A Global Undertaking:
Realizing the Disarmament Promise of the NPT

Briefing paper for the Atlanta Consultation III:
Fulfilling the NPT

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Through the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI), eight international non-governmental organizations (the Albert Schweitzer Foundation, Global Security Institute, International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, International Network of Engineers and Scientists, International Peace Bureau, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom) are able to work primarily through “middle power” governments to encourage and educate the nuclear weapons states to take immediate practical steps that reduce nuclear dangers and commence negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons. MPI is guided by an International Steering Committee, chaired by Ambassador Henrik Salander of Sweden.

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This Middle Powers Initiative Briefing Paper was prepared by Dr. John Burroughs, Executive Director of the New York-based Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP). LCNP is the UN office of the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms.

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FOREWORD

As we begin the pivotal year of 2010, the Middle Powers Initiative is pleased to be making its contribution by hosting the Atlanta Consultation III – *Fulfilling the NPT* - at the Carter Center in January, aimed at helping to ensure a positive and forward-looking outcome for the May Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Atlanta Consultation III will continue the tradition of the 2000 and 2005 consultations in working to build common strategies to strengthen and preserve the NPT.

I am glad to be able to present our Briefing Paper for the Consultation: *A Global Undertaking: Realizing the Disarmament Promise of the NPT*. This paper follows directly from our October 2009 paper *Making Good on the Promises: From the Security Council Summit to the 2010 NPT Review*. These two reports combined present an analysis of recent events and offer practical and substantive recommendations for advancing the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda.

I wish to thank Dr. John Burroughs, the Executive Director of the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, for writing this paper.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Ambassador Henrik Salander
Chairman, Middle Powers Initiative
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

From President Barack Obama’s Prague speech to the UN Security Council Summit, 2009 was an extraordinary year of commitments at the highest levels to the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons. This year, 2010, must be the year for action, for setting in motion irreversible processes to achieve that objective. Middle powers must capitalize on the momentum at this spring’s pivotal Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference.

This Middle Powers Initiative (MPI) Briefing Paper is intended to inform the January 2010 Consultation in Atlanta sponsored by MPI and the Carter Center in anticipation of the Review Conference. In this paper, MPI recommends that middle power countries take the following positions in preparing for the Review Conference:

Reducing the Role of Nuclear Weapons

- reaffirm the NPT commitment to a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies as a step toward non-use in any circumstance and the elimination of the weapons;
- oppose counterforce and countervalue doctrines;
- phase out extended nuclear deterrence and strengthen regional cooperative security mechanisms;
- end the deployment of nuclear weapons on foreign territories;
- reaffirm the NPT commitment to strengthen assurances of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states;

The Disarmament Process

- reaffirm the NPT unequivocal undertaking to eliminate nuclear arsenals;
- commend US-Russian negotiations regarding a START replacement treaty and support NPT commitments to further US and Russian reductions and to multilateral reductions leading to elimination;
- call for all states with nuclear weapons to declare the size of their stockpiles and to commit not to increase them;
- reaffirm the NPT commitment to lower the operational status of nuclear forces;
- support an NPT commitment to establish a comprehensive, UN-based accounting system covering size of nuclear arsenals, nuclear weapon delivery systems, fissile material stockpiles, and spending on nuclear forces;
- support an NPT commitment to commence preparatory work, deliberations and negotiations on a convention or framework of instruments for the sustainable, verifiable
and enforceable global elimination of nuclear weapons;

Measures Making the World Safer Now and Establishing Elements of a Nuclear Weapon-Free World

- support early entry-into-force of the Comprehensive nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); oppose conditioning ratifications on deals for entrenching and expanding weapons complexes, retaining the option of designing and manufacturing modified or new-design warheads, and modernizing delivery systems; and call for the closure of all nuclear test sites;
- negotiate for a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) that goes beyond a ban on future production for weapons purposes and safeguards materials not designated for weapons programs;
- support an NPT commitment to initiatives to create a zone free of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the Middle East;
- support the establishment of a nuclear fuel bank, work toward the global multinationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle, and join and support the International Renewable Energy Agency;
- support proposals to improve NPT governance;
- support an NPT commitment to make the Additional Protocol a standard for compliance with non-proliferation obligations.

Part I of this Briefing Paper outlines the matrix of commitments and proposals to be considered at the Review Conference. Part II addresses reducing the role of nuclear weapons with regard to assurances of non-use against non-nuclear weapon states, doctrine, and extended nuclear deterrence and nuclear sharing. Part III examines the disarmament process, including verified reductions; de-alerting; transparency, reporting, and benchmarks; and a legal framework for elimination. Part IV concerns measures making the world safer now and establishing elements of a nuclear weapon-free world: the CTBT; FMCT; nuclear weapon-free zones, the Middle East, and North East Asia; regulation of nuclear fuel production and supply; improved NPT governance; and the Additional Protocol and other non-proliferation and safety measures. MPI’s central contention is that implementation of the steps now on the agenda must visibly and substantively demonstrate the intent to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons.

I. The Matrix of Commitments

1. In his seminal April 5, 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama said: “The existence of thousands of nuclear weapons is the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War. No nuclear war was fought between the United States and the Soviet Union, but generations lived with the knowledge that their world could be erased in a single flash of light.… Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of those weapons have not. In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up. More nations have acquired these weapons. Testing has continued. Black market trade in nuclear secrets and
nuclear materials abound[s]. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold…. [A]s the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act. We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it, we can start it. So today, I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. I’m not naive. This goal will not be reached quickly – perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence. But now we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change. We have to insist, ‘Yes, we can.’”

2. In a less well-known but also important speech in Moscow on July 7, 2009, Mr. Obama said: “The notion that prestige comes from holding [nuclear] weapons, or that we can protect ourselves by picking and choosing which nations can have these weapons, is an illusion. In the short period since the end of the Cold War, we’ve already seen India, Pakistan, and North Korea conduct nuclear tests. Without a fundamental change, do any of us truly believe that the next two decades will not bring about the further spread of these nuclear weapons? That’s why America is committed to stopping nuclear proliferation, and ultimately seeking a world without nuclear weapons. That is consistent with our commitment under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. That is our responsibility as the world’s two leading nuclear powers. And while I know this goal won’t be met soon, pursuing it provides the legal and moral foundation to prevent the proliferation and eventual use of nuclear weapons.”

3. Calls for achievement of a nuclear weapon-free world have continued to pour in from other quarters as well, notably from UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. On September 9, 2009, at the UN/NGO conference in Mexico, “For Peace and Development: Disarm Now!,” he placed his October 2008 five-point proposal for disarmament in a broader context: “There can be no development without peace and no peace without development. Disarmament can provide the means for both. ‘We the peoples’ have the legitimate right to challenge the leaders of the international community by asking these questions: What are you doing to eliminate nuclear weapons? How will you fund your fight against poverty? How will we finance mitigation of, and adaptation to, climate change and the protection of our environment? These are global goods that every government and every individual in the world should strive to achieve together in the spirit of renewed multilateralism…. Disarmament can help lead the way to a renewed multilateralism and that is why I have made it a number one priority.”

4. The historic UN Security Council Summit held September 24, 2009 added momentum to the drive for a nuclear weapon-free world. In their statements, heads of state embraced the objective of elimination of nuclear weapons. Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama of Japan said: “The vision of a world without nuclear weapons proposed by President Obama this April has encouraged and inspired people around the world. It is high time for us to take action.” Resolution 1887 adopted by the Summit reflects the agenda laid out by President Obama in Prague and key NPT commitments. While the resolution contains no innovations on disarmament, it references the NPT disarmament obligation and the 1995 and 2000 NPT conference outcomes; endorses US-Russian negotiations on nuclear arms reductions; calls for bringing the CTBT into force and commencing negotiations on an FMCT; and comprehensively sets forth safety and non-proliferation measures to reduce the risk of a nuclear weapons catastrophe.
5. In a significant development at the fall 2009 session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the United States joined in co-sponsoring Japan’s resolution, “Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons” (A/RES/64/47). It was also supported by Russia and the United Kingdom, and received an overwhelmingly positive vote, with 171 in favor, two opposed (India and the DPRK), and eight abstentions. It thus helps identify current common ground. However, two NPT nuclear weapon states, France and China, abstained. France objected to the omission of any reference to disarmament steps taken by it and the United Kingdom, and opined that the resolution could have better promoted a “concrete approach” to disarmament. China stated that in current circumstances relevant measures endorsed by the resolution are not practical and viable, possibly referring to the call for all nuclear weapon states to undertake reductions and the invitation for them to agree on transparency measures.

6. In preparing for the NPT Review Conference, and in framing the wider agenda for achievement of a nuclear weapon-free world, states can draw on a well-developed set of commitments and proposals, reinforced and further elaborated in 2009. They include: the 1995 NPT Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament; the 2000 NPT Practical Steps for disarmament; draft recommendations of the 2009 NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom); UN General Assembly resolutions – “Renewed Determination,” “New Agenda,” “Nuclear Disarmament” (Non-Aligned Movement), and others; UN Security Council Resolution 1887; the Secretary-General’s five-point proposal for disarmament; reports of the WMD (“Blix”) Commission and the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND); and proposals of civil society groups, campaigns, and initiatives, among them Global Zero, the Nuclear Security Project, and the Middle Powers Initiative and its Article VI Forum launched in the wake of the failed 2005 NPT Review Conference. Through a series of meetings of the Forum, MPI identified seven priorities for the NPT review process: verified reduction of nuclear forces; standing down of nuclear forces (de-alerting); negotiation of a FMCT; bringing the CTBT into force; strengthened negative security assurances; regulation of nuclear fuel production and supply; and improved NPT governance. (See “Towards 2010: Priorities for NPT Consensus,” April 2007.) MPI remains convinced that those measures warrant priority, and they are integrated into the analysis and recommendations of this Briefing Paper.

II. Reducing the Role of Nuclear Weapons

7. In 2000, NPT states parties made a vital commitment to a “diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.” However, in ensuing years, that commitment was honored more in the breach than in the observance, especially by France, Russia, and the United States, each of which enunciated doctrines expanding the role of nuclear weapons. In Prague, President Obama promised to reverse this trend, at least for the United States, saying: “To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same.” The world well understands the importance of doctrines. They imply retention of capabilities, and they assume the alleged security benefits of nuclear weapons and therefore promote proliferation. The “Renewed Determination” resolution includes the commitment to a diminishing role in an operative paragraph. In regard to the reviews of nuclear postures undertaken by the United States and Russia, in revising NATO’s “Strategic Concept,” due to be completed by 2011, and in reasserting, supporting, and developing 2000 commit-
ments at the 2010 Review Conference, middle powers should focus upon guarantees of non-use to non-nuclear weapon states; revision of strategic doctrines; and limiting and ending nuclear “extended deterrence” and nuclear sharing.

A. Negative Security Assurances

8. A foundation for reducing the role of nuclear weapons is the ongoing effectiveness of assurances of non-use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapon NPT states parties made by the NPT nuclear weapon states in 1995. The 1995 NPT Principles and Objectives provide: “[F]urther steps should be considered to assure non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These steps could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.” Non-nuclear weapon states have noticed the failure to take such steps; it is one of the reasons some states assert they are not motivated to take on further non-proliferation obligations absent fulfillment of promises by the nuclear weapon states. The Middle Powers Initiative has identified reinforcement of the assurances, including through a legally binding instrument, as a priority for the NPT review process. UN Security Council Resolution 1887 acknowledges the importance of the matter, affirming that the assurances “strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.” While significant, this provision falls short of “further steps.” The International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament recommends that the 2010 NPT Review Conference agree on the need for NPT nuclear weapon states and other states possessing nuclear weapons to give unequivocal assurances of non-use to all states in compliance with the NPT, supported by a binding Security Council resolution. The ICNND’s other proposals for the Review Conference outcome also deserve close attention.

B. Doctrines

9. The statement of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to the 2009 UNGA First Committee provides a good framework for assessing doctrines on use of nuclear weapons. The statement reads in part: “The ICRC notes that in 1996 the International Court of Justice confirmed that the principles of distinction and proportionality found in international humanitarian law apply to nuclear weapons. In applying these principles to nuclear weapons the Court concluded that ‘the use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the principles and rules of international humanitarian law.’ Given the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons the ICRC, as a humanitarian organization, goes beyond a purely legal analysis. Nuclear weapons are unique in their destructive power, in the unspeakable human suffering they cause, in the impossibility of controlling their effects in space and time, in the risks of escalation and in the threat they pose to the environment, to future generations, indeed, to the survival of humanity. The ICRC appeals to all States to ensure that these weapons are never used again, regardless of their views on the legality of such use.”

10. The policies of nuclear weapon states, and of NATO, should reflect the operating reality, which is the extremely high threshold – reflected in non-use of nuclear weapons since 1945 – for even considering use of nuclear weapons. They should convey that the sole purpose of possessing nuclear weapons pending their elimination is to signal the unacceptability of their use by other states. And they should pave the way for the only lawful and civilized stance: that nuclear weapons will not be used in any circumstance whatever.
11. While embracing these perspectives, many diplomats and many in civil society are reluctant to delve into the details of nuclear postures. This is understandable, due to the awful nature and apparently technical character of the subject matter. Nonetheless, at a minimum, doctrines imply the retention and development of capabilities, and therefore decisively affect prospects for disarmament. Accordingly, it is important to strongly oppose counterforce doctrine, which requires readiness to carry out a comprehensive nuclear attack against an enemy’s nuclear capabilities. The doctrine is a Cold War recipe for nuclear war fighting. It implies maintaining nuclear forces in a quick-launch status, capable of carrying out a preemptive strike, and increases pressures to resort to nuclear weapons in a crisis. In the US-Russian context, it is also perceived by many to require maintenance of large and complex arsenals, both to carry out counterforce attacks and to have usable nuclear weapons that would survive such an attack. In the November/December 2009 *Foreign Affairs*, Keir Lieber and Daryl Press argue that US counterforce capabilities and doctrines are necessary to a credible threat to use nuclear weapons against nuclear-armed regional enemies. That approach assumes and reinforces a future of proliferation and war. Any “countervalue” doctrine projecting second strikes against cities should also be firmly opposed.

C. Extended Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Sharing

12. With regard to the geopolitical underpinnings of nuclear postures, it is essential that US allies communicate that “extended deterrence” is not a justification for an expansive role of nuclear weapons. Alliances do not have to depend on nuclear weapons for deterring aggression; non-nuclear military power is quite robust. Nor should diplomacy, trade incentives or conflict prevention be neglected. Alternative security approaches, like the North East Asia nuclear weapon-free zone long advocated by civil society, have to be developed. Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama’s remarks at the Security Council Summit were promising in this regard. He explained the security benefits that would arise from “the creation of a nuclear weapon-free zone, when coordinated between the five nuclear weapon states – the Permanent Five – and non-nuclear weapon states in the region.” It is also encouraging that Egypt reportedly has rejected the notion of installing extended nuclear deterrence in the Middle East, instead reiterating the need for a regional zone free of weapons of mass destruction. All states now part of nuclear alliances should take steps to reduce and phase out the role of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines.

13. An intermediate step in fulfilling the NPT commitment to a diminishing role in alliance arrangements regarding nuclear weapons would be to affirm that the weapons serve only to signal the unacceptability of use of nuclear weapons by other states. The new Japanese government should insist on that position with the United States, as it seems poised to do. The Democratic Party of Japan has said that a policy of no first use should be discussed with the United States. The Foreign Minister, Katsuya Okada, has expressed support for such a policy. NATO countries also have the obligation to limit the role of nuclear weapons in the revision of NATO’s Strategic Concept, to be adopted at the Lisbon summit in late 2010 or early 2011. In 1998, Germany sought to persuade the United States of the merits of a no first use policy, only to be firmly rebuffed. NATO countries should press the matter again, this time with an administration whose leader has been eloquent on reducing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and seeking their elimination.
14. Finally, it is well past time to end the deployment of US nuclear weapons on the territory of several NATO allies (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey) including both weapons under sole US control and weapons subject to release to those allies for employment in time of war. That arrangement sends the wrong signal to the world by elevating the political value of nuclear weapons, and serves as a terrible precedent for other states possessing nuclear arsenals to consider “sharing” their own nuclear weapons. A promising development is the new German government’s announcement that it will advocate within NATO for the withdrawal of remaining nuclear weapons from Germany and Europe.

15. Also heartening is another in the series of op-eds by former statesmen, this one entitled “Toward a Nuclear Weapon-free World” and published in the Netherlands on November 23, 2009 by Ruud Lubbers (former Prime Minister of the Netherlands), Max van der Stoel (former Minister of Foreign Affairs), Hans van Mierlo (former Minister of Defense and of Foreign Affairs), and Frits Korthals Altes (former Minister of Justice). They wrote: “As a member of NATO, the Netherlands should also make itself clearly heard in the upcoming revision of NATO’s Strategic Concept.... Given the clear indications that the United States takes nuclear disarmament very seriously and that the original objective of deterrence has lost its validity, we need to ensure that neither the United States nor the other NATO allies wait for each other. The Netherlands should play an active role so that the revision of the Strategic Concept will lead to the withdrawal of American nuclear weapons from the territories of non-nuclear weapon states.”

III. The Disarmament Process

A. Verified, Irreversible Reductions Leading to Elimination

16. The “Renewed Determination” resolution highlights the role of the principles of verification, irreversibility, and transparency in the process of reducing and eliminating nuclear arsenals. It is significant that the United States and Russia in supporting the resolution have committed to those principles, which are rooted in the 2000 NPT commitments. In his remarks at the Security Council Summit, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown elaborated on application of the principles, importantly implying that international – not only bilateral - monitoring is necessary. He stated that nuclear weapon states “should commit to making irreversible the steps on disarmament that we have already taken; we should work together to map out the next steps on the road to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Credibility is the key, and the International Atomic Energy Agency already undertakes detailed inspections. We need to be more transparent if we are rapidly and verifiably to reduce nuclear weapons globally.”

17. The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) expired on December 5, 2009. The United States and Russia are presently seeking to agree on a START replacement treaty that would, per the July 2009 Joint Understanding, limit each side to no more than 1675 deployed strategic warheads and between 500 and 1100 strategic delivery vehicles. The Obama administration then hopes to negotiate a much more ambitious agreement that would further reduce strategic warheads, reduce non-strategic warheads, and provide, for the first time, for verification of the dismantlement of withdrawn warheads. The result would be verified limits on the entire nuclear arsenals, not just deployed strategic warheads, of both sides.
18. When US and Russian arsenals are sufficiently reduced, a matter as to which other states with nuclear weapons should be consulted, the stage would be set for multilateral negotiations on reductions. **All states with nuclear weapons should now declare the size of their stockpiles and commit not to increase them.** This would generally build confidence, and facilitate deep US-Russian reductions and commencement of multilateral negotiations.

19. The START replacement agreement now under discussion would not fundamentally alter the nuclear balance of terror between the United States and Russia. The 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty set a ceiling of 2200 strategic deployed warheads; the START replacement would lower the ceiling but not enough to qualitatively change the relationship. Its main virtue would be that it would reinvigorate the process of reduction and ensure continued fulfillment of the verification and monitoring functions once met by START. The stakes – and the obstacles – would be much higher with respect to a subsequent agreement.

20. Observers concur that Russia now attaches great importance to its nuclear forces in view of its degraded security and military posture. Russia is concerned about its security position vis-à-vis the United States and NATO, in light of such factors as US wars waged on its periphery, the color revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, and NATO expansion. In military terms, Russia is concerned about reducing its nuclear arsenal while the United States spends huge sums to maintain a highly sophisticated and effective military, and makes advances in non-nuclear strategic strike systems, engages in research and development regarding strategic anti-missile systems, and holds open the option of deploying space-based strike and interceptor systems. Russia’s statement to the First Committee of the General Assembly on October 15, 2009 made clear that in negotiations after a START replacement is agreed, it will want to address all three types of non-nuclear strategic systems. Russia also may prove resistant regarding non-strategic nuclear arms reductions.

21. Whether the United States would alter its overall strategic posture to facilitate deep bilateral reductions opening the way to multilateral reductions remains to be seen. The Obama administration cancelled plans for deployment of ICBM interceptor systems in Europe, but research and development continues, and the medium-range systems to be deployed instead may one day be given a long-range capability. One adverse sign was the US Senate’s unanimous adoption of a provision on military spending in 2010 that bars expenditures to implement reductions pursuant to a treaty with Russia unless the President certifies that it does not limit US “ballistic missile defense systems, space capabilities, or advanced conventional weapons.”

22. **Middle power countries should commend the United States and Russia for negotiating regarding a START replacement treaty and insist on commitments at the Review Conference to further US and Russian reductions and to multilateral reductions leading to elimination.** US and Russian reductions can be either negotiated or unilateral, and the 2000 NPT commitment to unilateral reductions should be preserved. Negotiations can be derailed by domestic or international developments. It remains the case that the United States and Russia, and other states with nuclear weapons, can and should undertake unilateral reductions, as Jan Lodal and Ivo Daalder recommend in their 2008 *Foreign Affairs* piece, “The Logic of Zero.”

23. Also essential is working for changes in security architecture that will make Russia and the United States comfortable with making truly deep reductions and facilitate multilateral negotia-
Cogent observations are found in the January 9, 2009 International Herald-Tribune op-ed, “Toward a Nuclear-Free World: A German View,” by four former statesmen, Helmut Schmidt (former chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany), Richard von Weizsäcker (former president), Egon Bahr (former minister), and Hans-Dietrich Genscher (former foreign minister). They said: “Barack Obama called in Berlin for Cold War mindsets to be overcome. This ties in with the ideas discussed following the end of the Cold War under the motto, ‘security stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok.’ Gorbachev was unable to realize his vision of a European house; Russian President Dmitri Medvedev has now called for a new pan-European security structure. We recommend giving this opportunity careful consideration. Security and stability for the northern hemisphere can only be achieved through stable and reliable cooperation among America, Russia, Europe and China.”

B. Standing Down Nuclear Forces (De-alerting)

24. The United States and Russia each are currently estimated to have about 1,000 warheads capable of launch within minutes of an order to do so. In Prague, President Obama asserted that “the threat of global nuclear war has gone down,” but in terms of capabilities the threat very much remains. It is also too little remarked that serious tensions, with at least seeming potential for escalation into armed conflict, occasionally arise between the two countries, as in relation to Georgia and the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, and could easily arise in the future. The Cold War-style nuclear relationship must be brought to an end, to reduce ongoing risks and to facilitate disarmament.

25. The “Renewed Determination” resolution calls for “measures to reduce the risk of an accidental or unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons and to also consider further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems ....” In 2007 and 2008 (A/RES/62/36 and A/RES/63/41), a broadly supported resolution sponsored by Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Sweden and Switzerland (joined by Malaysia in 2008) called for “further practical steps to be taken to decrease the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems, with a view to ensuring that all nuclear weapons are removed from high alert status.” The resolution was not offered in 2009 in deference to consideration of the matter in current reviews of nuclear postures.

26. A report released at the First Committee, Reframing Nuclear De-Alert, comprehensively analyzes the question and recommends that de-alerting be brought back into arms control dialogue between the United States and Russia and generally. The report was prepared by the EastWest Institute and supported by Switzerland and New Zealand. At an event launching the report, General (ret.) Eugene Habiger, former Commander in Chief of United States Strategic Command, strongly supported de-alerting, and said that it is feasible from a military point of view; what is required is a political decision.

27. Since its inception, the Middle Powers Initiative has called for de-alerting, and in recent years identified it as one of the priorities for the 2010 NPT review process. De-alerting could be pursued within or in connection with US-Russian nuclear arms reduction negotiations, and also could be a topic for wider consideration by states with nuclear arsenals. Middle powers should press for a renewal of the 2000 commitment to de-alerting at the Review Conference. Consideration should be given to specifying means of implementation, for example formation of an international commission to provide guidance and report on progress.
C. Transparency, Reporting and Benchmarks

28. One of the 2000 Practical Steps provides for “regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI.” In accordance with this provision, NPT nuclear weapon states have provided general statements regarding, e.g., reductions of deployed weapons, and some have also declared their arsenal size and fissile material holdings. However, there is nothing even resembling a comprehensive authoritative international accounting of warhead and fissile material stockpiles, nuclear weapons delivery systems, and spending on nuclear forces. Non-governmental researchers make valiant efforts to fill the gap, but their assessments are mostly estimates based only partly on official information. The need for an authoritative accounting system is obvious: it would provide baselines for evaluating progress in disarmament, and enable the identification of objective benchmarks for progress. Nuclear arms control and disarmament for too long has depended on commitments and intentions, with the exception of US-Russian/Soviet bilateral arms control agreements, which do set objective limits. It is time for benchmarks to be set, as the WMD Commission recognized, and establishing an accounting system is a first step in that direction.

29. In his October 24, 2008 five-point proposal for disarmament, Secretary-General Ban stated: “The nuclear weapon states often circulate descriptions of what they are doing to pursue these goals, yet these accounts seldom reach the public. I invite the nuclear weapon states to send such material to the United Nations Secretariat, and to encourage its wider dissemination. The nuclear powers could also expand the amount of information they publish about the size of their arsenals, stocks of fissile material and specific disarmament achievements. The lack of an authoritative estimate of the total number of nuclear weapons testifies to the need for greater transparency.” Middle power countries should seek a commitment at the Review Conference to establishment of a comprehensive, UN-based accounting system covering size of nuclear arsenals, nuclear weapon delivery systems, fissile material stockpiles, and spending on nuclear forces.

D. Legal Framework for Elimination

30. Fundamentally, only a binding global agreement can firmly establish the obligations not to possess, use, or threaten to use nuclear weapons. Unquestionably, there are major challenges to overcome in developing an institutional system that would reliably provide for verified and enforceable elimination of nuclear warheads and delivery systems and successfully manage nuclear power. It is worth considering reaching agreement, through a framework approach, on the basic norms prior to detailed negotiation of all matters relating to verified elimination and its enforcement.

31. The challenges can in part be addressed through measures on the standard international agenda – the CTBT, FMCT, regulation of nuclear fuel production and supply, etc. - so long as they are negotiated and implemented with the objective of a nuclear weapon-free world in mind. It is also imperative, however, to squarely address the nature of the overall framework; the challenges will not go away just because they are ignored. Moreover, measures now apparently within reach may in fact remain unattainable while a nuclear weapon-free world is not even on the horizon. In that circumstance, they may be perceived as primarily aimed at preserving the ad-
vantage of powerful states and deemed unacceptable. It must be clearly enunciated and intended that the steps are meant to lead to a world free of nuclear weapons, not to maintain an unsustainable two-class nuclear world. That intention is best conveyed by creation of a process expressly devoted to achieving the global elimination of nuclear forces.

32. Every year since 1997, the General Assembly has adopted a resolution calling upon all states immediately to fulfill the disarmament obligation affirmed by the International Court of Justice by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention. In 2009, the resolution (A/RES/64/55) was adopted by a vote of 124 to 31, with 21 abstentions. Ban Ki-moon has also repeatedly lent his authority to this approach, beginning with his October 24, 2008 address, in which he stated that the model convention he has circulated to UN member states is a “good starting point” for negotiations to fulfill Article VI through a convention or framework of instruments.

33. At the Security Council Summit, several heads of states expressed support for a convention prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons globally. While noting that for the time being the NPT “remains the core” of the regime, President Heinz Fischer stated that “Austria supports the idea of a nuclear weapons convention equipped with a sophisticated verification mechanism.” Hu Jintao, President of China, stated that “the international community should develop, at an appropriate time, a viable long-term plan composed of phased actions, including the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.” On behalf of Viet Nam, President Nguyen Minh Triet endorsed the Non-Aligned Movement position paper for the Summit, invoked the continuing “urgent demand of mankind” for “nuclear disarmament leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons,” and called for “early commencement of negotiations on an international nuclear disarmament agreement.” India has also raised its voice, most recently on September 29, 2009, when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reiterated its proposal for negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention.

34. Negotiation of a convention is not only the demand of a large majority of the world’s countries; it is widely supported by civil society. This was illustrated by the NGO declaration, “Disarming for Peace and Development,” adopted at the Mexico City conference, whose second point reads: “Promptly commence negotiations on a convention prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons globally within an agreed, time-bound framework.” The ICNND report reflects and contributes to the mainstreaming of the convention approach. It states: “Work should commence now, supported by interested governments, on further refining and developing the concepts in the model convention now in circulation, with the objective of having a fully-worked through draft available to inform and guide multilateral disarmament negotiations as they gain momentum.” The ICNND does not support the near-term commencement of negotiations, positing that it is premature until further steps are taken to reduce and marginalize nuclear arsenals. However, it should be remembered that over the lengthy period of negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the United States and Russia also bilaterally negotiated concerning their large stockpiles. Negotiation of a convention can proceed in parallel with, and inform and stimulate, negotiation and implementation of other measures.

35. It is true that achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons will likely require complementary arms control and disarmament, notably in relation to space-based systems, anti-
missile systems, and non-nuclear strategic strike systems. However, it is established beyond doubt that nuclear disarmament is not to be held hostage to comprehensive demilitarization or like transformation of the global security landscape. The 2000 unequivocal undertaking to eliminate nuclear arsenals is separate from the commitment to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. The International Court of Justice unanimously concluded that Article VI requires negotiations to be completed on “nuclear disarmament in all its aspects,” not comprehensive disarmament.

36. The call for undertaking a comprehensive approach to nuclear disarmament now reflects a mature understanding of the means to be employed and the challenges to be met. Middle power countries should press for the NPT Review Conference to adopt a commitment to commencement of preparatory work, deliberations and negotiations on a convention or framework of instruments for sustainable, verifiable and enforceable global elimination of nuclear weapons.

IV. Measures Making the World Safer Now and Establishing Elements of a Nuclear Weapon-Free World

37. Credible disarmament requires the verified dismantlement of nuclear warheads and delivery systems and the verified reduction, securing and disposition of stocks of weapons-usable fissile materials. Increasingly attention has turned to those fundamental imperatives, and rightly so. But the importance of related measures must not be denigrated, measures that help prevent horizontal proliferation, vertical proliferation – nuclear arms racing, and, in a nuclear weapon-free world, breakout. Among them are three that the Middle Powers Initiative has identified as priorities: the Comprehensive nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, the Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty, and multilateral regulation of nuclear fuel production and supply. Other matters warranting attention at the NPT Review Conference include, without limitation, nuclear weapon-free zones in the Middle East and North East Asia, improved NPT governance and the Additional Protocol.

A. Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

38. The “Renewed Determination” resolution calls for hold-out states to sign and ratify the CTBT “at the earliest opportunity with a view to its early entry-into-force and universalization.” It is indeed important to bring the CTBT into force. The CTBT inhibits qualitative nuclear arms racing, and is a high barrier to new states acquiring warheads deliverable by missile. But it is also important that the CTBT be made legally effective “without conditions,” as provided by the first of the 13 Practical Steps adopted by the 2000 NPT Review Conference. While the phrase could be interpreted as referring to qualifications directly attached to ratifications transmitted to the treaty depository, more broadly it weighs against ratification packages, implicit or explicit, whose domestic effect is to reinforce and enhance capabilities for long-term maintenance and modernization of nuclear arsenals. Conditioning approval of the CTBT on “modernizing” an arsenal would be contrary to a principal stated objective of the treaty, advancing the process of nuclear disarmament.

39. Unfortunately, strong efforts are underway in the United States to tie ratification of the CTBT to commitments to modified or new-design warheads and new weapons production facilities, and also to modernization of delivery systems. The US Congress has appropriated $32.5 million for work in 2010 on design of non-nuclear components of a “refurbished” nuclear bomb,
the B-61, currently deployed in Europe. Congress has also appropriated $97 million for design of a new facility to produce the plutonium cores of warheads at Los Alamos Laboratory, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility, and $94 million for design of the Uranium Processing Facility at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, which would build secondaries for warheads. Construction is slated to begin this spring of a replacement Kansas City Plant in Missouri for production of non-nuclear components of warheads. The new facilities would provide the capability to build up nuclear forces should that be deemed necessary and to produce modified or new-design warheads.

40. While supporting early entry-into-force of the CTBT, middle power countries should oppose conditioning approval of the CTBT, in the United States and other countries, on deals for entrenching and expanding weapons complexes, retaining the option of designing and manufacturing modified or new-design warheads, and modernizing delivery systems. Building weapons facilities that among other things provide the capability for expanding arsenals runs contrary to the 2000 principle of irreversibility. Modified or new-design warheads, despite denials to the contrary, are likely to add military capabilities to nuclear forces, contrary to the 2000 commitment to a diminishing role of nuclear weapons in security policies. This is currently taking place in the “life-extension” program for the W-76, the main US warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles. A high price was already paid in the United States for the CTBT in the 1990s, in the form of commitments to supercomputing and experimental facilities and to “sub-critical” testing known collectively as “Stockpile Stewardship.” A new anti-disarmament package accompanying CTBT ratification in the United States will surely complicate the already difficult task of obtaining ratifications from India and Pakistan. A far better path would be for the United States, Russia and other states with nuclear arsenals to demonstrate good faith by closing their test sites, as at least France has already done.

41. Additionally, middle power countries should be wary of making a successful NPT Review Conference outcome contingent upon progress in obtaining CTBT ratifications. The timing of US ratification is uncertain, and there are eight other countries that must ratify before the treaty enters into force. Moreover, at least among the NPT nuclear weapon states, the longstanding moratorium on testing holds and appears likely to continue to do so. Further, making CTBT ratification the central sign of fidelity to NPT disarmament commitments plays into the hands of those who seek to extract the maximum anti-disarmament price for its ratification.

B. Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)

42. For the first time since 2004, in 2009 the General Assembly adopted the resolution entitled “Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices” (A/RES/64/29). Adopted without a vote, the Canada-sponsored resolution urges “the Conference on Disarmament to agree early in 2010 on a programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations” on an FMCT. Other expressions of support for FMCT negotiation came from the “Renewed Determination” resolution and Security Council Resolution 1887. The latter calls on the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to negotiate an FMCT “as soon as possible.” It also refers approvingly to the CD’s program of work encompassing three other priority items, discussions not excluding negotiations on assurances of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, prevention of an arms race in outer space, and systematic and progressive efforts leading to elimination of nuclear weapons.
43. In its explanation of vote on the FMCT resolution, Pakistan stated that its support for the resolution is without prejudice to its position that the CD should adopt a holistic approach to its agenda. Pakistan also emphasized that a fissile materials treaty must be a genuine disarmament measure that takes into account its “legitimate security concerns.” Iran stated that the CD should have a balanced program “responsive to the priorities of all member states.” Israel qualified its support with the contention that a fissile materials treaty would not address the “poor track record of compliance” with “existing obligations” in the Middle East.

44. At high levels, governments need to come to grips with the concerns of Pakistan, which is currently producing materials for weapons and building new facilities to produce plutonium for weapons. For its part, India is constructing a fast breeder reactor, to be kept outside safeguards, that will be fueled with reactor-grade plutonium, of which India has a large and growing stockpile, and will produce weapons-grade plutonium. A ban on producing materials for weapons – if coupled with a verified ban on using “civilian” plutonium for weapons – would cap South Asian arsenals at nearly equal levels of up to a few hundred weapons each. As part of the US-India nuclear deal, India committed to “working with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral [FMCT].” This has, however, not yet been put to any test. China is another key player. It seems to remain concerned about the effect of an FMCT capping the size of its arsenal on its overall strategic position, in view of US pursuit of advanced non-nuclear strike systems and missile interceptor systems. The most significant challenge to an FMCT may come from Israel, which appears to view an FMCT as likely to compromise its policy of opacity and to lead to further demands for dismantlement of its arsenal.

45. When negotiations begin, middle power countries should strongly support an FMCT that comprehensively prevents use of existing materials outside military programs for weapons acquisition and that facilitates disarmament. As the International Panel on Fissile Materials has well explained, this requires, inter alia, applying safeguards to all weapons-usable materials, including “civilian” plutonium, materials declared excess to military “needs”, and highly enriched uranium for submarine propulsion; that is, all fissile material that is not in weapons or is not assigned to weapons. To maintain this principle, the panel also recommends that all future arms reductions require the fissile material from withdrawn weapons to be placed under safeguards. An Additional Protocol type inspection regime that enables detection of undeclared activities is also desirable. In addition to increasing confidence that no materials are produced for weapons, this would have the salutary effect of significantly decreasing discrimination between weapon and non-weapon countries. Regrettably, it seems that the Obama administration has decided on taking a narrow approach to the treaty, while calling for a parallel voluntary initiative on transparency, safeguards on existing materials, and placing “excess” materials under safeguards. The scope of the treaty is a matter as to which a concerted effort by middle power countries could have an effect.

C. Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones, the Middle East, and North East Asia

46. The role of regional nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZs) in reinforcing and advancing the denuclearization of much of the planet has been highlighted this year with the entry-into-force of two treaties creating NWFZs in Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba) and in Central Asia (Treaty of Semipalatinsk). A conference of NWFZs will be held in New York just prior to the NPT Review Confer-
ence. The NGO declaration adopted at the Mexico City conference includes ambitious recommendations for the NWFZ meeting to consider: “Consolidate existing nuclear weapon-free zones, promote cooperation between members of such zones, and create new zones, with the goal of achieving, in the near future, a global nuclear weapon-free zone.”

47. In his remarks at the Security Council Summit, Austrian President Fischer said: “Nuclear weapon-free zones contribute significantly to sustainable stability. Regions like the Middle East would benefit from such a regime.” As the WMD Commission explained, initiating steps toward a zone in the Middle East would contribute greatly to a longer-term solution to the peace and security challenge posed by the Israeli arsenal, the Iranian nuclear program, and the initiation or intensification of nuclear programs by other states in the region. One such step recommended by the Commission would be a regional freeze on any reprocessing or enrichment activities.

48. Prospects for a Middle East zone will likely have a direct bearing on the outcome of the NPT Review Conference. The 1995 NPT resolution calling for establishment of a Middle Eastern zone free of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons will again be a focus of attention. The draft recommendations considered at the 2009 NPT PrepCom contain useful elements, among them convening a conference on a Middle East zone and appointing a special coordinator. Middle power countries should make it a top priority to work for agreement on a provision regarding the Middle East at the Review Conference.

49. As noted earlier, the proposal for a North East Asia nuclear weapon-free zone has gained traction with the advent of the new Japanese government. Additionally, support for the proposal will come from a working group composed of parliamentarians from the Republic of Korea and Japan, established in 2009 through the Parliamentarians Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. A regional zone, and the process of creating it, could contribute to the sustainable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The DPRK would relinquish its nuclear arsenal and nuclear weapons capabilities, and receive in return binding assurances against use of nuclear weapons – long a top concern of DPRK leadership. By providing Japan and the Republic of Korea binding assurances against use of nuclear weapons, a zone could also facilitate their lessening or ending reliance on US nuclear weapons for defense.

D. Multilateral Regulation of Nuclear Fuel Production and Supply

50. Security Council Resolution 1887 “[e]ncourages the work of the IAEA on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including assurances of nuclear fuel supply and related measures, as effective means of addressing the expanding need for nuclear fuel and nuclear fuel services and minimizing the risk of proliferation, and urges the IAEA Board of Governors to agree on measures to this end as soon as possible.” In his statement at the Summit, then IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei observed: “I have proposed the establishment of a low enriched uranium bank to assure States a guaranteed supply of nuclear fuel for their reactors to that they might not need their own enrichment or reprocessing capability. A number of complementary proposals have also been made in that regard. Our ultimate goal, however, should be the full multinationalization of the fuel cycle as we move towards nuclear disarmament.” The Middle Powers Initiative has backed Mr. ElBaradei’s position as a priority for a successful NPT review process. However, MPI also recommends that states strive to increase reliance on renewable sources of energy and to this end join and support the International Renewable Energy
Agency. As the International Panel on Fissile Materials observed in its 2009 report: “Even with stringent and equitable new rules to govern nuclear power, its continued operation and certainly any global expansion will impose serious proliferation risks in the transition to nuclear disarmament.”

51. Progress has been slow regarding “multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.” In the IAEA Board of Governors, in 2009 the relatively modest step of establishing a fuel bank has run into considerable skepticism and opposition, despite assurances that it would not preclude countries from acquiring enrichment or reprocessing capabilities, only provide an incentive not to do so. The General Assembly and NPT review proceedings similarly have not provided any guidance, and the recent vague call by the Security Council might not gain support in those more inclusive bodies. This indicates that full success in preventing the spread of nationally-controlled nuclear fuel production capabilities will in the end require movement on internationalizing in some form existing capabilities in states with nuclear arsenals and a few others (currently Brazil, Germany, Iran, Netherlands, and Japan).

E. Improved NPT Governance

52. To promote implementation of both non-proliferation and disarmament obligations, a stronger NPT institutional capability is needed, as Canada, Ireland, and other states have urged. The provisions of the NPT regarding mechanisms for inducing or compelling implementation are weaker than those of conventions on biological and chemical weapons. Administrative support is provided by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, which is under-resourced and has no authority between review proceedings. Impartial, expert compliance assessment is limited in scope with respect to non-proliferation, since the IAEA is charged by its Statute and safeguards agreements only with monitoring nuclear materials to ensure their non-diversion to weapons. Compliance enforcement with respect to non-proliferation is left largely to the Security Council. There are no treaty provisions for compliance assessment or enforcement with respect to disarmament. At a minimum, states parties need to establish a secretariat and a mechanism for holding meetings of state parties to address issues of withdrawal and of compliance with both disarmament and non-proliferation requirements. A further key innovation would be a standing bureau or executive council capable of addressing issues on short notice. These matters should be seriously considered at the Review Conference.

F. The Additional Protocol and Other Non-Proliferation and Safety Measures

53. As President Obama said in his remarks at the Security Council Summit, Resolution 1887 endorses “a global effort to lock down all vulnerable nuclear material within four years,” an Obama administration priority. He added that the United States “will host a summit next April to advance that goal and to help all nations achieve it.” Expanding this effort beyond its primary locus, Russia, will be challenging, but the goal has been set. The “Renewed Determination” resolution similarly but more vaguely “encourages every effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear and radiological material.”

54. Resolution 1887 also calls for all states to ratify the Additional Protocol, which enhances the IAEA’s authority to detect undeclared nuclear activities, and “encourages” supplier states to take a state’s status in this regard into account in making nuclear export decisions. The resolution further highlights the Security Council’s responsibility with respect to withdrawals from the NPT, and urges
supplier states to attach conditions to nuclear exports requiring that in the event of withdrawal from an IAEA safeguards agreement, safeguards would continue to apply to exported nuclear material and equipment and the supplier state would have the right to require their return.

55. It will be difficult for the 2010 NPT Review Conference to approve similar provisions. Many non-nuclear weapon states are resistant to agreeing to what they regard as further and intrusive restrictions on non-military uses of nuclear power, or in some cases on their ability to renounce the NPT obligation of non-acquisition of nuclear weapons, while a discriminatory system remains intact: the application of safeguards in NPT nuclear weapon states is limited, the prevention of further proliferation is in question, and elimination of nuclear weapons is aspirational only. The “Renewed Determination” resolution only encourages efforts to achieve universal adherence to the Additional Protocol, and the draft recommendations considered at the 2009 NPT PrepCom contain no reference to the instrument. Nonetheless, the Middle Powers Initiative recommends in particular that middle power countries work for a commitment to make the Additional Protocol a standard for compliance with non-proliferation obligations. Achieving greater confidence in prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons is good in and of itself, and also creates a better environment for progress on reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. For the same reasons, tightening restrictions on withdrawal from the NPT is desirable.

56. At the Summit, Mr. ElBaradei made observations regarding the role of the IAEA well worth considering in development of the non-proliferation/disarmament regime at the Review Conference and elsewhere. Noting that “our verification mandate is centered on nuclear material,” he said that if “the Agency is to be expected to pursue possible weaponization activities, it must be empowered with the corresponding legal authority.” He also observed that “at the current level of funding, the IAEA will not be able to fulfill its mission in nuclear verification and security.”

Conclusion

57. Since the failed 2005 NPT Review Conference, momentum has been building for revitalizing the non-proliferation regime and setting the course for achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons. It has been generated by middle power states, which in NPT PrepComs, the General Assembly, and elsewhere, have steadfastly upheld NPT objectives and commitments; by the WMD Commission and now the ICNND; by numerous non-governmental groups, campaigns, and initiatives, including MPI’s Article VI Forum; by former statesmen declaring the imperative of reversing the erosion of the non-proliferation regime and, in the post-Cold War era, ending reliance on nuclear weapons for security; and by the new US president and other heads of state. It is now time to act decisively to turn the momentum into accomplishment. At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, middle power countries must seize this once-in-a-generation opportunity not only to envision a world of peace and security without nuclear weapons, but to generate concrete actions to make it a reality.
Through the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI), eight international non-governmental organizations (the Albert Schweitzer Foundation, Global Security Institute, International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, International Network of Engineers and Scientists, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom) work primarily with “middle power” governments to encourage and educate the nuclear weapon states to take immediate practical steps that reduce nuclear dangers, and commence negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons. MPI is guided by an International Steering Committee chaired by Ambassador Henrik Salander of Sweden.

Middle power countries are politically and economically significant, internationally respected countries that have renounced the nuclear arms race, a standing that gives them significant political credibility.

MPI, which started in 1998, is widely regarded in the international arena as a highly effective leader in promoting practical steps toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The work of MPI includes:

a) **Delegations** to educate and influence high-level policy makers such as Foreign, Defense and Prime Ministers, and Presidents. Delegations focus on leaders who have great impact on nuclear weapon policy making, both domestically and internationally. MPI Delegations are planned to coincide with significant political events such as the NPT Review Conferences and their preparatory meetings, NATO and other summits;

b) **Strategy Consultations,** which serve as the “off the record” interventions designed to provide a working environment in which ambassadors, diplomats, experts, and policy makers can come together in an informal setting at pivotal opportunities, in order to complement the ongoing treaty negotiations at various forums such as the United Nations or the European Parliament; and

c) **Publications,** such as Briefing Papers, that examine whether or not the nuclear abolition agenda is progressing and make corresponding recommendations to governments and activists. MPI Briefing Papers serve as intellectual catalysts for the MPI Delegations and MPI Strategy Consultations, and are widely read.

The Global Security Institute, founded by Senator Alan Cranston (1914-2000), has developed an exceptional team that includes former heads of state and government, distinguished diplomats, effective politicians, committed celebrities, religious leaders, Nobel Peace Laureates, and concerned citizens. This team works to achieve incremental steps that enhance security and lead to the global elimination of nuclear weapons. GSI works through four result-oriented program areas that target specific influential constituencies.