-state actors. A direct consequence has been high decibel protests over India’s plans to import nuclear power plants following its civil nuclear deal with the US of 2008.

*The non-state non sequitur*

11.32 The PNS Mehran attack put the spotlight on the danger of insider collusion in the Pakistani armed forces with terrorists/non-state actors. The possibility was raised in public debates in India after the assassination of Salman Taseer, former Governor of Punjab, on 4 January 2011 in Islamabad. His own security guard had shot him because he disagreed with Taseer’s opposition to Pakistan’s blasphemy laws. It was seen as the death of liberalism in Pakistan, especially as his assassin, Malik Mumtaz Hussain Qadri, hailing from Punjab and reportedly associated with the Barelvi movement, was showered with rose petals as the police tried to bring him to court in Rawalpindi.

11.33 Shortly after the PNS Mehran attack, a Pakistani investigative journalist, Saleem Shahzad was killed. His body showed up in a canal bearing torture wounds in Mandi Bahauddin district

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<sup>26</sup> Available at <http://pmindia.nic.in/speeches.htm> PM statement to press conference in Washington DC, 13 April 2010.

in Pakistan's northeast two days after he was abducted. Leading Pakistani journalists immediately accused the ISI of being responsible. *The New York Times* reported on 4 July 2011 that two senior Obama administration officials believed the ISI had directed the attack on Shahzad.<sup>27</sup> The paper reported that the officials claimed this based on 'reliable and conclusive' new classified intelligence. The motive was that Shahzad had written scathing reports about the infiltration of militants in the country's armed forces. A third senior Obama administration official claimed, 'Every indication is that this was a deliberate, targeted killing...'. The illogic of declaring someone a 'non-state actor' had come a full circle. They were not 'non-state' after all. In this case, although the ISI denied any hand in the death of Shahzad, many believe that his death may have been an accident while being tortured by the ISI.

11.34 The spectre that emerges from the above is the possibility of insiders in the Pakistani armed forces who might collude with terrorists, compromising the security of nuclear materials and even nuclear weaponry. Indeed, rogue insiders could compromise security anywhere in the world, not just in Pakistan. Most analysts in India tend to see a low possibility of non-state actors compromising nuclear security, though none would be willing to rule it out. This underlines the need for improving and constantly reviewing India's security needs vis-à-vis its nuclear materials, apart from addressing proliferation concerns. Keeping the general public informed about the dangers of nuclear incidents or attacks and preparing them for such an eventuality is, therefore, even more urgent than ridding the world of nuclear weapons, as the former is more likely than the latter by any account.

11.35 Two questions emerge from the account given above of the rising dangers of nuclear terrorism. Who are 'non-state actors' and why would they be interested in nuclear terrorism? Quite literally, only a private citizen who is not representing or working for any government can be described as a non-state actor. But isn't that most of the population in the world? The use of this phrase is more misleading, as it suggests that states, therefore, have little responsibility in delivering on nuclear security (and hence the emphasis on state responsibility at the Washington Nuclear Security Summit in 2010). Surely, anyone who uses or threatens to use nuclear weapons or nuclear material is a terrorist? And should that not apply to both state and non-state actors

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<sup>27</sup> Jane Perlez and Eric Schmitt, "Pakistan's Spies Tied to Slaying of Journalist", *New York Times*, 4 July 2011 [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/05/world/asia/05pakistan.html?\\_r=1](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/05/world/asia/05pakistan.html?_r=1)



equally? Rajiv Gandhi called the bluff that somehow states have an overriding security need to profess the possession of nuclear weapons, in his exhortation in 1988:

Deterrence needs an enemy, even if one has to be invented. Nuclear deterrence is the ultimate expression of the philosophy of terrorism holding humanity hostage to the presumed security needs of a few.<sup>28</sup>

11.36 India's leading strategic analyst, the late K. Subrahmanyam noted this when he remarked, 'The basic acceptance of terrorism as the instrumentality of politics is the core of deterrence theology, as Rajiv pointed out two decades ago.'<sup>29</sup> And he continued,

...since other nuclear weapon nations still adhere to the doubtful rationality of nuclear deterrence, therefore, it has become compelling to deter those who subscribe to nuclear deterrence doctrines and resort to them in international relations.<sup>30</sup>

11.37 Analysts have also suggested that nuclear weapons may not be useful for terrorists. Terrorists work for a political cause. The use of nuclear weapons or nuclear material would be against an existing global norm on its non-use. The threat or use of nuclear weapons or material against this taboo, in this sense, would not be able to promote any political goals.<sup>31</sup>

11.38 The global norm of the non-use of nuclear weapons is, therefore, an important step in the direction of eventually ridding the world of nuclear weapons. President Obama recognised its existence and importance in his joint statement with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New Delhi, which declared, 'They support strengthening the six decade-old international norm of non-use of nuclear weapons'.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> See Annexe II for text of Rajiv Gandhi speech at the UNGA, 9 June 1988.

<sup>29</sup> K. Subrahmanyam, "Rajiv Gandhi's Vision of an NWFV in Today's Context", in Manpreet Sethi ed., *Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World* (Knowledge World in association with the Centre for Air Power Studies: New Delhi, 2009), p. 127.

<sup>30</sup> *ibid*, p. 130.

<sup>31</sup> Rajesh Rajagopalan, "Nuclear Weapons and International Terrorism", in Manpreet Sethi ed., *Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World* (Knowledge World in association with the Centre for Air Power Studies: New Delhi, 2009), pp. 37-44.

<sup>32</sup> Joint Statement by President Obama and Prime Minister Singh of India, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, November 08, 2010.

## Conclusion II

11.39 The argument *for* nuclear weapons is predicated on the practical. The argument *against* nuclear weapons is predicated on the moral. The world of today, with the international experience of terrorism, has exposed the flaw in this reasoning. The argument *for* nuclear weapons is predicated on the *immoral*. The argument *against* nuclear weapons is predicated on the *practical*.

11.40 The “moral” voice in international relations today has generally drowned in the cacophony of “practical policies dictated by national interest”, also called “enlightened self-interest”. It is, therefore, worth hearing from the mouths of those who deeply espoused the cause of nuclear weapons, a contrary view, no matter how briefly it may have been held. Kissinger *et al* in their first article in 2007, resurrected the “moral” argument:

Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical measures toward achieving that goal would be, and would be perceived as, a bold initiative consistent with *America’s moral heritage*. The effort could have a profoundly positive impact on the security of future generations. Without the bold vision, the actions will not be perceived as fair or urgent. Without the actions, the vision will not be perceived as realistic or possible.<sup>33</sup> (emphasis added)

11.41 The real contribution of non-state actors is a wake-up call to the world on not so much the dangers of nuclear terrorism, but the need to keep citizens informed and protected, while urgently moving in the direction of ridding the world of nuclear weapons. It is, hence, an inescapable fact that the largest constituency to support nuclear disarmament around the world will come only from the general public, aware and alive to the dangers of nuclear terrorism. This is the fundamental difference between the world of 1988 and the world of 2011.

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<sup>33</sup> See footnote number 19, Shultz *et al*

## **Recommendation**

11.42 Leading states with nuclear weapons have in the past conducted many studies on the consequences of a nuclear conflict on their cities. GLAWARS of the 1980s is one such study cited in this chapter. There has been precious little in addition to this even amongst these leading Nuclear Weapon States. In India, at least in open source material, there's been no study on the consequences of either a nuclear conflict or a terrorist incident in our major cities. Based on Conclusions I and II of this chapter it is, therefore, strongly recommended that a separate Commission be set up to study the consequences of a nuclear conflict or a terrorist attack in India, led by experts in the field, such as Dr. R. Chidambaram and Dr. V. S. Arunachalam, whose report is then widely circulated in public. It is also strongly recommended that the government work closely with civil society elements to build up the country's civil defence preparedness in dealing with the large-scale consequences of a nuclear conflict or nuclear terrorist attack.

## **CHAPTER XII**

### **ROADMAP AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **Towards a Nuclear-Weapons-Free and Nonviolent World Order**

##### **Roadmap**

Using the valuable scaffolding of the RGAP, whose robustness and validity remains despite the passage of time, WP 2006 seeks to scale the mount of disarmament – where NWS have so far been reluctant to go – by peeling away through the first six preliminary steps at the military utility of nuclear weapons to pave the way to the seventh stage of a nuclear weapons convention aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons within a specified time-frame.

12.2 Thus, RGAP 88 and WP 2006, taken together provide a viable political-strategic framework for taking the RGAP ideas further forward in the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This is because the WP 2006 approach confronts, head-on, a key obstacle that still plagues global disarmament initiatives. States which possess nuclear weapons will not give them up until such time as these weapons have been stripped of their military and political utility by setting out a series of six specific steps that would progressively delegitimize and devalue nuclear weapons, RGAP/WP constitute a practical path towards getting all states concerned to seriously get down to negotiating a nuclear weapons convention.

12.3 The Group, therefore, reiterates the imperative of India championing an approach to the elimination of nuclear weapons, anchored in the principle of a time-frame but flexible with regard to the staging of discrete measures of disarmament, as well as the periodicity of time-frame, so as to assist India in working with all concerned, but with all deliberate speed towards the greater goal.

12.4 RGAP is premised on a commitment by all States to the time-bound elimination of nuclear weapons. The process works out through three phases, each of which comprises discrete steps towards disarmament (CTBT, FMCT, PAROS, etc.). However, without

endorsing the time-bound approach, many of the discrete steps within the three phases set out in RGAP have been negotiated or are sought to be negotiated by the international community. Moreover, unlike India, virtually every country that has taken a proactive position in favour of the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons is also a signatory to the NPT and has signed/ratified CTBT. Therefore, constructing a broad coalition in favour of a nuclear-weapons-free world will require a certain nimble-footedness on India's part. To impart such flexibility to carrying forward the RGAP ideas, adapted as in WP 06 to current realities, the following seven-point Roadmap is proposed:

**First**, as a non-NPT SNW, India could reiterate that it is committed to the goal of complete disarmament and to eliminating its own arsenal as part of a universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable global process. Other NWS/SNW should also be encouraged to make a similar undertaking;

**Second**, India could work to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in the security doctrines of the NWS. India already has introduced the idea of a dialogue on nuclear doctrines among all states possessing nuclear weapons with the U.S., France and Britain. Beginning at Track-II and moving towards the official level, India should ensure such a dialogue is held involving the five NWS, as well as SNW, on security doctrines with a view to identifying ways in which the salience of nuclear weapons could be reduced;

**Third**, such a framework could also consider identifying ways of reducing the danger of accidental use of weapons through de-alerting etc;

**The fourth element** involves the negotiation of a global agreement on no-first use. This would necessarily have to involve the NWS/SNW, only two of whom (India and China) currently have an NFU policy, but countries that live under the protection of the American nuclear umbrella (e.g. Japan, Australia, South Korea) would need to be part of the process of discussion, if not negotiation;

**The fifth element**, essentially binding negative security assurances (NSA) in which the NWS undertake never to launch a nuclear attack on States which have renounced nuclear weapons, has wide support within the Nonaligned Movement as well as the New Agenda Coalition (NAC: Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden). India could consider reaching out to key countries in NAM and the NAC in order to push the idea of a treaty incorporating binding negative security assurances;

**Sixth**, Once the NWS have agreed to an NFU and NSA treaty, moving to a Convention banning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and

**Seventh**, eventually a Convention banning their production, stockpiling and possession. Such a Convention would give legal expression to the Article VI NPT disarmament obligations which non-NPT NWS have also undertaken to abide by. Put differently, it is hard to imagine how the NWS could agree to abolish nuclear weapons if they have not first agreed never to use them against one another or against non-nuclear weapon states. At the international level, Costa Rica and Malaysia have already proposed a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (MNWC). In the absence of progress on any of the intermediate elements outlined above, the MNWC has not gathered much traction at the UN, while the UN Secretary-General's 5-Point Proposal has received wide support, it still remains his proposal with no takers among the NWS, in consequence of which the SG, on re-election, has placed disarmament on the top of his agenda for his second term. What India can do, however, is to work closely with all those countries backing the MNWC to ensure that the NWS and SNW take the intermediate elements – NFU, NSA and modifying security doctrines to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons – more seriously, so that we reach WP06 seventh stage of negotiating a Nuclear Weapons Convention that will discuss a world without nuclear weapons in a specified time-frame.

12.5 The seven-point Roadmap outlined above is a general approach. Implementation will require fine-tuning, country-wise and item-wise, as set out in earlier chapters of this Report,

and read with the 7 “general” and 19 “India-specific” considerations set out in Chapter I<sup>1</sup>. For India, as a State with Nuclear Weapons, to resume her traditional championship role in the cause of a world without nuclear weapons, the Roadmap set out here should be examined and implemented in the light of the totality of the Group’s Report and promoted through the 14 Recommendations as set below:

### **Recommendations**

1. **Assume** a high profile role in advocating the basic ideas and goals set out in RGAP 1988, as adapted by WP 2006
2. To this end, bring prominently on to the agenda of India’s **bilateral strategic partnership dialogue** with the two principal NWS issues of nuclear disarmament
3. **Initiate** bilateral dialogues on nuclear disarmament issues with all other NWS and SNW/near-SNW, including Pakistan
4. **Reiterate** as often as is required that India is committed to the goal of complete disarmament and to eliminating its own arsenal as part of a non-discriminatory and verifiable global process. This will reassure all States party to the NPT as well as help set the stage for Article VI reductions and eventual elimination of nuclear arsenals
5. **Promote** in concert with NAM and the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden) the proposal for a treaty incorporating binding negative security assurances
6. **Engage** in dialogue on nuclear doctrines with all States possessing nuclear weapons with a view to securing consensus on reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in the security doctrines of the NWS

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<sup>1</sup>See Chapter I, pp. 5-24.

7. **Seek the restoration** of friendly and cooperative relations with all countries advocating nuclear disarmament, particularly those with whom relations had turned somewhat frosty during the IAEA/NSG negotiations in 2008, and vigorously participate in conferences on disarmament called by them
  
8. **Complement the series of bilateral engagements** with vigorous championship of disarmament issues, based essentially on RGAP 1988, in the Nonaligned Movement which in the era beyond binary blocks, should result in NAM becoming the world's principal forum for articulating the cause of disarmament and for advocating multilateral negotiations to this end, bearing in mind that disarmament was, in fact, the primary focus of the Movement through the first ten NAM Summits – Belgrade 1961 to Belgrade 1989. NAM should be consciously leveraged to build upon its strong advocacy of a world without nuclear weapons at the 2010 NPT RevCon to push for the commencement of negotiations under Article VI of the NPT at the 2014 PrepCom leading to the 2015 RevCon. Without changing India's basic position that it will not accede to the NPT except as a fully-recognised NWS, India should actively participate behind the scenes and from the wings at the 2012 - 2015 NPT-related RevCon preparations and conference, particularly through NAM countries, to keep the focus on the commencement of multilateral negotiations on the elimination of nuclear weapons in keeping with the essential principles and continuing logic of RGAP 1988/WP 2006
  
9. **Raise India's profile** in this regard in the UN General Assembly in political and diplomatic terms and in more technical terms in the First Committee and, when possible, the CD
  
10. **Keep the fires burning** in the Conference on Disarmament to push for "discussions", to set the stage for eventual "negotiations" on universal nuclear disarmament



11. **Actively participate in civil society initiatives** globally to push the disarmament agenda and make available adequate resources to leading Indian civil society organizations to engage with similar campaigns globally
  
12. **Undertake a massive campaign within the country**, perhaps under the aegis of a rejuvenated IFUNA, to alert and sensitise the general populace to the dangers of nuclear conflict brought on by State or non-State actors and thus to mobilize public support for India's return to the arrow-head of the global nuclear disarmament movement, based on the essential principles of RGAP 1988. To this end, the Group urges the establishment of high-level committees to educate the country about the consequences for the people and the economy of nuclear conflict and nuclear terror as well as organise civil defences in the event of such a catastrophe
  
13. **Encourage the Public Diplomacy Division** to engage with national universities and high school students to create public awareness through various public platforms, such as debates in universities, TV, radio, internet and social media, documentaries and movies, on the rationale and desirability of universal nuclear disarmament
  
14. **Strengthen the Disarmament Division of MEA** to meet these new challenges and foster a greater interface with national security think tanks working on relevant issues

12.6 While the Group certainly sees greater potential for universal nuclear disarmament today than there might have been in 1988, it is strongly recommended that irrespective of the state of global interest or disinterest in universal nuclear disarmament, India must continue to pursue its vision of a non-nuclear world since an NFWF would be good for the Planet, good for the region, and good for India's national security.